Collecting and Analyzing Qualitative Data:

Hermeneutic Principles, Methods, and Case Examples

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Champaign, Illinois
www.sagamorepub.com

314. Patterson, Michael E. ; Williams, Daniel R. *Collecting and analyzing qualitative data : hermeneutic principles, methods, and case examples.* [S.l. : s.n.], 2002: 127 p.

Interior Layout: Kenneth J. O'Brien
Cover Design: Charles L. Peters

ISBN:
Library of Congress Card Catalog Number:

Printed in the United States of America

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Acknowledgments

THE AUTHORS WISH to acknowledge the Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research Institute, which provided funding that made possible both the case study analyses presented in Chapter 5 as well as the general development of the hermeneutic research approach presented in the book. The authors would like to especially acknowledge Alan Watson of the Aldo Leopold Wilderness Research Institute. Ideas presented in this book were initially developed as part of the first author's dissertation in the School of Forestry at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, which was supported in part by the William J. Dann Fellowship. The authors wish to acknowledge the contribution of Julie Ozanne, Associate Professor of Marketing at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, whose course in the philosophy of science was instrumental in making this book possible. Finally, the authors would like to thank the students with whom we have worked in the classroom or on graduate committees for the many hours of challenging questions and informative discussions; you helped shape the nature of this book. The opinions expressed in this book are entirely the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those held by the institutions or individuals whose support and contributions we gratefully acknowledge.

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1
Introduction

OVER THE PAST THREE decades, the use of qualitative research methods has become commonplace in social science as a whole and increasingly represented in tourism and recreation research. In tourism, for example, Markwell and Basche (1998) recently noted the emergence of a pluralistic perspective on science and the growth of research employing qualitative frameworks. Similarly in recreation, a recent analysis of the *Journal of Leisure Research* indicated that 28% of the articles from 1992-1996 employed qualitative approaches, compared to only 1.5% for the period 1978-1982 (Weissinger, Henderson, and Bowling, 1997). At the same time, however, these disciplines have struggled with the ability to define and communicate the underlying philosophy and principles by which qualitative research is conducted or evaluated in a peer-review process. Although the *Journal of Leisure Research* published a special issue on the philosophy science noting that the recreation and leisure literature has been largely uninformed by the philosophy of science and encouraging us to engage in a dialogue on this issue (Sylvester, 1990; Weissenger, 1990), such a discussion has been slow in emerging. In fact, a recent paper in *Leisure Sciences* expressed a qualitative researcher's increasing discomfort with the nature of the qualitative research published in these disciplines (Dupius, 1999). Similarly in tourism, while noting the re-emergence of qualitative approaches in research over the last 20 years, Walle (1997) recently suggested that the discipline needs to draw upon the experience of closely associated social science disciplines, such as consumer behavior and social anthropology, where the contemporary discussions of alternative methodologies are more advanced than those currently found in tourism. Overall then, despite the increased prevalence of research conducted using qualitative approaches in recreation and tourism, discussions of the principles that should guide this research lags behind other social science disciplines. Yet if we are to ensure that the increasing number of qualitative studies achieve the promise of new and different types of insights rather than becomes merely a weak repetition of the types of understandings already realized by more traditional approaches, the underlying philosophy and principles that guide the practice of specific qualitative approaches to science need to be more clearly communicated.

Many factors have contributed to the delay in developing a dialogue on qualitative research in tourism and recreation that is more informed by the philosophy of science, not the least of these are lingering apprehensions about the scientific status of tourism and recreation research (an issue discussed in more depth in Chapter 2). Thus, it is important that qualitative researchers build on a solid base in the philosophy of science. Another related factor retarding the advance of qualitative approaches is the difficulty a reader faces in sorting out a coherent set of principles from the confusing array of literature that is collectively labelled qualitative research or qualitative methods, which is understandable because very different sets of principles and philosophies coexist under these broad labels.

The first tasks facing a book such as this are to define qualitative research, identify the rationale for adopting a qualitative approach to research, and outline the specific system of qualitative research principles being discussed. We use the term qualitative research in reference to the nature of the data that serves as the initial basis for analysis. As a matter of data or observations then, qualitative research can be simply defined as those approaches in which empirical systems are represented by nonnumerical measures. The rationale for using qualitative forms of representation is not because one abhors numbers or finds statistics difficult to understand, but because the phenomenon under consideration requires it (e.g., because the phenomenon is inherently qualitative; because the phenomenon of interest is characterized by a high degree of ambiguity or the need to negotiate the meaning of questions/responses in a way that defies the opportunity for concise operationalization necessary for quantification; because a holistic rather than multivariate understanding is needed; etc.).

The rationales for using qualitative data outlined above reflect a philosophical world view often labelled as interpretivism rather than qualitative research. The use of the term interpretivism rather than qualitative in a discussion of research frequently indicates a shift in focus from the nature of data or methodology to a focus on the underlying research principles and philosophy. However, there are many different interpretive research traditions each reflecting distinct and sometimes incompatible principles. As a consequence, any discussion seeking to provide a tutorial in the application of interpretive research must identify the specific system of research principles being discussed. In this book, we refer to a coherent and internally consistent set of research principles as a paradigm. The specific interpretive paradigm serving as guide for the collection and analysis of qualitative data underlying this book is hermeneutics. The nature of this paradigm is discussed indepth in Chapter 3. For readers seeking an overview of additional interpretive paradigms in social science, we highly recommend Denzin and Lincoln's (2000) *Handbook of Qualitative Methods.*

Even though we emphasize a specific interpretive paradigm, we still think that readers who have interests in other interpretive paradigms will find our discussion of hermeneutics useful for two reasons. First, in our effort to position hermeneutics within a broad model of science, we provide suggestions for how one may go about deciding which methodology is appropriate given the phenomenon under consideration. Second, in developing exemplars of hermeneutic interpretation, we provide what we hope are concrete examples of how one goes about producing, analyzing, and interpreting qualitative texts and discuss issues that have relevance to problems many investigators encounter, regardless of their particular system of interpretivist principles.

We believe it is important for researchers in the fields of tourism and recreation to develop the ability to discuss qualitative research at the level of research philosophy and

principle. However, an unfortunate consequence evident in many discussions reflecting an interpretivist perspective is a failure to discuss methodology for collecting and analyzing data in specific "how to actually do it" detail. Partly this reflects the emergent nature of research design inherent in interpretivist perspectives (i.e., they are not amenable to precise procedural prescriptions and more of the burden for interpretation falls on the investigator). Partly it is a reflection that many of those discussing interpretive approaches tend to focus on ontological issues (nature of reality) rather than methodological issues. The positive aspect of this tendency is the focus on defining the nature of the problem (as opposed to focusing simply on generating an answer through the mechanical application of methods). However, the negative side is the failure to adequately address the issue of "how to do it." To address this concern, Mishler (1990) has advocated the development of "exemplars" or case studies as a means of illustrating possible methodological approaches without establishing rigid, cookbook-like characterizations of methodology.

In this book, we seek to balance the seemingly competing objectives of abstract philosophical foundations on the one hand with concrete procedural guidance on the other. To accomplish this, the book is organized into three sections. The first section (Chapters 2 and 3) presents a discussion of the underlying philosophy and principles that guide the practice of hermeneutics as an approach to science and that differentiate it from other interpretivist paradigms such as grounded theory, naturalistic inquiry, and ethnography. This discussion is structured according to a recent framework from the philosophy of science for analyzing and describing scientific paradigms (cf., Anderson, 1986; Laudan, 1984; Patterson and Williams, 1998). The second section (Chapter 4) provides a more specific discussion of methodology consistent with this paradigm. The third section (Chapter 5) contains a series of case studies or exemplars illustrating the application of this paradigm. Both idiographic (individual level) analyses and nomothetic (across individual) analyses are discussed and illustrated. The concluding chapter (Chapter 6) discusses the types of conceptual and applied research questions in tourism and recreation for which it would be appropriate to adopt an hermeneutic approach.

2
General Principales of Science and Hermeneutics

AS NOTED IN Chapter 1, we believe some of the factors inhibiting a deeper dialogue on interpretive research grounded in the analysis of qualitative data are lingering apprehensions regarding its scientific status. For example, Calder and Tybout (1987:139-140) state that while these approaches can provide "provocative and entertaining reading ... interpretive knowledge must stand apart from science." Therefore, we will begin our discussion by exploring the relationship between science and hermeneutics (the interpretive approach to science presented in this book).

Science can be defined according to its goals, its distinguishing characteristics, its underlying logic, and its principles. As a starting point we offer the following two-part definition. Science is:

(1) a ***rigorous*** and ***systematic*** set of ***empirical*** activities for constructing, representing, and analyzing knowledge about phenomena being studied (Brunner, 1982; Nespor and Barylske, 1991)

that is guided by

(2) a set of ***normative*** philosophical commitments shared by a community of scholars.

The first part of the definition alludes to what we consider to be three of the key defining and universal characteristics of science (Table 2.1). First, at its core, science is ***empirical.*** By this we mean not only that science is based on observation, but also that observation or the data it produces serve as a test of ideas. The use of the word "test" in reference to scientific data frequently is linked to the notion of hypothesis testing (sometimes associated more formally with an approach to science known as falsificationism or the hypothetico-deductive method). However, the logic associated with hypothesis testing

is only one possible type of logic describing the way in which observations can function as a test. For example, Mishler (1990) makes a distinction between inquiry-guided research and research based on hypothesis testing. While both research approaches described by Mishler are empirical, the testing logic linking the observations to the research concepts (i.e., the nature of the empirical test) differs. Therefore, when characterizing science in terms of a test of ideas, we are not referring specifically to hypothesis testing. Instead we are stating the more general idea that, in science, data function in an evidentiary role; researchers confront ideas based on the data produced by observations, and the data provide a basis for supporting, refuting, or justifying a researcher's interpretations.

A "testing logic" is the system of principles that explains the manner in which data function as a test of ideas (e.g., hypothesis testing is a prominent and widely known testing logic). However, there are many testing logics describing the relationship of data to research concepts, and explaining the underlying testing logic is a fundamental aspect of research design (Schrader-Frechette and McCoy, 1994). No one testing logic is universally or unconditionally the most "correct." Choosing the most appropriate logic for empirical tests depends on judgments about the research goals and assumptions about the nature of the phenomenon being studied (issues discussed in depth later in the book). Thus, in our

EMPIRICAL IN NATURE
• Grounded in observation
• Observations function as a test of research concepts
• A testing logic explaining principles linking empirical observations to research concepts is evident
ADEQUACY OF EMPIRICAL TEST IS SUBJECT TO EXTERNAL CRITICISM
• Principles, methods, and data explicitly presented to allow a relatively independent assessment of the warrants for researchers interpretations
• Peer-review possible
RIGOROUS AND SYSTEMATIC NATURE OF OBSERVATION
• Scientific analysis does not entail selective use of data for the purpose of supporting preconceived ideas
• Scientific analysis entails more than a cursory look at preconceived ideas; research is guided by a well-developed theoretical framework, set of research principles, and a detailed and defensible research design

Table 2.1 Three of the Defining and Universal Characteristics of Science.

view, while science does presuppose the notion of an empirical test, the manner or logic by which empirical observations function as a test is a conditional rather than a universal characteristic of science.

Expressing the somewhat relativistic view that multiple testing logics co-exist within the broader realm of science is not the same as stating that all testing logics are equally appropriate, either with respect to science in general or with respect to specific research applications. In fact, a second universal characteristic of science is that the ***adequacy of the empirical test is subject to external criticism*** (Table 2.1). That is, the principles guiding the logic of the empirical test, the underlying research concepts, the methods used, and the data are all presented in such a way that readers are able to make a relatively independent assessment of the warrants or justification for the interpretations and conclusions drawn from the empirical observations. This characteristic makes possible the peer review process that is one of the hallmarks of science.

The final universal characteristic of science discussed here is also linked to the concept of an empirical test; the ***rigorous and systematic nature*** of scientific research (Table 2.1). This characteristic may seem at first to border on being a meaningless platitude. However we raise it to distinguish science from "anti-science." Anti-science has been defined as the selective use of data to support a predetermined world view or political agenda (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1996). Raising this issue is particularly appropriate in a discussion of interpretive research because some of its contemporary critics characterize interpretive re-



Figure 2.1: Three Domain Model of the Scientific Process Showing the General Systematic Process Common to all Approaches to Science (adapted from Brinberg and Hirschman, 1986).

search as an effort to show how a conceptualization may fit the data in a way that includes selective use of data with "no pretense of searching for refuting evidence or competing explanations for the same data" (Calder and Tybout, 1987:139). We would agree that this type of process is not scientific (it is not rigorous, systematic, or an adequate empirical test), but disagree that this is a legitimate characterization of interpretivist research.

As with the issue of an empirical test discussed above, it is not possible to offer a detailed, specific, all-encompassing definition of what it means to be rigorous and systematic. However, it is possible to present a model of the research process at a general level that maps out the systematic processes common to all science (Figure 2.1). A more detailed discussion of the nature of these processes can be found in Brinberg and McGrath (1985) and Brinberg and Hirshman (1986).

Overall, the first part of the definition of science presented above alludes to three defining and universal characteristics which, taken collectively, are necessary criteria for establishing the scientific status of research. However, while these are necessary criteria, they are not sufficient. When evaluating the scientific status of research, one must also consider the second part of the definition of science presented above. The key concept in the second part of the definition of science is "***normative philosophical commitments***." The term normative is used in its sociological sense and refers to standards or rules for behavior, in this case with regard to the practice of science. That is, when researchers practice science in a particular way, they are "buying into" something; specifically a set of normative philosophical commitments. At first glance this appears to imply another universal characteristic of science, but instead we intend this portion of the definition to communicate the idea that within science many different normative approaches legitimately coexist. Thus it refers to the variation within science rather than to universal characteristics.

Much of the recent work in the philosophy of science has focused on more appropriate ways of characterizing and making explicit the normative philosophical commitments scientists "buy into." In fact, it is with respect to this issue that Thomas Kuhn made one of his most significant contributions, defining the appropriate unit of analysis for studying different scientific research traditions as the macrostructure (Anderson, 1986). A concept much broader than methodology, the macrostructure of science refers to the normative philosophical commitments accepted (implicitly or explicitly) in a research tradition without direct empirical support (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988). These normative commitments guide the practice of science (e.g., define what is knowable, prescribe how methodology is applied, establish criteria used in peer review processes, etc.) within a community of scholars who utilize a specific scientific research tradition. Patterson and Williams (1998) present a framework for characterizing the macrostructure of an approach to science. According to this framework, the macrostructure is comprised of three levels: world views (where the focus is on broad philosophical discussions concerning the nature of science and the concept of validity); paradigms (discussions concerning the normative philosophical commitments underlying specific approaches to science such as naturalistic inquiry, symbolic interactionism, or behaviorism), and research programs (empirically centered discussions concerning theory and the specific methods of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data). Hermeneutics, the focus of this book, represents a scientific paradigm. The purpose of this book is to present hermeneutics as a paradigm and to illustrate the types of research problems for which a hermeneutic paradigm would be appropriate.

The basis for discussing and evaluating research traditions at the paradigmatic level is Laudan's (1984) Reticulated Model of Scientific Rationality (Figure 2.2). According to



Figure 2.2: Framework for Characterizing Scientific Paradigms, Adapted from Laudan (1984).

Laudan's model, every scientific paradigm (e.g., behaviorism, the information-processing paradigm within cognitive psychology, grounded theory, naturalistic inquiry, semiotics, hermeneutics, etc.) is comprised of three core types of normative commitments: ontology (assumptions about the nature of reality, human nature, and the nature of human experience), epistemology (assumptions concerning the methods, limits, and nature of human knowledge), and axiology (the goals of science). Further, unlike Paul Feyerabend's statement that "anything goes," Laudan suggests that the merits of a paradigm can be judged based on the internal consistency of these sets of normative commitments and on the attainability of its goals (Anderson, 1986). Thus, characterizing a paradigm on the basis of these three types of normative commitments not only provides a basis for understanding the paradigm but also provides a basis for evaluating its merits. Several papers in the field of consumer research serve as exemplars of how the logic of Laudan's model can be used as the basis for characterizing and critiquing different scientific paradigms (Anderson, 1986; Holt, 1991; Larsen and Wright, 1993; Murray and Ozanne, 1991).

In summary, we will close this chapter by returning to the issue that served as the starting point for discussion: the relationship between science and hermeneutics. Science refers to empirical approaches to generating knowledge that exhibit certain principles, several of which are discussed above and outlined in Table 2.1. Hermeneutics is one of many specific approaches to science (paradigms) that conforms to the universal principles of science but at the same time reflects a set of internally consistent normative commitments that, as a whole, differ from other approaches to science (e.g., falsificationism, naturalistic inquiry, grounded theory, etc.). Chapter 3 discusses the normative commitments (the logic or system of principles and reasoning) that underlie and guide the practice of hermeneutic research. Chapter 4 is a more specific discussion of methods consistent with this paradigm. Chapter 5 includes a series of case studies or exemplars that serve both a tutorial and illustrative role regarding the application of hermeneutics to significant phenomena in tourism and recreation research. Chapter 6 explores research questions for which an hermeneutic approach is suited.

3
Hermeneutic Paradigm

HERMENEUTIC RESEARCH TRADITIONS

IN ITS BROADEST sense, hermeneutics refers to a family of interpretive approaches to science rather than a single, wholly unified scientific philosophy. Hermeneutics originated during the 17th century as an approach for interpreting biblical texts (Gergen, Hepburn, and Fisher, 1986). During the late 19th century, the domain of hermeneutic inquiry was expanded to include the study of human behavior when philosophers like Wilhelm Dilthey suggested that understanding humans "was more like interpreting texts than like gaining empirical knowledge of nature" (Olson, 1986:160). Dilthey's proposition reflects the over-arching theme or question that different hermeneutic research traditions share in common: Is the nature of interpretation associated with hermeneutic disciplines (literary criticism, jurisprudence, history, psychology, etc.) fundamentally different in nature than interpretation traditionally associated with the natural sciences (Connolly and Keutner, 1988:1). Since the emergence of hermeneutics in the social science realm, several distinct hermeneutic research traditions have developed, although there is overlap among the normative commitments of the hermeneutic traditions (Arnould and Fischer, 1994; Nicholson, 1984; Russell, 1988). Four commonly recognized philosophical orientations in hermeneutics are outlined below.

The first research tradition, hermeneutic divination, is associated with the philosopher Friedreich Schleiermacher. The distinguishing characteristic of this hermeneutic research tradition is the belief that the correct interpretation of a text is achieved by "divining" the author's "original seed of thought ... [and] how it was executed" (Nicholson, 1984:26).

A second hermeneutic research tradition has been referred to as hermeneutic reenactment or reproductive hermeneutics (Nicholson, 1984; Stewart 1983). Its origins are associated with Dilthey. A distinctive feature of this research tradition is the emphasis on interpretation through an empathetic process. Empathetic understanding is obtained through bracketing (setting aside, suspending) preconceptions, putting oneself in another's place, and imaginatively reliving the actual and possible experiences of others (Russell, 1988;

Stewart, 1983; Wertz, 1983). At the paradigmatic level of science, this version of hermeneutics is closely related to existential phenomenology (cf., Polkinghorne, 1983).

A third hermeneutic research tradition has been referred to as hermeneutic reconstructionism or critical hermeneutics and is associated with Karl-Otto Apel and Jurgen Habermas (Arnould and Fischer, 1994; Nicholson, 1984; Russell 1988). One of the distinctive features of this branch of hermeneutics is the belief in the existence of a "false consciousness" that systematically distorts our understanding of human experience (Arnould and Fischer, 1994). Adherents to hermeneutic reconstructionism suggest that science must develop theory and techniques sensitive to social and authoritarian (power) structures in order to understand human action (Arnould and Fischer, 1994; Nicholson 1984).

The final hermeneutic research tradition has been referred to as productive or projective hermeneutics. These labels serve primarily to distinguish this hermeneutic tradition from hermeneutic reenactment (the second hermeneutic research tradition discussed above). As indicated above, hermeneutic reenactment seeks knowledge through "reproducing" the original actor's meaning or experience (Stewart, 1983). This reflects a point of view referred to as hermeneutic objectivism because it assumes texts have a unique meaning that can, in principle, be determined by the reader (Connolly and Keutner, 1988:16). In contrast, productive hermeneutics maintains that researchers cannot "bracket" their preconceptions, nor can they truly empathize with another's experience. Instead, they maintain that an "utterly innocent" reading of text is impossible, and that the interpreter plays an active role in creating the interpretation (Nicholson, 1984:29). In essence, the interpreter or researcher helps "produce" meaning in the process of analysis. Thus, rather than reflecting an objectivist perspective, this hermeneutic tradition reflects a constructivist viewpoint that an interpretation of a text "is not simply *there* waiting to be discovered, [but] is constructed in the process of reading" (Connolly and Keutner, 1988:17). As an applied scientific paradigm, productive hermeneutics is associated most closely with the philosophies of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and Martin Heidegger. The hermeneutic research tradition presented in this book is productive hermeneutics. Unless otherwise noted, when used below, the term "hermeneutics" refers to this specific hermeneutic research tradition.

NORMATIVE PHILOSOPHICAL COMMITMENTS

This section explains the normative commitments underlying hermeneutics as an approach to science. Normative commitments are the underlying principles and philosophy that guide the practice of a specific approach to science (see part 2 of the definition of science presented in Chapter 2). As noted previously (Figure 2.1), Laudan (1984) proposed that scientific paradigms can be understood and explained on the basis of three core normative philosophical commitments: ontology, axiology, and epistemology. As with any scientific paradigm, these three classes of normative commitments form the basis for the logic or system of principles that guide the conduct of an hermeneutic study.

Documenting the normative commitments of hermeneutics at the paradigmatic level is complicated by the diversity and differences among the central philosophers and the interpretations of their philosophy by practitioners. For example, Hekman (1984) and Polkinghorne (1983) point to important differences in the philosophy of Gadamer and Ricoeur, both prominent philosophers associated with this hermeneutic research tradition. Also, Heidegger is often associated, not with productive hermeneutics, but with existential phenomenology and hermeneutic reenactment (cf., Polkinghorne, 1983). Because the fo-

cus of this book is on the application of hermeneutics to issues relevant to tourism and recreation research, rather than focusing on philosophy per se, the discussion of normative commitments presented below reflects the interpretation and integration of ideas of the major philosophers by the community of theorists and practitioners who have sought to apply hermeneutics to social and psychological phenomena. More specifically, the normative commitments presented in this book reflect an approach to science consistent with the work of Terwee (1990), Packer and colleagues (Packer, 1985; Packer, 1988; Packer and Addison, 1989), and the current authors (Patterson et al., 1998) who have attempted to move hermeneutics from the realm of philosophy into the realm of actual scientific practice. At a broader level, this presentation of hermeneutics also is informed by Bernstein's (1986), Hekman's (1984), Nicholson's (1984), Polkinghorne's (1983), and Wachterhauser's (1986) interpretations of the philosophies of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur.

1.)	Nature of Reality
	Objectivist Ontologies - maintain the existence of a single, free-standing reality waiting to be discovered (Howard, 1991). The basic "unit of analysis" is information which is seen largely as being an inherent quality of an object.
	Constructivist Ontologies - maintain humans actively construct reality, knowledge, and identities (Howard, 1991; Nespor and Barylske, 1991). The basic "unit of analysis" is conceived of as meaning which is seen as being as much a quality of the perceiver as the of the object.
2.)	Nature of Human Experience
	Deterministic Ontologies - philosophies that view psychological functioning (e.g., satisfaction, aesthetic response, and behavior) as outcome variables dependent on or caused by isolatable environmental and personal variables (Anderson, 1986; Hudson and Ozanne, 1988).
	Narrative Ontologies - philosophies that assert human experience is more like an emergent narrative than an outcome predictable on the basis of isolatable antecedent environmental and personal variables (Arnould and Price, 1993).
3.)	Human Nature
	Information-based Models of Human Nature - those models of human behavior that treat individuals as rational, analytic, goal-driven information processors.
	Meaning-based Models of Human Nature - those models of human behavior which portray individuals as actively engaged in the construction of meaning as opposed to processing information that exists in the environment (Mick and Buhl, 1992).

Table 3.1: Examples of Different Contrasting Ontological Commitments.

Ontological Commitments

Ontological commitments deal with issues such as the nature of reality, human nature, and the nature of human experience. In other words they reflect a stance on the nature of the phenomena being studied. Examples of somewhat contrasting ontological commitments are presented in Table 3.1. Broadly speaking, hermeneutic ontology reflects the principles of the constructivist, narrative, and meaning-based ontologies outlined in Table 3.1. A detailed discussion of the ontological commitments specific to hermeneutics is presented below. While this discussion may at first appear to deal with esoteric philosophy far removed from the practice of science, assumptions about reality and the nature of human experience play a fundamental (though often unexamined) role in shaping the conduct of scientific research. Therefore, an understanding of a paradigm's ontological commitments *and their implications for research* is an essential first step in conducting research using the principles of that paradigm.

Nature of Reality

Rather than viewing the world as being comprised of a single, objective reality (as in biology) hermeneutic philosophy maintains that there are multiple realities that vary across time, cultures, and individuals. This position is adopted because, rather than defining its subject matter in terms of a true, physical universe that exists independently of human experience, hermeneutics conceives of its subject matter as systems of meaning that reflect how individuals experience and construct the world. Meaning, from a hermeneutic perspective, is not defined in terms of a timeless, immanent property of objects (as in taxonomic categories). Rather, the question "what it 'means' ... becomes what it means in the context in which it occurred" (Hekman 1984:346).

A great fear among (or perhaps a major criticism) by critics of interpretive research is that the ontological perspective outlined above leads down a path to absolute relativism. Certainly, within the realm of scientific philosophy, there are absolute relativists. Consider for example, Harry Collins, whose sociological analyses of controversy in science led him to conclude that "the natural world in no way constrains what it is believed to be" (Laudan, 1984:21). However, relativism to that extreme a degree is not consistent with hermeneutic ontology. This is illustrated by the hermeneutic view of human consciousness. According to this perspective, the world as experienced is not solely a construction of an individual's mental processes nor merely a reflection of the external world (Polkinghorne, 1989; Valle, King, and Halling, 1989). Instead, it is seen as being co-constituted by the individual and the world (Moss and Keen, 1981; Polkinghorne, 1983:205; Valle et al., 1989). In other words, in contrast to the extreme relativism, hermeneutic ontology maintains that structure exists in the world and recognizes the constitutive role it plays in human experience.

Co-constitution, as used in hermeneutics, should not be confused with the dualistic notion of interaction between a subject (the individual) and an object (the environment). Instead, the term co-constitution refers to a mutually defining inter-relationship (Valle et al., 1989). Thus, consciousness is not regarded as an internal, mental object. Instead it is seen as an activity through which phenomena reveal themselves (Polkinghorne, 1989; Valle et al., 1989). Consciousness, then, is comprised of activity from two sources, the individual orienting itself to the world and the world revealing itself to the individual (Moss and Keen, 1981). The essence of this active, mutually defined consciousness is expressed by the concept of intentionality (Wertz, 1989). This concept refers to the fact that consciousness always has an object. In other words, consciousness is always consciousness of something (Valle et al., 1989; von Eckartsberg, 1981; Wertz, 1989). As Moss (1981:155) states:

> "Intentionality signifies that: (a) the organism is oriented toward its situation, (b) the situation organizes the organism's awareness and behavior, and (c) the organism's behavior and awareness in turn organize the situation."

As a consequence, the ontological commitments of hermeneutics are not those of absolute relativism. Hermeneutic philosophy maintains there is structure in the environment. At the same time, this paradigm recognizes that individuals may experience this structure differently. As a result, multiple realities may exist because different individuals or cultures have come to assign different meaning to structure in the environment. In fact, beyond simply assigning meaning, humans are viewed as actively constructing meaning. An illustration of differences from a cultural standpoint is the elaborate vocabulary Eskimos have for describing minute differences in ice and snow characteristics, some of which have no equivalent in the English language (Moran, 1981:8; Nelson, 1969:398). Nash's (1982) discussion of wilderness and the American mind illustrates how reality and meaning can change across time. Phillips' (1994) discussion of naming as a means of constructing social biographies or Sack's (1992) discussion of place represent examples of how humans construct reality.

The views regarding consciousness and "systems of meanings" that underlie hermeneutics also differ from the perspective underlying the information processing (goal-directed) paradigm that has dominated much of psychology and consequently tourism and recreation research (cf., Malm, 1993; Williams and Patterson, 1996). The information-processing paradigm locates consciousness within the individual and treats it like an object that can be described in terms of computer-like syntax or cognitive processes, personality traits, attitudes, behavioral intentions, or even biochemical events (Anderson, 1986; Malm, 1993; Packer and Addison, 1989). From this perspective, reality is seen as being composed of complex wholes that can be decomposed into independent units of basic information that can be described by multivariate models, the elements of which can be studied together or separately (e.g., the Theory of Reasoned Action [Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980]). Rather than seeing reality in terms of a multivariate system of discrete elements (variables), hermeneutics envisions phenomena as holistic units. As with gestalt psychology, the whole is seen as more than the sum of the parts. This perspective has been illustrated by using a baseball analogy:

> "understanding the game requires that instead of focusing on elements or attributes taken out of context, for example, one player's skill or the speed of the pitched ball, one must study the game as a behavior setting ... in which patterns of behavior become understandable only when viewed in the context of places, things, and times that constitute the whole setting" (Altman and Rogoff, 1987:29).

As with Hirschman's (1986) humanistic perspective, from a hermeneutic viewpoint, phenomena are described in terms of themes, patterns of relationship, flow of events, and context. The term "theme" as used here refers to "features of a system that may be focused on separately, but that require consideration of other features of a system for their definition and for an understanding of their functioning" (Altman and Rogoff, 1987:37).

Within hermeneutics, the concept of contextualism is closely related to the holistic view of reality. Similar to humanistic psychology, hermeneutics maintains that to reduce a phenomenon to its "basic" elements or to remove the elements from the larger context is

to eliminate much of what is meaningful about the phenomenon (Malm, 1993). This view of reality is evident in hermeneutics through Ricoeur's (1981:44) concept of the polysemy of language which refers to "the feature by which our words have more than one meaning when considered outside of their use in a determinate context." Gergen et al. (1986:1262) illustrate this point with the following example:

> "[I]n written discourse one typically clarifies the intention behind a given word, phrase, or sentence by demonstrating how it figures within the corpus of the work as a whole. If the character in a novel addresses another as 'a fool,' the meaning of this term significantly depends on whether the two have been described, for instance, as friends or as enemies, as given to jocularity or as formal, and so on."

A more substantive illustration of this context-dependent perspective within psychology comes from research regarding self-concept. Research in social psychology has indicated that an individual's self-concept is not constant. Instead people construct the self according to their current situation or role. For example, when in the presence of someone older or with higher status, people tend to describe a different self-image than when they are with younger or lower- status individuals (Bruner, 1990). In other words, the 'self' is not a context-free phenomenon, it is a transactional product of individuals and the situations they find themselves in.

Nature of Human Experience

The hermeneutic perspective on the nature of human experience is expressed through the concepts of situated freedom and modes of engagement. Situated freedom is closely related to the concept of co-constitution. It refers to the belief that human experience is not completely determined by the environment, nor is it characterized by complete personal freedom (Valle et al., 1989:8). On the one hand, the environment presents situations that constrain what a person may experience and how a person may act (Thompson, Locander, and Polio, 1989; Valle et al., 1989). However, humans have the freedom to make choices and act in a purposeful manner, and one's personal project and practical activity make perception interpretive (Nicholson, 1984; Valle et al., 1989). Thus, human control manifests itself through the ability to act on the world in a purposeful manner and the ability to orient attention to different aspects of the context (Valle et al., 1989).

Nicholson (1984) illustrates this perspective by contrasting human perceptual experience with the process through which a photographic image is formed. In a photograph, the chemical composition of film registers patterns of incoming light, thereby reproducing an image. However, rather than reproducing an image, the human perceptual experience is one of "seeing-as." For example:

> "What the traveler sees in glancing out the window [of a train] we call a house (or a group of houses). But he sees it as an indicator of the distance he has yet to go. Seeing it that way depends on his current project" (p. 40).

Additionally, Nicholson points out that our practical activity (personal projects) "lead[s] us to tend to see certain things and not others" (p. 36). For example, the window shopper notices the merchandise in the display (e.g., hats and coats) and not the glass of the window or the mannequins displaying them.

A second fundamental ontological characterization of human experience underlying hermeneutics is expressed by Heidegger's concept of modes of engagement (Packer, 1985). Heidegger distinguishes between three distinct, but interrelated modes of engagement that he referred to as ready-to-hand, unready-to-hand, and present-at-hand. The *ready-to-hand mode* of engagement is the mode most closely associated with personal projects (e.g., mailing a letter, talking to a friend, or using a hammer). Human awareness during this form of activity is holistic:

> "We are aware of the situation we find ourselves in, not as an arrangement of discrete physical objects ...., but globally, as a whole network of interrelated projects, possible tasks, thwarted potentialities, and so forth. This network is not laid out explicitly, but it is present as a 'background' to the project we are concerned with .... There is no deliberate means-ends planning in this mode; indeed, any tools we may be using (and our own body) are not experienced as distinct entities that could be set into a means-ends framework ... Our experience is not of the hammer, nor of the wood and nails as independent entities, but of the hammering, the raising of the wall, the constructing of a home" (Packer, 1985:1083).

The *unready-to-hand mode* of engagement arises when some problem upsets our personal project. At this point,

> "Our experience changes as we become aware that there is a problem and then recognize something of its nature. The source of the breakdown of action now suddenly becomes salient, in a way it was not in the ready-to-hand mode. This source is still seen, however, as an aspect of the project we are involved in, rather than as a context-free object. For example, my hammer may prove too heavy for the task I am engaged in. Its 'weightiness' becomes salient, whereas before it was transparent; but I am not aware of the objective 'weight' of the hammer (so many pounds), only that it is too heavy" (Packer, 1985:1083-1084).

The third and final type of engagement is the *present-at-hand mode*. In this mode, we step back from the personal project to

> "reflect, and turn to more general and abstract (i.e., situation-independent) tools such as logical analysis and calculation .... At this point our experience changes its character yet again, and we now become aware of, for example, the hammer as an independent entity, removed from all tasks we might pursue by its means, and as endowed with discrete and definite measurable properties" (Packer, 1985:1084).

Hermeneutics maintains that much of our everyday experience occurs in the ready-to-hand mode of engagement, as practical activity in which actions and emotions are structured by (1) the situation, (2) cultural practices, and (3) current projects and concerns that include habitual responses that are so familiar they are taken for granted. Such activities do not involve "context-free elements definable in the absence of interpretation" (Packer, 1985:1083). Because human experience is seen as being mutually defined (co-constituted) by the transactional relationships among settings, individuals with unique identities, and situational influences, "ready to hand" modes of experience are most appropriately viewed

as an emergent narrative rather than as predictable outcomes resulting from the causal interaction of antecedent elements.

This perspective stands in contrast to the goal-directed perspective on the nature of human experience, common in much of tourism and recreation research (cf., Williams and Patterson, 1996), which leads to research strategies that treat all human experience as if it represents the present-at-hand mode of engagement. An hermeneutic philosophy would suggest that the characterization of human experience obtained through this latter (goal-directed or present at hand) perspective often differs from the actual nature of the experience. That is, the research context adopted in a goal-directed perspective forces individuals to adopt an abstract, logical, reflective attitude concerning their experience when, in fact, the actual experience was a form of ready-to-hand engagement. Thus, in the present at hand mode of inquiry adopted by the goal-directed perspective, oftentimes what is being studied is different from the experience as it is lived.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS

Epistemology refers to normative commitments concerning issues related to the nature, methods, and limits of human knowledge. At the paradigmatic level of the macrostructure of science (Figure 2.1), these assumptions deal with issues like the role of interpretation in science, the relationship of observer to the phenomenon being observed, type of knowledge generated, and research process (Patterson and Williams, 1998). Below, each of these issues is discussed from an hermeneutic perspective. On some of the issues presented below, hermeneutic commitments are contrasted with those of other paradigms. The purpose here is not to argue for the superiority of hermeneutics as an approach to science (a judgment we maintain can only be made in the context of a specific problem and set of research questions) or condemn other research traditions as unworthwhile (such a position is wholly untenable in our view) but to help illustrate the meaning and implications of hermeneutic epistemological commitments.

Role of Interpretation

An epistemological commitment characteristic of some normative conceptions of science is that science should, and does, present an objective, unbiased, interpretation-free procedure for recording observations about phenomena being studied (Packer and Addison, 1989). Frequently, this perspective occurs in concert with the view that numerical systems establish an interpretation-free procedure based on detached, objective analysis of numbers and allow researchers to employ the precise, economical, and powerful techniques of mathematical analysis without which "the problem of establishing functional relationships involving many variables cannot even be stated clearly, much less solved" (Anderson, Basilevsky, and Hum, 1983:233; Michell, 1986). However, hermeneutic epistemology rejects the assumptions that: (1) unbiased observation is possible, (2) all observation precedes and is independent of (is not tainted by) prior conceptions, and (3) numerical systems are inherently passive forms of data representation. Ultimately a researcher's position on these issues reflects normative commitments regarding the role of interpretation in research. A more thorough discussion of these three issues regarding the role of interpretation in research is presented below from an hermeneutic perspective.

Interpretive Nature of Observation. The first issue relates to the question of whether unbiased observation is possible. Hermeneutic epistemology maintains that unbiased observation is not possible, because there is not a one-to-one correspondence between human

experience and that which is physically out there (Chalmers, 1982:27), a point also emphasized in hermeneutic ontology. As Chalmers points out, two observers viewing the same phenomenon at the same time witness the same thing but may interpret it differently. Interpretation of what is seen depends in part on one's past experience, prior knowledge, professional background, culture, and expectations. For example, an illustration of differences from a cultural standpoint raised previously in the discussion of hermeneutic ontology is the elaborate vocabulary Eskimos have for describing minute differences in ice and snow characteristics, some of which have no equivalent in the English language (Moran, 1981:8; Nelson, 1969:398). In other words, Eskimos have a keen ability to perceive minute differences in characteristics of snow and ice that most other cultures do not, and this creates an opportunity for them to interpret aspects of the physical world in different ways than do others without similar culturally constituted experiences.

In tourism and recreation research, the basic concept that observation and experience are interpretive and influenced by one's background is widely recognized. For example, consider the interest in concepts such as familiarity and experience use history (e.g., Hammitt, 1981; Hammitt and McDonald, 1983; Schreyer, Lime, and Williams, 1984). However, what some traditional normative epistemologies seem to overlook, is that the influence of these background and cultural forces on perception is also evident in scientific research. Yet prior experience and similar background variables do play a central role in scientific interpretation. An example of the role these factors can play in the practice of science is illustrated by Polyani's (1973:101) description of the changes in the perceptual experiences of medical students learning to read x-rays:

> "At first, the student is completely puzzled. For he can see in the x-ray picture of a chest only the shadows of the heart and ribs, with a few spidery blotches between them. The experts seem to be romancing about figments of their imagination; he can see nothing that they are talking about. Then, as he goes on listening for a few weeks, looking carefully at ever-new pictures of different cases, a tentative understanding will dawn on him; he will gradually forget about the ribs and begin to see the lungs. And eventually, if he perseveres intelligently, a rich panorama of significant details will be revealed to him: of physiological variations and pathological changes, of scars, of chronic infections, and signs of acute disease. He has entered a new world."

A second example that is more closely related to the type of research conducted by tourism and recreation researchers is evident in Mishler's (1990:424-426) critique of Stewart, Franz, and Layton's (1988) analysis of life history narratives exploring "the changing self." Adopting a positivist epistemology, Stewart and colleagues attempted to establish standardized procedures that would allow others to replicate their study. However, Mishler argues that the ability of others to use these researchers' coding scheme actually depends on their understanding of the coder's subculture, and that it is not possible to transfer the "standardized" coding procedure directly to another research context. Mishler maintains that this is not an idiosyncratic feature of Stewart et al.'s research, but is "as much a part of normal scientific practice as their use of a coding manual and statistical tests" (p. 426). Further, he contends that:

> "The main point is that standard methods are poorly standardized ... because when they are actually applied they turn out to be context-bound, nonspecifiable in terms of

'rules,' and not generalizable. Close examination of the procedures used in any study would reveal a similar gap between the assumption of standardization and actual practices."

A possible counter argument to Mishler's conclusion is that the particular research program he chose as an illustration was based on a "weak" or developing theory, and this was the reason it was apparently subject to unspecifiable, "ad hoc" interpretation procedures. Such an argument would contend that, in the case of well established theories, it is possible to develop an "algorithmic model" whereby instructions can be formulated and transferred so that a scientist is able to replicate another's experiment exactly (Collins, 1975:206). However, sociologists such as Collins (1975, 1985) who study the practice of science have found that the algorithmic model of replication does not fit well with the way science is actually practiced. Instead, Collins (1975) argues that an enculturational model of knowledge transfer represents a more accurate description of science as it is actually practiced. In this model, the negotiation of replication (i.e., agreement concerning whether or not a given study counts as a true replication of an original study) is described as a "transmission of a culture which legitimizes and limits the parameters requiring control in the experimental situation, without necessarily formulating, enumerating, or understanding" (p. 207) specific methodological rules. This perspective, based on a broader analysis of scientific research, is consistent with Mishler's conclusion.

The final example of the role researchers' prior background plays in science demonstrates the influence of the larger, cultural context in which science is embedded. Building on Sampson's (1981:731) suggestion that ideas represent "the consciousness of a group or epoch," Malm (1993:71-72) points out that the basic elements of behaviorism were really an adaptation of the stimulus/response concept that was a prominent concern among biologists at the beginning of the 20th century. Similarly, many of the basic elements of the information-processing paradigm that currently dominates much of contemporary psychology are "the (creative) application of the principles of computer technology to the definition of human thought processes" (p. 72).

Thus, the preceding discussion suggests scientific observation is not "unbiased" and that the belief that observation precedes and is independent of theory is wrong; the reverse is true (Chalmers, 1982:28). Further, this perspective on the relationship between theory and observation is not limited to qualitative researchers, it is explicitly evidenced in the epistemological commitments of some experts in quantitative measurement. For example, Anderson et al. (1983:234) state "There is no measurement without theory. Theory precedes measurement or, more properly, every measurement implies theory." Hermeneutics maintains this perspective also, seeking to develop a normative epistemology that is not grounded in the notion that unbiased, interpretation-free observation is the scientific ideal or even a possibility. Thus, hermeneutics addresses the question of how to develop a normative epistemology for science from a starting point acknowledging that observation and interpretation are inherently biased.

Burden of Interpretation. A second aspect of hermeneutic epistemology related to the role of interpretation in science challenges the assumption that numerical measurement systems make possible an interpretation-free basis for analysis. In actuality, the use of quantitative response scales does not avoid the issue of interpretation at all. Consider, for example, the use of operational models and measurement scales that form the bedrock of much of the quantitative psychological and sociological research in tourism and recreation.

A critique of this approach often voiced by interpretive researchers is that the use of operational models substitutes the researcher's concepts for the subject's own understandings (cf., Hekman, 1984:334-335). In effect, one implication of this criticism is that the quantitative approach to measuring psychological concepts typically employed in survey research shifts a large portion of the burden of interpretation from the researcher's shoulders to those of the individuals being studied. In other words, the respondent is required to reflect on and interpret the nature of a psychological event based on the researcher's experience (i.e., the researcher's measurement items) rather than their own personal understandings.

At a cursory level, some of the potential problems in interpretation associated with this issue appear to be recognized within current quantitative psychological measurement literature. For example, consider warnings that slight changes in question wording can lead to large differences in response percentages and that any single wording may lead to responses due primarily to some idiosyncracy of a specific item rather than the latent variable of interest (Anderson et al., 1983:248). However, Gergen and colleagues' (Gergen, 1989; Gergen et al., 1986) empirical exploration of this issue using Rotter's Internal-External Locus of Control (IE) scale suggests the problem lies at a much deeper level than suggested by the cautions outlined above. A major implication of their research was that respondents can readily supply a plausible interpretation for a response item that does not match the one intended by the researcher. Their research also suggests that attempts to establish validity of psychological scales through assessments of predictive, discriminant, and convergent validity do little to appease these concerns, because behavior patterns taken out of meaningful context may be subject to the same degree of interpretive indeterminacy.

As Gergen et al. (1986) point out, one could argue that unproblematic communication is the rule, not the exception in everyday life, and therefore the findings from their studies overstate the case. That is, one could argue that misinterpretation of psychometric measurement items is an unlikely scenario. However, as Gergen and colleagues suggest that, typically, everyday conversation is embedded in "a relatively unambiguous context of communication" that allows social interchange to proceed with relative ease (p. 1268). In contrast, survey-based questionnaires may often lack sufficient context to permit meaningful response. Or even worse, these types of assessments may be embedded in a context that significantly alters the meaning or salience of events, an issue discussed in more detail below in the section on research relationship.

In summary, the major implication of this critique is that the use of analyses grounded in numerical systems does not escape the problem of interpretation. Instead the fundamental question seems to be "How is the burden of interpretation distributed between the respondents and the researcher?" Hermeneutic epistemology favors placing more of the burden of interpretation on the researcher's shoulders through the use of methods like open ended, in-depth interviews rather than operational models.

Intrinsic Nature of Numerical Representation Systems. A third normative commitment related to the role of interpretation in hermeneutic epistemology is also directly linked to the belief that numerical measurement systems make possible an interpretation-free basis for analysis. The hermeneutic critique of this issue focuses on the "cost" associated with the use of mathematics and statistics. Mathematics and statistics are by no means passive instruments (Danziger, 1985:4). Rather, as Danziger points out, the use of mathematics imposes a definite structure on empirical systems. First, mathematics requires numerical data. To apply a numerical system to data, the empirical domain must be structured into

basic elements with specific properties (e.g., independently identifiable; well-defined, mutually exclusive boundaries; concepts that remain identical with themselves, despite changing circumstance; etc.). Additionally, mathematics structures empirical systems into relations with certain properties such as addition, multiplication, and distance. However, other properties such as intrinsic relations and qualitative changes are excluded.

While the quantitatively imposed structures described above may be appropriate for representing some psychological and social phenomena, they do not seem to fit well with many concepts currently emerging in the social sciences in general, and tourism and recreation in particular. Consider, for example, Mishler's (1990:428) finding that formation of identity among crafts persons is neither linear nor progressive or the growing interest in concepts like authenticity and sense of place. In this regard, Danziger (1985:4,8) points to two significant costs of using numerical systems to represent data. The first cost is that reliance exclusively on quantitative data will result in the development of theoretical models that are in accord with the methodological requirements of mathematical systems rather than with the true nature of phenomena. As a result, one will end up with a representation of psychological phenomena as if they were logical rather than psychological processes.

The second possible cost that Danziger points to occurs when a theory or concept being evaluated was formed independently of the methodology used in evaluation.

> "In order to establish the relevance of the results obtained for the theory being tested, one ought to be able to show that the structure that one's numerical system has imposed on the data is at least broadly congruent with the structure suggested by theory. If it turns out that the numerical structure and the theoretical structure involve different assumptions, then the theory one is testing is not the theory one wanted to test, but at best some vague analog thereof" (p. 4).

Thus, although they are powerful tools and are at times economical and precise, mathematics and statistics are by no means passive instruments for evaluating theory or representing reality (Danziger, 1985:4). Recognition of this requires tourism and recreation researchers to situate discussions of quantitative versus qualitative primarily within the context of the ontological views about reality, principles regarding its representation, and the nature of theories being evaluated rather than within the context of establishing an interpretation-free basis for data collection and analysis.

Relationship of Observer to Phenomena Observed

As the discussion above suggests, the strict or unqualified view of science as unbiased or interpretation free fails as a normative guide for science, partly because it fails to recognize that all observation and therefore all science rests on interpretation (Holbrook and O'Shaughnessy, 1988:401; Olson, 1986:161). In contrast, hermeneutic epistemology explicitly recognizes that the study of human experience and meaning is an interpretive activity. Grounded in the ontological view of human consciousness described earlier, Gadamer viewed the process of textual (data) interpretation as the fusion of two horizons of meaning (the horizon of the author of the text [actor] and the horizon of the reader [researcher]), both of which play a constitutive role in the development of understanding (Hekman, 1984).

The emphasis on the actor's horizon represents a rejection of the tendency in traditional quantitative research to substitute the researcher's concepts for the actor's own un-

derstandings (i.e., the use of an operational model) (Hekman, 1984:334). Instead, hermeneutic research begins with the actor's own understandings. At the same time, the emphasis on the researcher's horizon represents a rejection of some more relativistic interpretive paradigms' (e.g, existential phenomenology, naturalistic inquiry) tendency to "over-privilege" the actor. Hermeneutics dismisses the notion that meaning is the private property of the individual and that understanding is achieved solely by gaining access to the actor's structuring of his or her world (referred to as *Verstehen* in existential phenomenology) (Addison, 1989:52; Terwee, 1990:122). Instead, hermeneutic normative commitments suggest that the whole context in which behavior must be interpreted is comprised of much more than the actor's structuring of the world and personal understanding of his or her own motives (Terwee, 1990:123). Meaning and action are based in a context of situational influences, shared cultural practices, and social ideologies that might not be immediately apparent to the actor (Addison, 1989:52). As a result, it may be possible for a researcher to step back and, with the benefit of hindsight, see the whole situation and understand the meaning of actions more fully (or at least in a different light) than the individual actor (Hekman, 1984:339; Terwee, 1990:133).

The researcher's "horizon of meaning" can be further explained by referring to Heidegger's "forestructure of understanding." This concept refers to the belief that we understand in terms of what we already know (Packer and Addison, 1989b:34). That is, unless something is completely foreign, we approach it with a preliminary understanding that is shaped by past experience, life styles, and culture. Thus, hermeneutic epistemology explicitly acknowledges the role researcher bias plays in scientific observation and analysis. Further, unlike more relativistic interpretive paradigms that seek to "bracket" [set aside] these preconceptions, hermeneutic epistemology explicitly maintains that it is impossible to bracket prior knowledge. In fact, Gadamer (1984) argues that attempts to do so are based on the misguided notion that prejudices or preconceptions are inherently bad. He points out that prejudice actually refers to "a judgment that is given before all the elements that determine a situation have been finally examined." Adherents to this view maintain that this situation describes the human condition: "understanding inevitably involves reference to that which is already known" (Terwee, 1990:128) and history is never over, so all of the elements affecting a judgment are never given and therefore, human understanding is necessarily provisional and open to present and future change (Stewart, 1983:383). Gadamer (1984), in fact, argues that prejudice is not a barrier to be overcome by science, but is instead the positive possibility of interpretation. That is, knowledge is not and cannot be constructed from scratch, we can only understand concepts "insofar as a certain horizon of being has already been laid out for them in advance" (Caputo, 1987:61; Packer and Addison, 1989b:34). Thus, the forestructure of understanding (our prejudices) is the scaffolding upon which knowledge is built.

In acknowledging the positive function that prejudice (prior conceptions) play in science, Gadamer was not advocating parochial or uncritical thought that blindly follows tradition or unwarranted stereotypes (Wachterhauser, 1986). Therefore, although Gadamer's epistemology clearly acknowledged that the prospect of bracketing or suspending our prejudices is an ontological impossibility, he does make a distinction between blind prejudices and what Berstein (1986) refers to as enabling prejudices. In fact, for Gadamer (1984:246), distinguishing "legitimate prejudices from all the countless ones which it is the undeniable task of critical reason to overcome" was a fundamental question of hermeneutic epistemology.

Gadamer's response to this epistemological question was not primarily a methodological one. In fact, he emphasized that there is no single method on which all research could be modeled due to the "linguistically mediated nature of our contact with reality and the necessarily perpsectival and limited understanding this engenders" (Wachterhauser, 1986:33). Instead of the formal rules of method, Gadamer emphasized the concept of dialogical encounter involving a to- and-fro movement in which "both what we seek to understand and our prejudices are dynamically involved in each other" (Bernstein, 1986:91). This type of dialogue is a living conversation characterized by an openness to the phenomenon the researcher tries to understand (Bernstein,1986; Wechterhauser, 1986). Rather than merely trying to defend a position or confirm prejudgments, the dialogue is an open conversation devoted to developing an understanding of an issue rather than testing preexisting propositions. The forestructure of understanding is an enabling one, not a limiting one, making possible the continual emergence of new insights from the research process rather than remaining limited to confirmation or disconfirmation of prior hypotheses. This concept of dialogue, then, describes an important aspect of the "testing logic" that explains the manner in which data functions as a test of ideas in hermeneutic epistemology (a key dimension of the first universal and defining criterion of science presented in Table 2.1).

The concept of fusion of horizons presented above has other important implications with respect to the differences between traditional and hermeneutic perspectives on the role of the researcher in data collection and data analysis. Traditional epistemologies treat knowledge as if it is an object located in the minds of human actors, independent of social and situation-specific contexts (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; Nespor and Barylske, 1991). As a result, traditional epistemologies encourage researchers to act as if the data they gather are produced independently of the situations and instruments through which they are collected. In contrast, the belief that research instruments and research contexts play no role in the production of data is inconsistent with the assumptions of context-dependent, mutually defining (co-constituted) phenomena central to hermeneutic ontology. Instead, hermeneutics advocates a constructivist perspective (Connolly and Keutner, 1988) in which data are viewed as "a situated construction of social networks, a textually produced phenomenon rather than an entity with an existence independent of our practices of representation" (Nespor and Barylske, 1991:806).

As a consequence of these normative commitments, proponents of hermeneutics believe psychological experiments are often inappropriate because the usual (everyday) context is removed and subjects must respond to artificial or contrived manipulations. In such situations, hermeneutic philosophy maintains that it is hard to determine what the resulting responses actually mean (Gergen et al., 1986:1262; Terwee, 1990:89). Similar concerns may be expressed with respect to survey research. For instance, in tourism and recreation research, we are often interested in determining how various social and environmental conditions influence the quality of leisure experiences. Often this question is assessed by having respondents rate the importance of items representing different setting/experience impacts (cf., Roggenbuck, Williams, and Watson, 1993). However, it is not clear if the responses obtained from a survey adequately represent perceptual responses occurring during the actual leisure experience.

For example, research in social psychology suggests that whether or not people attend to a stimulus depends on its vividness and salience (Fiske and Taylor, 1984). Vividness is a property of a stimulus. A stimulus may be vivid when it is emotionally interesting; concrete

and image provoking; or proximate in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way. Salience is determined, in part, by context. For instance, a stimulus can be salient by dominating the visual field, by contrasting markedly with the immediate surroundings, or by contradicting prior expectations. Additionally, a stimulus can be made salient by instructions directing people to focus their attention in a particular way. Thus, the consequences of vividness and salience in production of subject responses in survey research need to be considered. How well, for example, do written depictions of setting/experience impacts mimic the vividness of impacts as encountered and perceived in the field during the actual experiences? Is salience unaffected by the survey format and organization, or do instructions accompanying the surveys, the location of a specific item in a questionnaire, etc. change the context and focus of attention to the extent that responses are no longer representative of perception as it occurs in everyday experience? A study by Williams (1988:153) supports the suggestion that survey context does affect visitor responses. This study examined perceived similarity among outdoor recreation activities. When shown photographs, respondents judged similarity in terms of setting characteristics and activity. In contrast, written descriptors of these photographs were grouped on the basis of social group characteristics and activity.

Recognizing the role researchers and the research context play in the production of data has other significant implications for the data-collection strategies employed within the hermeneutic paradigm. While traditional epistemologies are concerned with establishing objective, unbiased, or "blind" judges and eliminating the possibility of "leading questions," hermeneutic epistemology maintains that all judges are prejudiced and all questions are leading. Proponents of hermeneutics question many traditionally employed methodological attempts to achieve objectivity and standardization on the basis that these methods impose the researcher's concepts on the respondent, allow few opportunities for examining how the respondent has interpreted the question, and provide little opportunity to clarify the effects of leading questions (Hekman, 1984; Kvale, 1983). These concerns have pushed hermeneutic researchers in the direction of data-collection strategies (e.g., participant observation, in-depth interviews, etc.) in which they are in a better position to control, assess, and take advantage of their role in data production.

Knowledge Generated

Traditional epistemologies seek to identify context-free generalizations and universal laws. Specific details of individual respondents or single occurrences of a phenomenon are of no intrinsic interest (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; Sellitz Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook, 1967). A methodological consequence of this epistemological view is the belief that aggregation of data across many individuals or situations (statistical generalizability) forms the only acceptable basis for making theoretical claims about behavior (Danziger, 1985; Babbie, 1986:20).

In contrast, hermeneutic research encourages a strong focus on individual cases and specific occurrences of a phenomenon. The interest in individual cases arises from two sources. In part, this focus reflects the ontological assumptions of a context-dependent reality; meaning that changes across time, cultures, and individuals; and a view of human experience characterized by situated freedom (within boundaries set by the environment, individuals are free to respond in unique and sometimes idiosyncratic ways). Thus, while phenomena are approached based on an understanding shaped by past experiences in analogous situations (the forestructure of understanding), researchers adopting the normative commitments of productive hermeneutics are prepared to accept the possibility that each

new situation is unique. Rather than seeking to establish theory that (ideally) can be applied without change, hermeneutics seeks instead to generate knowledge applicable in a specific instance or situation (Arnould and Fischer, 1994).

The second reason hermeneutics emphasizes individual cases rises from a concern about making universal statements regarding an individual's experience on the basis of aggregate data. This use of an "aggregate" approach in research is based on the assumption that the structure of phenomena related to the individual is isomorphic with or comparable to that of group data (Danziger, 1985:6,8). Danziger argues that there are no a priori reasons to assume any structural similarities exist between complex psychological processes in the individual and the logical structure statistics imposes on aggregate data. Thus:

> "If one puts individuals together in groups before even having looked at their individual behavior, it is clear that one will never learn anything about individual behavior; the results are about group averages, and will be restricted to group averages, or the nonexisting 'average individual'" (Terwee, 1990:132).

This suggestion is not completely new to tourism and recreation research (see Shafer's [1969] warning about the "average camper"). However, recognition of this potential problem typically has done little to change the practice of tourism and recreation research. When not ignored, the most frequent solution to this problem has been simply to look for characteristics by which to sub-aggregate users into more homogeneous groups. However, within these subgroups, aggregate statistics (especially measures associated in some way with the criterion of squared distance from the mean, e.g., variance) are still used. Thus, these sub-aggregates are open to the same potential pitfalls as the larger aggregates. In the worst-case scenario, all that has been accomplished is a proliferation of the number of misrepresentations. The alternative to this dilemma employed in hermeneutic epistemology, is to begin analysis with individual cases first (idiographic level analysis) and then to combine (aggregate) across individuals (nomothetic level analysis) only at a later stage and only where and when the idiographic analysis indicates it is appropriate (Terwee, 1990:132).

An important final point here is to emphasize that hermeneutic philosophy differs from absolute relativism. The latter perspective would claim that there is never any reason to expect commonality across individuals or situations. Such a position assumes there is no structure in the world (Olson, 1986:167) and ignores the concept of shared meanings, contradicting fundamental components of hermeneutic ontology (especially the core concept of situated freedom). In hermeneutics, nomothetic level insights into phenomena are seen as potentially attainable and are often (though not always) sought. But, as previously stated, due to the potential for unique assemblages of phenomena, the hermeneutic paradigm does accept the possibility that, in some cases, it is not possible to provide insights beyond the specific case (i.e., insights are not generalizable to other contexts in a meaningful or practically significant way).

Research Process

One dimension of the research process has already been presented above-the starting point for analyses is always at the idiographic level (individual cases). At a broader level, hermeneutics describes the research process as the hermeneutic circle, a metaphor intended to communicate multiple meanings. Broadly speaking, the hermeneutic circle refers to the inter-relationship between the part and the whole. Phenomena are seen as parts depending

on a larger whole, and an understanding of the parts relies on preconceptions about the whole (Terwee, 1990). The hermeneutic circle is also intended as a reference to the dialogical encounter between enabling prejudices (forestructures of understanding) and the phenomenon researchers are trying to understand (Bernstein, 1986), previously discussed in the section on the relationship between observer and the phenomena observed.

In a more specific sense, this metaphor can be used to describe the actual process of data analysis. In an hermeneutic analysis, the "text" representing an individual actor is "read" to gain an understanding of the data in its entirety. This global understanding is then used as the basis for a closer examination of the separate parts (Kvale, 1983; Thompson et al., 1989). In turn, "the closer determination of the meaning of the separate parts may come to change the originally anticipated meaning of the totality, and again this influences the meaning of the separate parts" (Kvale, 1983:185). To the extent that the researcher is interested in the nature of the phenomenon beyond a specific actor's individual experience, a similar part-whole phase of analysis is used to relate the idiographic level analyses with a more nomothetic analysis (Thompson et al., 1989).

As the circular process described above implies, hermeneutic researchers do not wait until all the data are in to begin analysis. Instead, hermeneutic data analysis begins when the first "text" is collected, so that emergent themes can be identified and used to guide further research. For example, in a study of smoking cessation, Willims, Best, Taylor, Gilbert, Wilson, Lindsay, and Singer (1990) interviewed study participants on 11 occasions. In each case, prior to conducting subsequent interviews, previous interviews were examined to help the researchers determine topics for further exploration. Traditional epistemology would object to this practice, as it would lead to a lack of standardization. However, hermeneutic epistemology suggests a position similar to Charmaz's (1991) statement that it is a mistake to ask each respondent the same question in exactly the same way. To do so imposes the researcher's concepts on the respondent, inhibits exploration of topics from the respondent's perspective, and denies the opportunity to improve both the interview process and the understanding of phenomena through exploration of emergent themes. This type of nonstandardized approach to interviewing is possible within hermeneutics because analysis begins at an individual rather than aggregate level.

A final implication of the hermeneutic view of research as a circular process is that there is no definitive end-point. Thus, while traditional epistemologies ideally seek to verify universal laws that describe the basic components of human functioning, hermeneutics seeks instead "to keep discussion open and alive, to keep inquiry underway" (Packer and Addison, 1989:35). This point of view is tied both to the ontological belief in a reality that changes over time and to Gadamer's views that history is never over, and that all elements affecting judgment are never completely given (Stewart, 1983). In other words, the metaphor relating research to a circle recognizes the possibility that our "scientific" interpretations may change as our historical, cultural, and technological understandings change. Thus, in hermeneutics, the conclusions expressed are seen as representing the researcher's understanding at the moment. This understanding is subject to revision as a result of future insights or as a result of changes in culture or technology that reshape the phenomenon being studied. However, hermeneutics is not a call for "anything goes." Research is not a matter of conjecture and guess (Packer and Addison, 1989). Rather, when properly conducted, it is the rigorous and systematic (third universal and defining criterion of science, see Table 2.1) application of meaningful thought beginning with a particular perspective (the forestructure of understanding) and progressing through a cyclical analysis in which

this position is evaluated (tested) and modified on the basis of the empirical analysis (first universal and defining criterion of science, see Table 2.1).

AXIOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS

Terminal Goals

Axiological commitments address the goals underlying a particular approach to science. There are two types of goals: terminal and instrumental. Terminal goals refer to the ultimate aims of an approach to science. At a very broad level, different approaches to science share the common goal of "understanding." However, as Hudson and Ozanne (1988) point out, views regarding what counts as understanding differ among scientific paradigms. In some normative paradigms, understanding is defined in terms of "explanation" and is intimately linked with the concept of prediction (Anderson, 1986; Hudson and Ozanne, 1988; Packer, 1985). In these paradigms, an explanation is not considered adequate unless "if taken account of in time, [it] could have served as a basis for predicting the phenomenon under consideration" (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948:138). Additionally, an explanation that accounts for only one occurrence of a phenomenon is considered meager and inadequate. Instead, explanations ideally take the form of general laws capable of predicting many occurrences of a phenomenon (Anderson, 1986; McCarthy, 1978, Sellitz et al., 1967). This type of explanation is considered possible based on the ontological assumptions related to a reducible reality composed of context-free elements. Additionally, explanation in this sense is usually linked to the concept of control (Fischer, 1993; Kvale, 1983). This goal is clearly evident in some arenas of tourism and recreation research, specifically where the predominant goal is to enhance managers' ability to control settings to achieve various goals (e.g., enhancing the quality of visitor experiences, prompting "appropriate" visitor behavior, etc.).

Understanding is also an over-riding terminal goal in hermeneutics. However, what counts as understanding within this paradigm is very different from the nature of explanation described above. Neither prediction nor subsumption of phenomena under universal laws is necessary for explanations to be considered useful and satisfactory. Meaning and behavior are not seen as fully integrated, closed systems, but are thought to be open and subject to change (e.g., consider the ontological concepts of situated freedom and a reality that changes with time and culture). Open systems change constantly and never attain a steady or equilibrium state. Additionally, in open systems, there is always uncertainty as to how the rest of the system will react to changes in one of the components (Lawson and Staeheli, 1990; Packer and Addison, 1989). In such situations, prediction may be neither possible nor useful. In light of this perspective, sanctioning explanations exclusively in terms of predictive ability is deemed inappropriate.

For similar reasons, searching exclusively for universal laws is considered unnecessary and inappropriate. If reality changes with time (e.g., wilderness in the American mind), then scientific explanations cannot possibly be good for all time. At best, most generalizations must be viewed as contextually situated in a specific time and place. Additionally, many generalizations may be so broad or abstract that they contain information that is useful only at a very general or abstract level (e.g., people go to natural areas to enjoy nature). Finally, to insist that a phenomenon is not explained until "one can point to a general 'law' of which the action is a specific exemplar" (Anderson, 1986:159) is to deny the possibility that some phenomena are unique in time and space.

In contrast to the concept of prediction, hermeneutics describes understanding as being analogous to the narrative conclusion of a story.

> "a narrative conclusion can be neither deduced nor predicted. There is no story unless our attention is held in suspense by a thousand contingencies. Hence we must follow the story to its conclusion. So rather than being predictable, a conclusion must be acceptable. Looking back from the conclusion toward the episodes that led up to it, we must be able to say that this end required those events and that chain of action" (Ricoeur, 1981:277).

Polkinghorne (1988:171) describes this approach to understanding as "retrodictive rather than predictive." That is, it is a retrospective analysis of events that gives an account that makes the ending reasonable and believable.

In contrast to the search for timeless, universal laws, Packer (1985) describes the hermeneutic goal of understanding as "first and foremost the giving of an account that is sensible in the way it addresses current interests and concerns." Polkinghorne (1988) notes that abandoning the notion of universal laws does not mean that hermeneutic analysis must also abandon the concept of causality. However, rather than defining causality in terms of constant antecedent/consequence relationships, hermeneutics recognizes that "narrative cause can relate to the antecedents of a peculiar sequence that may never be repeated" (p. 173).

On the basis of these beliefs, hermeneutics seeks understanding first by exploring the internal relations among actions and events within individual cases rather than by examining statistical relations across cases (Terwee, 1990:117). The possibility of identifying more general insights is not ruled out. In fact, given ontological commitments regarding systems of shared meanings and concepts such as co-constitution and situated freedom, the existence of commonalities is considered quite likely. However, the search for such commonalities is a secondary step, and the possibility of encountering phenomena that are unique in time and space is always recognized.

Finally, whereas explanation in the predictive tradition is often linked to the notion of control, the hermeneutic approach to explanation is more allied to the concept of communication. The goal is for the researcher to provide a better understanding of the nature and meaning of human experience in context, independent of the ability to wholly predict or control the outcome. Defining the ultimate goal of research in terms of communication rather than control is in line with some emerging perspectives relevant to tourism and recreation planning and management. For example, the ecological paradigm in natural resource management defines planning and management as being concerned with the process by which "landscape ... meanings are socially created, transmitted, and destroyed; and how these meanings are negotiated between competing groups" (Williams and Patterson, 1996:516). The emphasis on communication rather than the measurement and specification of internal mental states such as attitudes, beliefs or value orientations as if they are latent traits represents a more holistic and process-oriented approach that seeks to understand the different public discourses regarding values and meaning that shape experience, conflict, and the management of tourist settings and experiences.

Instrumental Goals

Instrumental goals refer to the criteria by which specific research applications are evaluated as good or bad science (e.g., for acceptability for publication in a peer-reviewed journal or as a basis for deciding management direction). While evaluation criteria should reflect the three universal characteristics of science identified in Table 2.1, approaches to developing specific evaluation criteria will differ across scientific paradigms, due to inherent differences in underlying normative commitments. Thus, as Strauss and Corbin (1998:266) note, every approach to science develops its own standards and procedures for judging the merits of research, and it is important that these criteria be made explicit. However, discussing explicit evaluation criteria from an hermeneutic perspective is complicated by the paradigm's underlying epistemology. Specifically, Gadamer believed that:

> "[o]ur very linguisticality and finitude make it impossible for us to escape the linguistically mediated nature of our contact with reality and the necessarily perpsectival and limited understanding this engenders. This means that we can never shake ourselves free of language through the development of something like the 'perfect' research method or the most rigorous set of ahistorical criteria for judging all disputes in our disciplines" (Wachterhauser, 1986:33).

Thus, discussing explicit evaluative criteria for a paradigm that maintains no ahistorical criteria for judging all disputes is possible without reverting to absolute relativism at first appears to be a highly problematic endeavor. However, a discussion of evaluative criteria is possible with respect to hermeneutics and may be approached by explaining the difference between foundationalist and anti-foundationalist philosophies.

Broadly speaking, normative approaches to setting instrumental goals (evaluative criteria or standards) fall into one of two classes: foundational and anti-foundational. Foundationalists seek to ground knowledge in methodological procedures that distinguish truth from nontruth and science from nonscience (Thompson, 1990). Some traditional

Criterion	Definition
Credibility	Does the interpretation agree with the subject's opinion?
Dependability of Measure	Is the researcher, as an instrument, consistent?
Transferability	Given sensitivity to changing context, is the interpretation generalizable?
Confirmability	Is the interpretation logical, nonprejudiced, nonjudgmental, and supportable based on data?

Table 3.2. Evaluative Criteria for Lincoln and Guba's (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry Paradigm.[1]
[1]Adapted from Holt (1991).

paradigms rely on the correspondence theory of truth for establishing validity (i.e., the belief that a single, objective, interpretation-free reality exists and serves as the basis for establishing truth) (Mishler, 1990). For instance, this type of perspective is evident in classical measurement theory in which the concepts of reliability and validity are defined in reference to the idea of a true score (cf., Churchill, 1979). Methodological procedures for ensuring correspondence to truth include procedures for establishing validity (e.g., multi-method, multi-trait matrix), reliability (e.g., Cronbach's measure of internal consistency), and generalizability (sampling procedures).

Foundationalist philosophy can also be found in some interpretivist approaches to science, such as Lincoln and Guba's (1985) naturalistic inquiry paradigm. Although the ontological and epistemological commitments of this latter paradigm differ significantly from those of traditional paradigms (e.g., multiple realities, knower inseparable from the known), "opposition turns to analogy" when it comes to establishing evaluative criteria (Thompson, 1990:26). As Thompson points out, naturalistic inquiry's criteria of credibility, dependability, transferability, and confirmability (Table 3.2) "bear a strong conceptual parallel to positivist criteria of internal validity, reliability, external validity, and construct validity" (p. 26). Also, like positivist foundationalism, this version of "interpretivist" foundationalism requires methodological procedures such as triangulation, informants' audit checks, and peer auditing to assure the "trustworthiness" of research (Holt, 1991).

Foundationalist logic is grounded in dualistic assumptions. Although the two foundationalist research traditions described above fall on different sides of the subjective/objective distinction in regard to ontological commitments (naturalistic inquiry emphasizes subjectivity while classical measurement theory emphasizes objective reality), both try to ground knowledge in methodological procedures that serve as evaluative criteria (Thompson, 1990). In doing so, both paradigms treat knowledge as an object that has existence independent of the knower and research as something that can be evaluated independently of its reading (Crothers and Dokecki, 1989; Holt, 1991). This dualistic separation of the subject (knower) and the object (knowledge) is inconsistent with hermeneutic ontological (co-constitution) and epistemological (fusion of horizons) commitments. When meaning and science are viewed in an hermeneutic way, prescription of methodological procedures that assure valid interpretations is seen as impossible for several reasons (Holt, 1991; Mishler, 1990).

First, a single set of methodological procedures cannot assure validity, because validity assessments are based on judgments of the importance of different research goals and threats to validity. Because research goals may conflict with one another and threats to validity may be weighted differently, different judgments about the acceptability of the necessary tradeoffs are possible, and no single algorithm or set of standardized rules for assuring the best interpretation can be defined (Kuhn, 1977; Mishler, 1990). For example, consider Stewart and Hull's (1992) discussion of the construct validity of visitor satisfaction measures. Real-time (on-site) satisfaction appraisals require less recall on the part of the visitor than do post-hoc (off-site) satisfaction appraisals. However, real-time measures disrupt the experience and possibly change the nature of the phenomenon being assessed. Thus, real-time satisfaction measures sacrifice the integrity of the experience for the potential advantages of immediacy of response. No definitive rules exist for deciding which represents a greater threat to validity.

Second, hermeneutics maintains no single set of procedures for establishing validity is possible, because there is no single correct interpretation of phenomena like tourism

experiences. Interpretations may vary because the question asked by the interpreter (or the interpreter's horizon of understanding) may vary (Hekman, 1984). These preunderstandings necessarily sensitize researchers to certain issues and obscure others. Also, the possibility of multiple interpretations exist because no one understanding can capture all elements of experience (Arnould and Fischer, 1994). Additionally, as Arnould and Fischer note, once authored, a text assumes a life of its own. For example, it can yield insights that the original author did not realize.

A third reason hermeneutics maintains that methodological procedures advocated by foundationalists fail to assure objective truth is that procedures to establish the "truth content" of an observation or theory break down because there is "no defensible method for establishing that truth exists" (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988:516). For instance, numerous historical and hypothetical examples from the philosophy of science illustrate situations in which agreement among raters is not a guarantee that truth is obtained, because such consensus may simply reflect their collective biases (Holt, 1991; Mishler, 1990). As an example from quantitative research for instance, Barnes and MacKenzie (1979) demonstrated that support of competing ways of measuring association during a controversy among British statisticians at the turn of the century was influenced by social interests of the time. Karl Pearson's support for the tetrachoric coefficient for nominal data was influenced by an interest in heredity and formation of eugenic policy. On the other hand, George Udny Yule's support for coefficient Q was associated with vaccination policies and their efficiency.

Analogous examples can be found in methodological procedures advocated by interpretative foundationalists (e.g., naturalistic inquiry) to assure "trustworthiness." For example, peer auditing fails because the auditor's interpretation is just as subject to bias as the original investigator's (Holt, 1991:60). Similarly, the criterion of triangulation breaks down because, if knowledge is a textual construction as suggested in hermeneutic epistemology, then there is no reason to believe that different constructions (data from different methodologies) should necessarily produce consistent interpretations (Holt, 1991:60; Thompson, 1990:26). And as a final example, respondent audits do not guarantee trustworthiness either. Such audits are also interpretations (Holt, 1991:60; Packer and Addison, 1989:284).

To summarize, foundationalist approaches to defining evaluative criteria treat validity (traditional paradigms) or trustworthiness (naturalistic inquiry) as if these concepts are objective, measurable components that can be achieved through adherence to certain methodological procedures (Holt, 1991). However, such dualistic notions are incompatible with hermeneutic ontology and epistemology. As a consequence, hermeneutics adopts an antifoundationalist philosophy with respect to discussing evaluative criteria (instrumental goals). The basic tenet of an anti-foundationalist philosophy is that "the credibility of the interpretation cannot be inferred separate from its reading" (Holt, 1991:59). For example, "length of immersion" is offered as an evaluative criterion in foundationalist/interpretive paradigms like naturalistic inquiry (Murray and Ozanne, 1991). However, as Holt (1991) points out, a reader may find a three-month study more credible than a study of the same phenomenon conducted over the course of a year if the first researcher was able to obtain richer or more complex information from her or his subjects. This type of evaluation can only be made based on a reading of the research text. Thus, from an hermeneutic standpoint, while naturalistic inquiry and other validation frameworks serve as useful warehouses of techniques, they should not be seen as mandatory procedural guidelines that guarantee validity (Holt, 1991). Rather than relying primarily on antecedent methodologi-

cal procedures to evaluate the quality of research, hermeneutics focuses instead on defining evaluative criteria related to the product itself. Three over-arching instrumental criteria for evaluating "the research product" have been proposed including: persuasiveness, insightfulness, and practical utility.

The term persuasiveness may at first appear to reflect the antithesis of science which, as discussed in Chapter 2, focuses on empirical tests and should be a process open to external criticism. However, the term persuasiveness, as used in this discussion, is defined in the context of scientific reasoning. In defining persuasiveness, Giorgi (1975:96) suggested that a principal criterion for evaluating research is "whether a reader, adopting the same viewpoint as articulated by the researcher, can also see what the researcher saw, whether or not he agrees with it." Mishler (1990) presents a similar argument. He maintains that validation requires that the reader be able to make a reasonable judgment about the warrants for the researcher's interpretive claims. Interpretations must therefore be coherent and documented with relevant examples from the data (Arnould and Fischer, 1994). Thus, persuasive refers to the notion of providing the reader enough access to the data to make an independent assessment of the warrants for a particular set of conclusions. Therefore, the concept of persuasiveness presented here is consistent with the characterization of science as an empirical enterprise subject to external critique. At the same time, it is consistent with hermeneutic epistemology and stands in contrast to alternative epistemologies. For example, some paradigms (e.g., applied behaviorism) require "multiple-judges" when researchers rate observational or subjective phenomena and require some acceptable level of inter-rater agreement when interpretations are derived independently. However, for reasons discussed previously, hermeneutic epistemology maintains that multiple interpretations exist and we should not necessarily expect inter-rater agreement. Instead, the concept of persuasiveness encourages a focus on the product or outcome of interpretation and the empirical warrants for the interpretations presented to justify the interpretation, rather than on some predetermined level of agreement based on separate analysts examining the data independent of, and in isolation from, each other.

The reason for using the term persuasiveness to describe this evaluative criterion rather than adopting a term with more "objective" connotations is to convey (and encourage adherence to) other fundamental tenets in the normative commitments underlying hermeneutics. To use a more "objective" term to describe this evaluative criterion would risk suggesting "an attitude about knowledge" reflecting the assumption that scientific knowledge should (or can) achieve the standard of apodictic knowledge (certain or absolute truth) (Polkinghorne, 1983:2). In contrast, hermeneutic ontology and epistemology maintains humans "... cannot stand outside their language systems and cultures and obtain an absolute viewpoint," and therefore certainty in knowledge in terms of absolute truth is not possible (Polkinghorne, 1983:13; Wachterhauser, 1986).

Polkinghorne (1983) refers to this as an assertoric view of knowledge.

> "Assertoric knowledge uses practical reasoning and argumentation. It requires a decision among alternatives, none of which provides certainty. A supporter of a knowledge claim is expected to argue cogently before the appropriate community, providing evidence pertinent to his or her proposal and defending his or her position as the most likely correct position among various alternatives" (p. 280).

This is consistent with Gadamer's epistemological characterization of research as a dialogical encounter that extends beyond merely dialogue with the data and includes "such academic practices as giving papers, entering debates and dialogues, asking questions, and so forth [which] are all part of working out our preunderstandings in light of the things themselves. Talk or dialogue is not an incidental condition of inquiry; it is the very life of inquiry, discovery, and truth itself" (Wachterhauser, 1986:33). From an hermeneutic ideal, peer reviewers employing this hermeneutic normative criterion do more than simply assess the warrants for the conclusion. In addition, they see themselves as being engaged in a dialogue devoted to helping develop an understanding of the issue, rather than simply defending a position or serving merely as gate keepers for scientific accreditation (Wachterhauser, 1986). This dialogue helps "bring the subject to life," allowing new insights, metaphors, and frameworks "that may suggest new ways of seeing the subject matter or new conceptual vocabularies can be hammered out and help move a discussion onto new ground" (p. 33). Thus, using the label "persuasiveness" for this criterion is in part an attempt to signal and convey an approach to validating research consistent with hermeneutic philosophy.

The second over-arching hermeneutic evaluative criterion is insightfulness. Thompson (1990:28) defined one type of insight as an "interpretation [that] allows the evaluator to see a set of qualitative data as a coherent pattern or gestalt. [Where] what might have previously seemed a set of discrete and unrelated events becomes a good conceptual figure." Thompson illustrated the nature of this type of insight with the following example from Kohler (1969).

> "The problem is to comprehend the relationship between [the] following three lines of integers:
>
> A) 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, ...
>
> B) 0, 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, 36, 49, 64, ...
>
> C) 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, ...
>
> The solution pattern is that line A consists of a series of integers, line B consists of the squares of those integers, and line C is derived from subtracting each square from the preceding square in line B: a procedure which gives the series of odd numbers. When these relationships are grasped, one has experienced an insight" (p. 28).

Polkinghorne (1983) described insight in the following passage:

> "The 'seeing' of the pattern which gives meaning to the text requires insight, the seeing is not a result of precise procedures as is, for instance, a mathematical result. In mathematics, the design and choice of procedures can require considerable creative work, but the analysis of the data follows directly from the application of the procedures. In the hermeneutic sciences, this is not so. Seeing the meaning is an insightful event supported by evidence, but the evidence is ambivalent and takes on its own meaning from its place in the interpretation proposed. The seeing is ultimately unformalizable and thus its demonstration is not absolute. (p. 238)"

Thus, the essence of this criterion is that the research should increase our understanding of a phenomenon. Rather than just resummarizing the phenomenon (e.g., long lists of quotes excerpted from interviews summarizing what was said), the presentation is interpre-

tive. The reader is guided through data in a way that produces an understanding of the phenomenon reflecting greater insight than was held prior to reading the research.

The third and final over-arching evaluative criterion in hermeneutics is practical utility. This criterion recognizes that research was motivated by a particular concern and that a useful interpretation is "one that uncovers an answer to the concern motivating the inquiry" (Packer and Addison, 1989:289). Mishler (1990) refers to this as trustworthiness, which he defines as the degree to which other researchers "rely on the concepts, methods, and inferences of a study, or tradition of inquiry, as the basis for [their] own theorizing and empirical research." He describes this as a functional criterion in contrast to dependence on an abstract set of evaluative rules. This functional approach, Mishler argues, "emphasizes the role played in validation by scientists' working knowledge and experience, aligning the process more closely with what scientists actually do than with what they are assumed to ... and supposed to do" (pp. 419-420).

This evaluative criterion is consistent with the assertoric view of knowledge (which represents a shift away from the belief that absolute or certain truth is possible), the terminal goal of communication (rather than prediction or control), and the epistemological commitments regarding the type of knowledge generated (contextual and time specific rather than universal laws) all of which characterize hermeneutic normative commitments. Though perhaps not immediately obvious, the primacy of this criterion in hermeneutic axiology reflects a shift in emphasis from a predominant concern for the "truth" of knowledge (e.g., "true scores" in classical measurement theory, unbiased estimators of population parameters, etc.) to a predominant concern for the usefulness of knowledge in enhancing understanding, promoting communication, or resolving conflict. Further, when paired with the persuasiveness criterion, this means that, rather than a standard of the absolute truth of findings, the primary concern is for "utility" from "sufficiently justified" interpretations. Obviously the ability to fully understand or accept this standard for evaluating research is contingent upon an understanding and acceptance (at least with respect to the phenomenon under investigation) of the integrated set of ontological, epistemological, and axiological commitments outlined for hermeneutics in the preceding discussion.

In conclusion, the foundationalist researcher who seeks certainty in knowledge made possible through the application of methodological procedures will likely find hermeneutic evaluative criteria unsatisfying. As Packer and Addison (1989) put it, the "Holy Grail" of validation has escaped again. But, as they point out, those who insist on a fixed set of validity criteria for hermeneutic research are demanding something even the natural sciences cannot provide. As Heidegger maintained:

> "to be human is to be interpretive ... truth is not something that we construct by using methods that supposedly distance us from what is to be known, thereby assuring an objective knowledge untinged by personal bias and personal perspective. Truth ... occurs in our engagement with the world. Certain convictions—that true knowledge is free from presupposition, that human passions and concerns blind us to things 'as they really are,' that only purity of thought can lead to truth—are our undoing. True understanding is the result of human engagement, for there is no 'pure truth' that lies outside human engagement with the world" (Polkinghorne, 1983:224).

Even Lee Cronbach (1982:108), one of the foremost figures in developing validation guidelines for research employing psychometric methodology, acknowledges that "validity

is subjective rather than objective: the plausibility of the conclusion is what counts. And plausibility, to twist a cliche, lies in the ear of a beholder."

Thus, from an hermeneutic perspective, while naturalistic inquiry and other validation frameworks serve as useful warehouses of techniques, they should not be seen as mandatory procedural guidelines that guarantee validity (Holt, 1991:60). Such a view would represent what Sigmund Koch (1981) referred to as ameaningful thought—long on method and short on meaning. Instead, research methodology should fit the nature of the phenomenon being investigated and the questions being asked (Polkinghorne, 1983:280) and the credibility of research should not be inferred separate from its reading. Again, hermeneutics is not a call for anti-science, "anything goes", or simply a matter of conjecture and guess. Rather, when properly conducted, it is an empirical enterprise characterized by critical and "meaningful" thought beginning with a particular perspective (the forestructure of understanding) progressing through a rigorous and systematic cyclical analysis (the hermeneutic circle) in which interpretations are evaluated and modified on the basis of the data that is then presented as evidence of the warrants for conclusions. Thus, when properly conducted, hermeneutic research satisfies the three universal and defining characteristics of science presented in Chapter 2 (Table 2.1); it is empirically grounded, subject to external critical appraisal, and is systematic and rigorous rather than selective in its analysis of data.

4
Hermeneutic Methods

THE DISCUSSION OF QUALITATIVE methods presented in this chapter is guided by the normative commitments underlying the hermeneutic paradigm described in Chapter 3. The discussion of methodology in the current chapter is organized around the pragmatic decisions faced in research design. However, before initiating this methodological discussion, we believe it is important to present a brief discussion of the relationship between methods and a paradigm's normative commitments.

Methods are the machinery of science, the specific tools used to collect and analyze data for a particular study. Normative commitments, on the other hand, are the principles that guide both the selection and operation of that machinery. Bypassing the effort necessary to learn and understand a paradigm's underlying normative commitments by going straight to a discussion of methods so you can get on with the business of conducting a study without having to "waste" time with the underlying philosophy is like trying to play a guitar without knowing how to finger the notes or read music. You are likely to make some interesting noise, but it will be a far cry from playing a song. In part this is because the same methods (e.g., interviewing) can be applied very differently depending on the underlying principles (normative commitments) that guide the research. When methods are not applied in a manner consistent with a paradigm's normative commitments, research will fail to achieve intended goals. Using cognitive psychology as an example, Malm (1993) provides an interesting discussion of what can happen when an approach to inquiry fails to match its methodology with underlying ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundations. Also, a firm grasp of normative commitments is necessary to ensure that the increasing number of interpretivist studies achieves the promise of new and different types of insights rather than becomes merely a weak repetition of the types of understandings already better achieved by more traditional quantitative approaches. Unfortunately, it is our impression that too much of the qualitative tourism and recreation research we see reflects the latter situation. Finally, our experiences working with students interested in interpretivist approaches to science are that, while they often come asking about qualitative methods,

most of their initial questions actually reflect issues that need to be addressed at the level of principles and normative commitments rather than methods. Thus, while you may have selected this book based on a desire to learn about methods for collecting and analyzing qualitative data, it is important to first consider the discussion of normative commitments outlined in Chapter 3.

Selection of a specific methodological approach should be driven by a researcher's perspective on three key issues: the nature of the specific questions motivating the research (i.e., the research goals); assumptions about the nature of the phenomenon being studied; and judgments about the relative importance of different research goals in combination with the relative significance of different threats to validity. Blindly adopting any particular methodological prescription without explicitly considering each of these issues is a good recipe for error. Because research goals may conflict with one another and threats to validity may be weighted differently, no single "best" methodology can be defined. As a consequence, difficult tradeoffs often have to be made with decisions guided by the underlying philosophy about the goals of the study and the nature of the phenomenon being studied.

The holistic and interdependent level at which these three factors (research goals, assumptions about the research phenomenon, and judgments about competing threats to validity) must be considered makes a discussion of methods in general (as opposed to a discussion of methods with respect to a specific research context) somewhat difficult. A thorough consideration of methodological decisions requires an analysis of a variety of contingencies that are difficult to specify in the abstract. Recognizing this difficulty, we take two different approaches to discussing methods in this book. First, a general discussion of methods is presented in this chapter, with an explicit acknowledgment that this discussion is somewhat lacking in specificity because it is presented in abstract rather than in regard to a specific research problem. This discussion addresses the basic methodological decisions that a researcher must face on any research project, emphasizes the tradeoffs or fundamental tensions reflected in the methodological choices regarding the aspects of research design discussed, and presents an hermeneutic perspective on these issues. Second, Chapter 5 discusses the issue of hermeneutic methods using three case studies to provide actual research contexts where specific hermeneutic methods can be illustrated.

A study's methodology is more than simply a statement of process or technique. It actually represents an explanation of the specific "testing logic" (see Chapter 2) that explains the relationship of empirical observations to research concepts. The basic methodological decisions faced in any research design include: (1) choosing a guiding conceptual framework (forestructure of understanding), (2) deciding how to represent empirical observations (data representation), (3) determining the sampling principle that will guide how elements from the population are selected for observation, (4) determining the method(s) of data collection, and (5) determining the method(s) of data analysis. Each of these steps in research design is discussed below from an hermeneutic perspective.

STEP 1: ADOPTING A FORESTRUCTURE OF UNDERSTANDING

Although not always characterized as a methodological step, the selection of a conceptual framework to guide the research is a very important dimension of the underlying testing logic because conceptual frameworks provide guidelines for how data will be collected. In social science, the fundamental tension underlying this methodological decision reflects a tradeoff between depending on a conceptual framework generated by prior re-

search versus remaining open to what is new, unique, and/or unexpected in the current research context. Two extremes to addressing this tension are evident. The first is represented by the use of operational models and/or tests of hypotheses or propositions that are developed or directly adopted from a review of the existing literature on the topic. The strength of this approach is that it takes advantage of the insights developed through past research, allowing the researcher to begin from a more advanced starting point than earlier researchers and to avoid wasting time reinventing the wheel. However, significant costs are that the potential insights from a given study are limited to the rigid boundaries defined by the operational model or the hypotheses/propositions being tested and/or that one or more aspects of the framework may distort, misconstrue, or not be compatible with or relevant to the research phenomenon in its current context.

At the other extreme pole of this fundamental tension are some interpretivist approaches to science that emphasize attempts to "bracket" preconceptions and approach the study of phenomena without prior conceptions. A presumed advantage of this approach is complete openness to the phenomenon being explored. And indeed, unlike the model described above, this approach does not set rigid boundaries on potential insights from research. However, this approach may prove to be equally limiting in another way. As discussed in the section in epistemology in Chapter 3, prior conceptions can be enabling rather than limiting. That is, they can broaden rather than reduce a researcher's ability to see, understand, and describe phenomena. Thus, in this extreme, a researcher runs the risks of not capitalizing on existing insights and/or "rediscovering" what was already known, rather than truly advancing understanding.

Hermeneutics reflects a middle point between these two extremes. Hermeneutic researchers seek to develop a "forestructure of understanding" (a conceptual framework about how to approach or understand the phenomenon) through an extensive review of literature on the phenomenon. However, developing an informed "forestructure of understanding" also carries with it a challenge for those adopting an hermeneutic philosophy: how to develop a perspective capitalizing on insights from prior research while at the same time remaining open both to the "uniqueness" in the specific occurrence of the phenomenon being studied and/or to the study subjects' "horizon of meaning" (see discussion of epistemology in Chapter 3). Hermeneutic researchers attempt to address this concern by utilizing conceptual frameworks/theoretical concepts, data-collection strategies, and data-analysis strategies that are capable of guiding the search for understanding but that do not narrowly predetermine the nature of responses (as is the case when researchers construct predefined operational models). Overall, the goal of the forestructure of understanding is to serve an enabling role, not a limiting one; it functions as a guide rather than a boundary to understanding. Specific examples of conceptual frameworks that are enabling, not limiting in the sense discussed here and in the section on epistemology in Chapter 3 are illustrated in the three case studies presented in Chapter 5.

STEP 2: DECISIONS ABOUT DATA REPRESENTATION

While one often encounters discussions making a distinction between qualitative and quantitative research, as a basis for describing different approaches to science, such a distinction is largely meaningless because it fails to address the underlying norms and principles that guide the practice of science. For example, the phrase "qualitative research" can refer to a large number of research approaches with widely varying normative commit-

ments. Where the qualitative/quantitative distinction does have meaning, though, is in regard to methodological choices regarding data representation (prior to analysis) and presentation (subsequent to analysis). The chief fundamental tension facing tourism and recreation researchers with regard to data representation is a tradeoff between efficiency in analysis versus maintaining the integrity of the phenomenon being studied.

Representing data using numerical systems creates two types of efficiencies. The first form of efficiency occurs with respect to analysis of data; numerical data allow researchers to employ the power of mathematical analysis and computerized statistical programs and these in turn have implications for sample size, amount of data that can be processed, and length of time required for analysis. The second form of efficiency is related to the ability to summarize and present the results. Numerical data can be summarized in concise tabulations much more readily in comparison to qualitative data, facilitating the ability to "open" the research to external critique. However, although these efficiencies are very desirable features in research, as discussed in the epistemological section of Chapter 3, numerical systems and associated statistics are not passive instruments. They impose a particular structure (set of properties) on empirical systems that are not always consistent with the nature of the phenomenon being studied or the nature of the insight into the phenomenon being sought. Thus, when choosing between qualitative and quantitative means of representing or presenting data, researchers must at times struggle with the choice between the efficiency and power that can accompany the use of quantitative forms of representation versus maintaining the integrity of the of the phenomenon being studied (i.e., the phenomenon is inherently a qualitative one).

Recognizing this fundamental tension requires researchers to situate discussions of quantitative versus qualitative means of representation within the context of the philosophy underlying views about reality and principles regarding its representation. Hermeneutics, with its origins and emphasis on qualitative phenomena (language, texts, communication, meaning, and experience) has a predisposition toward qualitative forms of data representation and presentation. At the same time, nothing within hermeneutic philosophy requires that data representation be exclusively qualitative. The means of storing and presenting data are not only methods for representing reality, but also media for communicating information about research phenomena. Even in the case of qualitative phenomena, useful information may be conveyed in quantitative presentations of the data. The second case study in Chapter 5 illustrates a situation where a quantitative summary/presentation of qualitative data was used to convey significant information about the phenomenon being studied (see Table 5.1).

STEP 3: CHOOSING A SAMPLING PRINCIPLE

The purpose of sampling is to represent the phenomenon being studied using some subset of its elements because it is too large to be characterized in its entirety. Therefore, the central concern in any approach to sampling is representativeness; a sample is intended to represent the larger phenomenon being studied in some manner. The concept of representation can be conceived in different ways and at different scales. For example, representativeness may be conceived as being a question of whether the results are "statistically generalizable to" the population. A closely related perspective conceptualizes representativeness in terms of obtaining an "unbiased estimator" of a population parameter. But representativeness can also be conceived as a question of how well (richly, deeply, thoroughly) the

findings represent the actual subject or individual being studied. Often these different sampling goals are not viewed as potentially conflicting or even as being separate and distinct issues. However, these ways of viewing representativeness do reflect separable and, therefore, distinct goals. For example, for some phenomena (e.g., attempts to understand processes such as how community and landscape meanings are created, communicated, and destroyed through public discourse in planning and management) the concept of an "unbiased estimator" is not even meaningful. At other times there may be tradeoffs between one or more of these types of sampling goals (ways of conceiving of representativeness). In tourism and recreation research, we believe the primary fundamental tension in sampling involves tradeoffs between depth of insight and specificity at an individual scale versus generalizability at a population scale. For example, the more specific our understanding of the individual, the less that understanding generalizes to other people. At times, specificity in the depth of understanding is more desirable than generalizability.

A study's "sampling principle" is an explanation of how a particular sample represents the phenomenon being explored. It also reflects how a researcher has dealt with the "fundamental sampling tension" described above. Adopting an hermeneutic approach to research does not pre-specify a particular sampling principle or sampling approach. However, it does require a researcher to recognize that selection of a sampling approach is a choice requiring consideration of multiple and potentially competing goals with respect to representativeness. Further, it requires researchers to understand the nature, implications, and limitations of more than one sampling principle.

For example, tourism and recreation research often uses relatively large, random samples. This is particularly appropriate when the goal of research is to make statements about how tourist characteristics are distributed within a population and/or when those characteristics being studied are relatively tangible and concrete. But there are other ways of representing a population that reflect fundamentally different sampling principles and that may be more appropriate when study phenomena are less concrete and tangible. For example, when studying phenomena like tourist experiences, one can use purposive sampling where the goal is to select as diverse a sample as possible. Under this sampling principle, the goal of sampling is not randomness but identifying and describing "representative types" as Bellah, Madison, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (1985) did in their classic study of individualism in American society. The phrase "representative type" is used here to imply two concepts. First, it refers to the idea that the description of the experiences, belief systems, etc., represent a detailed understanding of actual individuals rather than an aggregate characterization of some nonexisting average individual (Shafer, 1969). Second, it is used to emphasize the idea that the data "represent" a possible type of experience in relation to the context of the setting (or a type of belief system within the population) rather than a statistically generalizable result. With this sampling philosophy, the population is represented by capturing the range of experiences or belief systems (or as diverse a range as possible). Using this sampling approach something is lost—the ability to draw conclusions about how experiences are distributed across a population. However, something is gained—by virtue of the smaller sample size the researcher can employ approaches to data collection that allow a more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon being studied. A more specific discussion and illustration of a sampling principle with widespread relevance to hermeneutic research is presented in the third case study in Chapter 5.

STEP 4: DATA COLLECTION

Hermeneutics does not prescribe a particular approach to data collection. However, in tourism and recreation research, the means of data collection most likely to be used in hermeneutic research is in-depth interviews. Therefore, this section provides a detailed look at how to conduct an hermeneutic interview. Other qualitative data-collection approaches that might be employed in hermeneutic research include the use of photographs or advertisements (cf., Mick and Buhl, 1993; Walker and Mourlon, 1989), personal diaries or narratives (cf., Markwell and Basche, 1998; Schroeder, 1996); and participant observation (cf., Belk, Wallendorf, and Sherry, 1989; Celsi, Rose, and Leigh, 1993).

Researchers employing traditional interview and survey research techniques view data collection as a process of "discovery", and interview procedures are based on a stimulus response model (Mishler 1986a:35-41). This model treats the interviewer's questions "as a standard research stimulus ... [that is] expected to remain constant so that any variance in the response can be attributed to factors in the interview population" (Polkinghorne, 1988:176-177). Thus, underlying this model is an objectivist ontology that maintains there is a "free-standing reality" (Howard, 1991:187) and that knowledge is "a substance located in the minds, bodies, or personal experiences of others" (Nespor and Barysike, 1991:806).

In contrast, hermeneutics reflects a constructivist ontology in which knowledge of phenomena and reality is viewed as a textually produced construction of the interviewer and interviewee (Howard, 1991:187; Nespor and Barysike, 1991; Paget, 1983:69). Mishler (1986a), for example, suggests that an interviewer influences the production of narratives in at least two ways. First, he argues that how an interviewer "listens, attends, encourages, interrupts, digresses, initiates topics, and terminates responses is integral to the respondent's account" (p. 82). Second, Mishler points out that the interviewer is the audience to whom respondents present themselves in a particular light. As a consequence, when conducting an interview from an hermeneutic perspective, the researcher must adopt the role of "self as instrument", participating in an emergent discourse. This perspective conflicts with several key aspects of the "stimulus-response" model in traditional interviews (e.g., that each respondent must be asked the same questions in the same way) (Charmaz, 1991). Guidelines for conducting interviews in a manner consistent with the constructivist ontology that underlies hermeneutics can be found in a number of sources (Charmaz, 1991; Ely, Anzul, Friedman, Garner, and Steinmetz, 1991; Kvale, 1983; Mishler, 1986a; Paget, 1983; Polkinghorne, 1988). The discussion below provides a brief overview.

Although some discussions of interview methodology make a distinction between structured and unstructured interviews, Ely et al. (1991:58) point out that all interviews have a structure. Differences between interviews are really a question of how the structure is negotiated. With respect to interviews using open-ended questions, two extremes are evident. The first extreme is represented by interviews in which all respondents are asked a standard set of questions in the same order, and responses are taken as given with no additional probing. In the other extreme, the interview begins with a single pre-planned question. Subsequent questions are spontaneous reactions to the interviewees' responses.

Pre-planned questions have several advantages. First, planned questions can serve as a valuable guide for both the interviewer and the respondent. From the interviewer's perspective, they serve as a means of insuring that all relevant topics have been covered. From the respondent's perspective, they serve as a means of clarifying what topics are relevant and also as prompts that may trigger discussions about important aspects of the experience that

may momentarily have been forgotten in the interview setting. Second, novice interviewers tend to wander if they do not have a guide, and this can lead to awkward silences that increase both their anxiety and that of respondents (Charmaz, 1991:390). Ely et al. (1991:66) point out that it is also difficult for inexperienced interviewers to spontaneously ask open-ended questions as part of the flow of the interview. Finally, listing questions prior to the interviews can help researchers identify hidden assumptions and biases (Charmaz, 1991:390).

However, there are also potential pitfalls with the use of preplanned questions. First, over-commitment to a standard set of questions may preclude exploration of important topics (Charmaz, 1991:392). Second, relying too heavily on a pre-planned, standard sequence of questions may disrupt the flow of the interview. Ely et al. (1991) point out that it is usually impossible to anticipate the interviewee's responses. Answers to early questions "may make the next question seem inappropriate or absurd" (p. 64). Additionally, rephrasing a question already addressed may cause anxiety on the part of the respondent and/or suggest to the respondent the previous answer was not correct or acceptable. This can lead to a situation in which interviewers are "faced with a problem of having the respondent trying to please [them] instead of spontaneously answering the question" (p. 65). A final problem with relying too heavily on a pre-planned set of questions is that it may preclude improvement through revision (Charmaz, 1991:392). That is, it may lead interviewers to adopt tenets of traditional interviews (the stimulus response model) that maintain all respondents must be asked the same questions in the same way. While such an approach may be necessary for traditional quantitative or content analysis approaches in which analysis begins at an aggregate level, an hermeneutic approach to analysis begins by attempting to develop a detailed understanding of the individual cases prior to aggregation, creating an opportunity to accommodate variation in interview structure. Thus, it is appropriate to ask whatever questions are relevant to understanding that individual's experience. Also, hermeneutic research is an emergent process. It is acceptable and, in fact, expected that insights from earlier interviews will be used to guide and improve subsequent interviews (cf., Willims et al., 1990).

As a consequence, the fundamental tension in conducting an hermeneutic interview is developing an appropriate balance between an interview that is strictly regimented by a pre-planned set of questions and one that wanders aimlessly from topic to topic largely at the respondent's whim. In principle, an hermeneutic interviewer seeks to achieve this by viewing interviews as "directed conversations" (Charmaz, 1991:385). The role of the interviewer is to lead the respondents to certain themes without directing them to express specific meanings (Kvale, 1983:190). In practice, an hermeneutic interviewer seeks to achieve this end by developing an interview guide to ensure that interviews are systematic and focused enough to cover relevant and comparable (across interviews) information.

The phrase "interview guide" is used rather than "interview schedule" to emphasize the flexibility in conducting the interview. The guide is not intended to function as a schedule of questions asked in exactly the same order. Themes are pursued when relevant during the emergent course of the interview. Further, if an adequate discussion about a theme emerges prior to its being asked by the interviewer, the interviewer checks it off his/her "guide" rather than re-asking later and running the risk of communicating to the interviewee an earlier discussion was not acceptable. Finally, the list of questions should be seen merely as a guide, because hermeneutic interviewing requires the use of contextual follow-up probes that emerge in response to features of the on-going conversation. During the

interview process, researchers should be alert to ambiguities, responses that appear incomplete, or responses that appear contradictory. In such cases, the interviewer should use probes to determine if these ambiguities "are due to a failure of communication in the interview situation, or whether they reflect real inconsistencies, ambivalence, and contradictions by the interviewee" (Kvale, 1983:177).

We typically develop the interview guide by first listing the themes to be addressed in the interview based on the forestructure of understanding, study goals, and research questions. For each theme we then develop a series of possible lead-in questions that we believe would generate a discussion from the interviewee about the topic. We typically develop several different lead-in questions in case initial questions are not understood by the respondent or for some reason do not generate a discussion about the desired theme. Further, we generally start out with very broad, only minimally directive questions, but develop a set of questions that are increasingly narrow and specific in focus. Some interpretivist researchers seek to avoid the latter type of questions (those with a narrow focus), fearing they are too directive and run the danger of substituting the researcher's understandings for the respondent's structuring of the phenomenon. However, we maintain that during analysis one can always conclude that the line of questioning was too directive and therefore not use the data. However, if a topic of relevance to the research is not raised by the interviewee nor asked by the interviewer, the researcher has no basis for drawing any conclusions whatsoever about the issue. Therefore, we argue it is appropriate to follow-up very broad, open-ended questions about a particular theme with increasingly specific and focused interview questions.

It is through the use of probes, that the concept of "self as instrument", which underlies an hermeneutic interview is most evident. Just as traditional survey instruments are field tested, there are certain skills associated with hermeneutic interviewing that can only be developed and refined through application. Examples include learning when to ask, when to listen, and how minor responses from the interviewer may influence the course of the interview (e.g., drawing in a breath when a question occurs to an interviewer may be interpreted by the interviewee as a signal to abruptly end the current discussion). These types of skills come through conducting interviews and carefully studying each successive transcript (Charmaz, 1991:391).

While some skills must be developed through application, others (e.g., certain aspects of probing) can be taught. For example, questions beginning with "why" tend to be viewed as hostile challenges in American culture, whereas questions beginning with "how" tend to reduce defensive feelings (Charmaz, 1991:391). Texts on reflective listening or therapeutic counseling can be extremely helpful in this regard. Ivey (1983), for example, presents a very thorough discussion of the use of probes in an interview situation. He begins by examining how the initial words used to phrase a question influence the response. For example, "what" questions often lead to a discussion of facts, "how" questions lead to discussion of process or feeling, while "could" questions are less directive than either of the other two. He also discusses situations in which the interviewer may want to use closed rather than open questions. Additionally, he discusses the use of encouragers (nonverbal communication, restatement of key words or phrases), paraphrases, and summaries as a means of directing conversation, eliciting information, and clarifying ambiguities. Finally, he presents a framework for analyzing transcripts that can be used as a tool for learning how to conduct interviews. This framework not only provides a basis for analytically dissecting interviews so that individuals can learn how they are conducted and where dif-

ferent directions could have been taken in the course of the interview, it also may serve as a means of evaluating the roles both the respondent and interviewer play in producing the discourse. Other references addressing similar issues include Cormier and Cormier (1985), Ivey, Ivey, and Simek-Downing (1987), and Kvale, (1996).

Following the interview guide approach described above, the end result will be an interview text that is co-produced by a respondent describing her or his experience and an interviewer asking questions that are inherently leading. This means that each interview will be unique. However, because the interview guide ensures that equivalent/comparable information is explored, and because idiographic (individual-level) analysis serves as the foundation for all subsequent nomothetic (across individual) analyses rather than beginning analyses at an aggregate level, this variation across interviews is acceptable.

A final note about the interview process also stems from the hermeneutic approach to analysis. As discussed in the section on epistemology in the preceding chapter, an hermeneutic approach to analysis is characterized using the metaphor of a circle, in which analysis is based on a rigorous and prolonged exploration of parts of the interview in relation to the whole. Using this approach, individual words; specific phrasing; and sometimes even tone of voice may become highly significant. Deep or significant meanings of comments not apparent during the interview or initial readings of interviews may emerge under more rigorous analysis. Therefore, a thorough; complete; and accurate database is essential. During the interview process it is not possible for the interviewer to record the necessary detail and nuances, so interviews should be tape-recorded for later transcription. Both the transcriptions and original tapes serve as the empirical basis for data analysis.

STEP 5: DATA ANALYSIS

The preceding sections on hermeneutic methodology were organized around a discussion of fundamental tensions requiring difficult tradeoffs that must be considered when choosing a methodological approach. In many ways, data analysis represents an amalgamation of these tensions/tradeoffs, but decisions with regard to analysis have largely been predetermined (and should be internally consistent with) prior methodological choices. As a consequence, the discussion in this section focuses on the process of hermeneutic analysis rather than fundamental tensions faced in analysis.

Hermeneutic data analysis centers around the development of what Tesch (1990) described as an organizing system. The purpose of an organizing system is to identify predominant themes through which narrative accounts (interviews) can be meaningfully organized, interpreted, and presented. The process of developing an organizing system *is* the "analysis," while the final organizing system is the product of the analysis.

This "organizing-system" approach is fundamentally different from a "content-analysis" approach that proceeds by developing a system of categories into which data are coded (an approach frequently associated with qualitative analysis). We think having an understanding of the distinction between Tesch's concept of an organizing system versus content analysis is important if hermeneutic research is going to result in something other than a pale and poor imitation of quantitative approaches. One of the main differences, though one that is hard to express, is that a successful organizing system is what makes the analysis "holistic" as opposed to "reductionistic/multivariate" in nature. A content analysis may identify important themes, but this approach fails to show the inter-relationships among these important themes and the categories into which data are coded tend toward the

abstract and generic, losing the richness of the qualitative database. In contrast, a successful final organizing system promotes a more holistic understanding of the phenomenon by showing the inter-relationships among themes and by retaining a rich characterization of individual themes.

The process we have followed in developing an organizing system proceeds according to the following steps.

(1) As noted in the preceding section, given the importance that language and the context in which it is embedded is accorded in hermeneutic philosophy, it is essential that the interviews be tape recorded to ensure an adequate database. Transcription of these interviews is necessary for the detailed "dialog" with the data dictated by the "hermeneutic circle" which characterizes the hermeneutic process of analysis (see section on epistemology in Chapter 3). Ideally the person who conducted the interview is also the person who does the analysis. Often it is most efficient to have a professional typist transcribe the data. However, if this approach is used, the data analyst should proof each transcript while listening to the original tape. Oral communication is vastly different than written communication, and the transcriber has had to make difficult, and sometimes critical, decisions. When proofing, in addition to looking for errors, the researcher should evaluate decisions made by the transcriber concerning punctuation and presentation. Also, tone of voice is at times critical for understanding the meaning of oral conversation. Some individuals have developed elaborate coding systems for recording pauses, voice inflections, etc. within the transcription. However, in our work, we have found such coding systems to be an imperfect medium for recording these features of conversation and that the resulting complexity is often an impediment to analysis and communication of results. Further we suspect that most tourism and recreation researchers have an interest in the content of the interviews rather than the linguistic, grammatical, etc. structure of communication, which makes such coding (in our experience) superfluous. However, if the approach of transcribing without coding nonverbal cues is used, the original tape should be kept until the final analysis (including any peer-review process) is complete in case voice inflection, pauses, etc. become a central issue in interpreting the meaning of a statement.

(2) The first step in actually developing an organizing system is to develop an indexing (numbering) system used to reference the location of specific units of text. The analyst must first decide upon a unit of reference (the smallest unit of text that can be accessed via the index/reference system). We have found a sentence to be a highly useful unit for serving as the basis for defining an index system. In other words, in the transcript that actually serves as the basis for analysis, each sentence is numbered sequentially. In part this decision is based on how we use the index system. These numbers function only as a reference system for locating and retrieving units of text, they are not part of the analysis. Using individual words as the basic unit would create an unmanageable system. Use of lines as a reference system breaks ideas in awkward places and is subject to the whims of the "font" selected. Use of paragraphs or other groups of sentences thought to express a complete idea requires an initial phase of analysis prior to defining the index system and creates problems when multiple ideas are expressed in a paragraph or when boundaries across distinct ideas overlap. Additionally, in conventional writing and transcription, sentences typically do express complete thoughts,

whereas paragraph boundaries often are defined on a more arbitrary basis that reflect "aesthetic" factors just as much as logical or complete groupings of ideas. Numerous qualitative software programs capable of creating a reference system are available. These software programs have the advantage not only of assigning numbers to units of text to be used as a reference system, they also facilitate coding and retrieving units of text addressing specific themes (discussed below) within and across interviews in subsequent stages of analysis. However, analyses can be conducted "manually" (i.e., without the aide of a software program) once the reference system has been permanently established.

(3) Following transcription, proofing the interview, and development of a reference system the interview should be read in its entirety one or more times depending on the familiarity with the interview. This reading provides an initial understanding of the interview content necessary to begin coding.

(4) The next step is to begin identifying and marking meaning units within the transcript. Meaning units are segments of the interview that are comprehensible on their own. The suggestion that portions of text are comprehensible on their own is not meant to imply that they can be fully understood independent of the context in which they are embedded. Rather, what is implied is a concept similar to Altman and Rogoff's (1987:37) term "aspects" which they defined as referring to "features of a system that may be focused on separately but that require consideration of other features of a system for their definition and for understanding of their functioning." Meaning units are typically not words or phrases, but groups of sentences. Beyond this general definition (i.e. a unit of the interview narrative that expresses an idea complete and coherent enough that it can be focused on separately), there is no specific algorithm or set of rules of identifying and defining a meaning unit. As a consequence, this stage of analysis requires a careful and thoughtful reading of the text. Since not all meaning units in an interview will be related to the phenomenon being investigated, it will probably prove overly tedious to identify every possible meaning unit. Focus on those that provide insight into the phenomenon being investigated. However, an analyst may find that comments that initially seem irrelevant eventually provide crucial insights. Therefore it is important to occasionally go back and read an entire interview over again. This approach is another aspect of the hermeneutic circle of analysis described in the epistemology section of Chapter 3.

(5) As the analyst starts to get a feeling for the nature of the meaning units, she/he begins to develop thematic labels under which the individual meaning units can be grouped. The distinction between meaning units and themes is important. The meaning units themselves are actual statements from the interview, they represent the "hard data" or evidence that the researcher will use to persuade the reader that the analysis and interpretations are warranted. The thematic labels, in contrast, represent *the researcher's* analysis concerning what the meaning units reveal regarding the phenomenon being studied. In other words, the thematic labels are interpretive. While the language used by the respondent is important, do not feel constrained to words or phrases used by the respondents in defining the themes. Particularly when it comes to a nomothetic (across individual) level of analysis, you may find that different individu-

als are using different language to describe the same theme. Also the prior conceptual understanding or more global perspective on the phenomenon you have as a researcher may lead you to identify and label themes with language not directly used by respondents. Another point to emphasize in regard to the relationship between meaning units and thematic labels is that thematic labels do not necessarily represent discrete and mutually exclusive categories. That is, one meaning unit may be "coded" into more than one thematic label, meaning units may be grouped together differently under different thematic labels, etc. As with meaning units, there is no specific algorithm or set of rules for identifying and defining thematic labels. These themes are identified on the basis of the "forestructure of understanding" developed through the ongoing review of existing literature/research; the research goals, questions, and themes used to develop the interview guide; and the emergent insights generated through the hermeneutic dialogue with the database from the current study. Particularly in the early stages of analysis we have found it useful to have several individuals analyze interviews. The goal here is not to develop, assess, or achieve some standard of "inter-rater" reliability; as discussed in the section on epistemology in Chapter 3, hermeneutics maintains that multiple interpretations may legitimately co-exist. Rather, the value of involving multiple analysts is the opportunity to engage in a dialogue about the research, not only with the data, but also with others who have engaged the data in a significant way. This idea is central to Gadamer's view of science ("talk or dialogue is not an incidental condition of inquiry; it is the very life of inquiry, discovery, and truth itself" [Wachterhauser, 1986:33]). Finally, while the process of coding can be done manually, qualitative software analysis programs are invaluable in facilitating this process and for accessing/retrieving meaning units associated with thematic codes during subsequent analyses or development of reports.

(6) Don't limit interpretation simply to identifying themes. Seeing, understanding, and explaining the interrelationships among themes is one of the key features of hermeneutic analysis that offers the possibility of a holistic and insightful interpretation. We have found that in the initial stages, trying to sit down and "write" the interpretation is extremely difficult and often not very productive. Instead, we often try to develop a visual aid that helps organize the themes and their inter-relationships. An important insight in our understanding of this type of analysis was when we realized that development of this type of visual organizing system was actually a key aspect of interpreting the data rather than simply a means of reporting the findings. That is, in the early stages, this effort is more appropriately viewed as being a part of the process of analysis rather than an attempt to communicate the product of analysis. Also figures can be much more readily manipulated than can written text, adding an important dimension of flexibility to early stages of analysis. Visual aids may take the form of an actual figure (as illustrated in Figure 5.1 presented in the first case study in Chapter 5) or a table (as illustrated in Table 5.1 presented in the second case study in Chapter 5).

(7) Writing a discussion of the interpretation that incorporates the empirical evidence that serves as the warrants or justification for the interpretation is the next step. The most common fault at this stage seems to be merely presenting a listing or summary of what a respondent said. Instead, this written presentation should be interpretive; it will be worthwhile only to the extent that it provides insight into the phenomenon being

studied. Also do not assume that the reader will immediately see what you saw—the researcher's familiarity with the data and understanding of the research context vastly exceeds that of the reader seeing material for the first time. Lead the reader through the interpretation with introductions, transitions, and summaries. At the same time, sufficient empirical evidence should be included to allow the reader to make a relatively independent judgment about the warrants for the researcher's interpretation. This empirical data should play a "justificatory" role rather than merely an "illustrative" role. A related concern is the loss of "efficiency" in the ability to summarize qualitative data in as concise and complete a manner as tabulation of quantitative data allows. This is especially problematic in light of the definition of "anti-science" as the selective use of data to support a predetermined world view (see Chapter 2) and the goal of maintaining the possibility of external critique as a universal standard of science (see Table 2.1). While there is no perfect solution to this dilemma, the analyst should be careful both to explain how the specific excerpts were selected (and how they represent the overall data base) and to include rather than ignore or dismiss contradictory or ambiguous data in the analysis. This issue is discussed in more detail in the "Conclusions" section of the second case study in Chapter 5.

(8) Hermeneutic research first seeks an understanding of the individual (idiographic level analysis). That is, it seeks to understand how an individual experiences and constructs the world regardless of whether or not similar themes/organizing systems can be found for other individuals (illustrated in Case Study 1 in Chapter 5). It is entirely appropriate, in fact desirable, to begin analysis of individual interviews as they are completed rather than to wait to begin analysis until all the interviews have been conducted. The ideal situation is to analyze an interview immediately subsequent to its completion and prior to conducting the next interview, in case there are insights to be gained that would help improve the next interview. But it is also equally important to revisit analyses of initial interviews based on insights gained from subsequent interviews. This reflects another dimension of the hermeneutic circle of analysis described in the epistemology section of Chapter 3. As you begin to build an understanding of several individuals, you may see themes that are relevant across a group of individuals or even the entire sample. Identifying and interpreting these themes represents a nomothetic (across individual) analysis. The organizing system for a nomothetic analysis may be an extension of the idiographic level organizing system so that it captures the range of individual perspectives (most strongly illustrated in the second case study in Chapter 5) or it may be entirely different—an analysis of the phenomenon rather than individuals (most strongly illustrated in the third case study in Chapter 5).

As a final note, do not make the mistake of thinking you will define a final organizing system at the beginning. You will in all probability modify it (add to, integrate, reorganize, etc.) as you go along. In particular, you may find a theme strongly evident in a later interview and, upon re-reading earlier interviews, find it is there but you missed it. That is good, that is what is supposed to happen and the reason for the hermeneutic circle of analysis. As you develop additional individual level organizing systems and the nomothetic organizing system, go back to the transcripts you previously analyzed and modify them if necessary. Though tedious at times, this process is the essence of the hermeneutic circle. Though not readily made visible or easily documented, it is one of the core features in achieving an analysis that is rigorous and systematic, the third defining characteristic of science (Table 2.1).

5
Case Studies in the Application of Hermeneutics

AS NOTED IN THE section on epistemology in Chapter 3, Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy emphasized that scientific inquiry is characterized by a dialogic encounter but was vague with respect to the specific method that characterized this dialogue (Bernstein, 1986, Wachterhauser, 1986). Additionally, as noted in Chapter 4, decisions about methods must be made in the context of assumptions about the phenomenon being studied, research goals and questions, and judgments about the relative significance of competing threats to validity. Further, from an hermeneutic perspective, selection of methods is seen as an emergent dimension of the research. For these reasons, the preceding chapter on methods was somewhat general and lacking in specific detail. It outlined principles, fundamental tensions caused by competing goals/threats to validity, and a general process, but fell short of specifying a methodological algorithm of the sort associated with statistical analyses like regression or t-tests. This lack of specificity is characteristic of anti-foundationalist philosophies like hermeneutics (see section on axiology in Chapter 3). In fact, the most extreme anti-foundationalists refuse even to address the issue of methodology, maintaining that each research application is unique. However, less extreme proponents of anti-foundationalism recognize that "knowledge is validated within a community of scientists as they come to share unproblematic and useful ways of thinking about and solving problems" (Mishler, 1990:422). In this regard, Mishler advocates the use of exemplars as a means for interpretive researchers to address "the task of articulating and clarifying the features and methods of our studies, of showing how the work is done and what problems become accessible to study" while avoiding establishment (or institutionalization) of compulsory, foundationalist-like algorithms. This chapter attempts to facilitate the practice of hermeneutics in tourism and recreation research by employing Mishler's (1990) concept of exemplars (case studies) as a means of clarifying the use of methods in an hermeneutic manner. Three case studies are presented below. These case studies were selected to highlight specific methodological issues. The discussion accompanying each case study begins with a summary of methodological issues to be illustrated. This is followed by an

explanation of the study approach and research goals. Finally the actual analysis is presented.

CASE STUDY 1: TOURIST EXPERIENCES ON LADY MUSGRAVE ISLAND

Overview

This case study is presented to illustrate a number of concepts: an idiographic (individual level) analysis; the use of a forestructure of understanding that builds on previous insights generated by research on related phenomena and that guides the current research effort while still maintaining an openness to what is new and unique in the current data set; the use of an indexing system to reference text in a way that facilitates analysis; and the development of an organizing system. The interview used in this case study comes from a study conducted by Lea Scherl for the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority on Lady Musgrave Island (a forested coral cay on the Great Barrier Reef). In its initial conceptualization and development, this research was not viewed as a hermeneutic endeavor. Instead, it was a content analysis approach modeled after Scherl's (1988, 1990) earlier study of wilderness experiences during an Australian Outward Bound Program. This initial content analysis sought to gain a comprehensive understanding of the variety of experiences sought by tourists on Lady Musgrave forming a taxonomy of tourism relevant to the area (Scherl and Valentine, 1992).

The interviews that formed the empirical text for analysis in this case study were conducted on-site, tape recorded, and later transcribed. The standardized questions consisted of 25 open-ended questions addressing issues such as the nature and meaning of the experience, perception of the setting, and opinions regarding management-related issues such as number and behavior of other recreationists. These interviews were conducted in a manner somewhat divergent from hermeneutic principles.[1] The most notable differences were the adherence to a standardized set of questions irrespective of the flow of the interview and the infrequent utilization of probes to explore initial responses. However, despite these departures from hermeneutic guidelines, the narrative data produced from these interviews lend themselves to hermeneutic analysis. The discrepancy between the interview process that generated the current data set and the hermeneutic interview process described in Chapter 4 is raised in part to highlight the issue that hermeneutic analysis and hermeneutic data collection are distinct dimensions of hermeneutic research. Hermeneutic analysis can be applied to many different texts beyond those produced directly through an hermeneutic process. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 3, the origins of hermeneutics centered around an interest in interpreting biblical scripture.

Idiographic Analysis

As discussed in the two preceding chapters, hermeneutic analysis begins with in-depth exploration of individual interviews. The goal of analysis for this case study is to identify predominant themes through which a narrative account of a specific experiential situation can be meaningfully organized, interpreted, and presented. This involves: (1) establishing a point of view from which to begin analysis (the forestructure of understanding), (2) reading the entire narrative several times to gain an understanding of it in its entirety, (3) using this preliminary understanding as the basis for a deeper exploration of the "parts", and (4) modifying the understanding of the whole on the basis of the more detailed understanding of the parts.

The idiographic stage of analysis is especially critical because it serves as the foundation for any subsequent nomothetic (across individual) analysis. At the same time, the idiographic stage is frequently glossed over in many exemplars of hermeneutic research, due to journal space limitations and the frequent desire to make nomothetic statements that have implications beyond individual cases. This is unfortunate, because this is one of the most distinctive aspects of hermeneutic analysis and, therefore, is the stage least familiar to those grounded in traditional quantitative approaches to science that conduct analyses and draw conclusions on the basis of aggregate data.

The original study collected 207 interviews of visitors to Lady Musgrave. Visitors fell into three categories: day trippers, "yachtees" (private groups that had arrived at the island via yachts) and campers (visitors camping overnight on the island). The idiographic analysis presented below is based on the analysis of an interview with one of the campers. Brief analyses of two additional interviews from this study can be found in Patterson, Williams, and Scherl, (1994).

Forestructure of Understanding

The purpose of the analysis presented in this case study was linked to a long-standing goal in nature-based tourism and leisure research of interpreting and describing the relationship between tourists/recreationists and the settings in which tourist/recreational experiences occur. In general, research exploring this relationship to setting/tourism destination centers around two competing perspectives regarding human nature and experience. The prevailing approach has been grounded in an information-processing model that makes important assumptions regarding three key aspects of human nature: the source of well-being, the nature of consciousness, and the nature experience. First, this model assumes that happiness and well-being occur when specific needs or goals are met (Diener, 1984; Lofman, 1991). Second, as implemented in tourism and leisure research, this approach depicts tourists as rational, analytic, goal-directed individuals who evaluate alternative settings based on objective properties (information) to determine which settings will produce desired benefits (cf., Driver, Brown, Stankey, and Gregoire, 1987). Finally, although personal characteristics such as expectations and past experience are included in some information-processing models, the manner in which these traits are operationalized treats people in a generic way (e.g., past experience affects everyone in the same way). In other words, this model adopts a deterministic perspective in which the variability in meanings and experiences that emerge from the encounter between tourists and the setting is viewed as a stable and predictable phenomenon caused by isolatable environmental and personal variables (Altman and Rogoff, 1987; Anderson, 1986).

In contrast to the information-processing model, the forestructure of understanding applied in the following analysis adopts a meaning-based model (cf., McCracken, 1987; Mick and Buhl, 1992) as the foundation for exploring tourists' relationship to the setting in which tourism occurs. This model maintains that happiness and well-being arise directly from the nature of activity and from interaction with objects, places, and people rather than from attaining desired end states (Diener, 1984; Lofman, 1991; Omodei and Wearing, 1990). Rather than beginning with a view of tourists as information processors seeking a package of benefits obtained through participation in a specific activity with a definite beginning and end, tourists are viewed as participating in the ongoing enterprise of constructing a life and an identity (McCracken, 1987). Humans are not seen as passively responding to objective information, but instead they are seen as actively constructing mean-

ing as they seek to create coherence in their lives. Thus, meaning is viewed as an emergent property actualized through a transactional relationship between person and setting (Mick and Buhl, 1992).

Initial Organizing System.

As stated in Chapter 4, the goal of an hermeneutic analysis is to develop an organizing system through which interviews can be meaningfully organized, interpreted, and presented (Tesch, 1990). Sometimes the organizing system emerges entirely from the data. However, in this case, the fundamental building blocks for the organizing system were conceived prior to the analysis based on the conceptual perspective outlined above. Therefore, the discussion of the organizing system in this case study is presented as part of the forestructure of understanding.

The organizing system was developed around two themes: claimed identity and current personal project.

Claimed Identity.

Mishler (1986b:243) suggests that all narratives are a form of self-presentation filled with references to a particular self-identity claimed by the respondent. For example, an interview about an individual's recreational experience may contain references to an identity linked to a culture structured around a specialized activity (e.g., scuba diving), an identity related to the social group in which the experience occurred (e.g., a concerned parent), or an identity related to more global settings characteristics (e.g., a wilderness purist). Given the importance attributed to identity in meaning-based models of human behavior (and hermeneutics), one major objective of the analysis was to identify the way that respondents express their identity through the interview and how this identity is related to their "construction" and experience of this setting.

Current Personal Project.

Both meaning-based models of human behavior and hermeneutics also emphasize the concept of "projects" rather than "goal-directed behavior." The phrase "current personal project" emphasizes two fundamental tenets of a meaning-based model: (1) the idea that human experience is an emergent narrative rather than a deterministically predictable outcome and (2) the concept of situated freedom in which people are seen as having the capacity to react in distinctively individual ways within boundaries imposed by the social, cultural, and environmental background. Thus, in the following analysis, particular attention was paid to identifying how people understand the current personal project they are engaged in and how this project is related both to their "claimed" identity and their "construction" and experience of leisure settings.

Analysis

Indexing/Reference System.

The first step in the analysis was to associate the interview transcript with an index system to reference the location of specific units of text. A portion of the indexed interview for this particular analysis is presented in Appendix II. As stated in the previous chapter, this reference system is used simply as a means of referring to, locating, and retrieving units of text. Beyond these functions it plays no role in the analysis.

Final Organizing System.

As stated in the preceding chapter, developing the organizing system is the analysis, while the final organizing system is the product of the analysis. The final organizing system for this particular interview is presented in Figure 5.1. In a journal article or project report, the results section would focus on an explanation of this organizing system and the discussion/conclusion section would address the potential implications as illustrated below.

Results/Discussion

The most prominent theme running throughout the interview was this camper's definition of the current project in which he was engaged: "escape." In his words, the personal significance of the experience was that:

> "It puts me back in touch with what Australia is like again because I live in Sydney and I don't get out that often and .... I find it very relaxing and I suppose it has reaffirmed to me how much I like getting away from people and from civilization and the next time I come I will probably go somewhere that's even more remote than this." 309-311[2]

The meaning of responses to many of the questions in the interview become more apparent when interpreted with respect to this project. Many responses provide insight into his personal understanding of what it means to escape while others suggest how his understanding of this project shaped his perception of this setting.

A second primary theme was related to the identity "claimed" by the respondent in the course of the interview—that of an experienced backcountry camper.

Question: How important are natural environments to you during your leisure time?

... "C105: Very important. The reason why they are so important is that's the reason I



Figure 5.1: Illustration of the Final Organizing System for the Interview of a Camper at Lady Musgrave Island, Australia.

> go on holidays, is to get away from an artificial environment or a man-made environment into a natural one, and so if I can't get into a natural one, there is no point me going on holidays, and that's why I don't go to a resort or to a camping area. I would rather go somewhere bush where you take everything with you and you are totally in a natural environment apart from your tent and your cooking area and that." 75-78

This claimed identity was closely related to the project of escape, but also appeared to influence this respondent's experience in important ways beyond simply a desire to escape. However, because the theme of "escape" was more prominent in the interview, the following discussion is organized primarily on the basis of this current personal project (Figure 5.1). Where appropriate though, the influence of the respondent's claimed identity as an experienced backcountry camper is pointed out.

The opportunity for escape was linked to three other themes running through the interview: attention, convenience, and safety. Overall these three themes help define the nature or boundaries of an acceptable opportunity for escape and serve as a basis for understanding how he interprets and responds to the setting.

Attention. The attention theme has two subdimensions: captivation and intrusion. For this respondent, captivation represents the positive possibility of escape. It is the opportunity to experience stimuli he finds inherently fascinating, involving, and different from that typical of life in Sydney. The specific nature of captivating experiences are illustrated in the following passage:

> "I think seeing the turtles yesterday—three of them all together, two huge ones and one little one about 1 metre across and I was coming in from the reef and they were just grazing on the grass in the shallow water at high tide and they didn't see me. So I got within three feet of them before two of them saw me and swam off and the other one just stayed there eating and I watched it for about 1 minute and it saw me and swam away. Then last night I was walking up the beach looking for hatchlings and I found a little hatchling going down to the water. That sort of thing I really enjoy. It increases my enjoyment a lot." 61-65

This and other responses suggest an object-centered orientation (Schachtel, 1959) to the actual experience. The focus of his attention throughout much of the experience was on the environment. For this camper, wildlife in particular was an important "captivating" dimension of the experience. He also mentioned using fish and bird identification guides he brought to the island. Additionally, when asked about what other information the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) might provide visitors, he suggested a booklet with the 10 most common species of coral, birds, and trees.

In contrast, intrusions are a class of stimuli that represent the conditions this camper is trying to escape. The most common source of intrusions were other visitors. Day trippers were particularly intrusive because they "are not a part of it [the experience] ..." (361). A day trip is instead:

> "a bit like going to a glorified museum or something. It is not really seeing what it is all about. You don't get to see the hatchlings, you don't get to see the turtles, you can't see the birds come in at night or watch the sunrise." 126-128

Additionally, day trippers were intrusive because they made this camper feel self-conscious.

> "To have so many people here in terms of every second or third day you get a whole bunch of tourists walking around the island, you feel a bit like you are in a zoo and you are getting visited by all these people and they are paying money to come and watch you, much like they come and watch the fish or the silly people who stay for two weeks on the island." 102

The yachts anchored in the lagoon were another intrusion, he "liked getting away from all that" (255). However, they were more acceptable than day trippers because they were, "in general ... a part of it" (361). Further, they were less of a problem than day trippers because he had encountered yachtees on the island itself only once.

In contrast, the mere presence of other campers was not a problem. In general, campers were friendly, but kept to themselves so:

> "it is not like you are in a bar or something and they are coming up to chat to you or anything like that, which is good." 82

In other words, the presence and behavior of other campers was typically not intrusive and was therefore consistent with the nature of the experience. However, some campers intruded on the experience by playing radios loud enough to be heard at night and in the morning. This was something he had come to get away from, and it interfered with his opportunity to escape. Interestingly though, he did not blame his fellow campers. They were "a bunch of teenage people... and, they were reasonable, they are what you expect from someone that age" (83). Instead, this camper thought the problem was caused by the regulation requiring everyone to camp in a single area, rather than allowing them to spread out. In other words, it was not so much the presence or number of other campers he was sensitive to, but their proximity. In fact, sensitivity to proximity of others shaped his response to the question regarding group size:

> "I was glad that the large group that came out was one altogether. If they had of been 3 separate groups they would have taken up an extra couple of spacings ... because they would have all wanted to be apart a couple of metres each instead of all being together, so I guess it is less crowded because they all came in one group, which is good." 168-169

This distinction between spatial proximity and use levels led him to perceive the social conditions at Lady Musgrave Island and at Northwest Island (a potential substitute site in the region) exactly opposite of the way the GBRMPA did. The interviewer described Northwest Island as a "sacrificial site" because it has a carrying capacity of 150 (compared to 50 for Lady Musgrave) and there are more motors (generators and air compressors) there. However, the camper being interviewed described Northwest Island as more private and providing a better opportunity for escape because he was able to camp away from other people and their generators there (345-359).

Despite his desire to escape, this camper found rules and regulations a nonintrusive and necessary aspect of the experience. He was pleased with the presentation made by the GBRMPA.

> "When we had the slide show the other night and the kids were told about the reef and what to expect when they go out there and how to look after [it], what not to do and what to do, I think that ... everyone in Australia should have access to that sort of information.... that sort of talk as a compulsory part of coming to the island." 22-23

However, he felt the tour boat personnel went too far and were unnecessarily intrusive when it came to explaining the regulations:

> "they acted like God ... very bossy and telling you what to do, and laying down the law and stuff like that ... I don't think people have to be like that to get their message across." 88-96

Convenience. A second theme linked to this camper's personal definition of escape and one that also shaped his perception of the island was convenience. This added an instrumental orientation to his perception of the island (i.e., an evaluation of the island relative to how well its attributes serve his current personal project). Although he wanted to escape civilization, adversity and the rigors of primitive life were not essential features of the experience. This was immediately apparent in his response to the question that asked him to describe the nature of the experience:

> "It is a pity they didn't drop us closer to the campsite because it is hard carrying your stuff all around the island.... [but] it is great being able to camp so close to the area where you are going to be snorkeling." 5-7

Further, when asked to describe what made Lady Musgrave distinctive from other places, he responded:

> "The camping area is the biggest difference that I can put between this island. Like on the beach, the Northwest Island you camp back from the beach in the ... trees so you don't actually get to see—like I can read my book and watch the sunset at the same time from my tent, whereas you can't see that at Northwest Island, you are back in about 50 yards." 58

Additionally, despite the desire to escape civilization, he found the solar-powered toilets "pretty fantastic." In part they were acceptable because they were not intrusive but:

> "nice and discrete, the solar powered thing is right near the ... trees, the toilet is hidden in the bushes, the signs are brown with white markings, they don't really glare at you which is nice." 288

However, he had mixed feelings about this facility. He recognized that this added convenience also attracted more people, forced visitors to camp in close proximity, and increased the possibility of intrusive interactions. As a result, he was willing to sacrifice convenience to preserve the opportunity to escape people.

> "If I had a choice between having more people around with facilities or having less people and no facilities, I would go for less people and no facilities and I would be

happy to make them all myself. If you are prepared to make the effort to get away from all the people you should be prepared to make the effort to keep everything clean, make your own toilet and carry your garbage out and use gas or metho when you are cooking and that stuff." 181-182

In addition to reflecting the theme of convenience as an aspect of the desire to escape, these responses also reflect an instrumental mode of perception linked to his identity as a camper. This instrumental mode is evident in his responses to questions asking him to describe what makes the environment distinctive (see index line 58 in excerpt above) or to describe the physical environment.

Question: How would you describe the physical environment at Lady Musgrave to a friend planning to visit it? "C105: If I was explaining it to someone who knew a bit about camping, I would say that it is a small island with coral all around it, trees in the middle, there is no water so you have to take everything with you. You can camp right on the beach but there is only one camping area so everyone is in together. There are toilets there, the only convenience you have. The weather is normally really nice, it doesn't get too cold and not too hot. You can always go for a swim and the beaches are nice on the north eastern side but on the other side it is quite corally, and so you should take shoes." 46-52

"This would be a particularly good island for the kids to come to because you have day-trippers so you can always get the kids coming on school excursions for the day. It would be great because everyone stays in the one camping area for kids to be all together. It is a very safe island. You have the lagoon to snorkel in and so on. It would be a fantastic teaching island for people to come to and get lectures and so on. There is probably some other islands that wouldn't be very practical for kids to be on, the ones that are a bit more remote and you wouldn't want young kids on them in case they got sick and so on." 297-302

Safety. Although he wanted to escape civilization, this camper did not want to be entirely isolated from the sense of security it affords.

"Safety always bothers me. I would never actually come out to an island by myself, I would always want company and if something ever drastically happened—one reason I am happy to have commercial or charter fishermen around, is there is always a boat to take you out or pass a message on or something like that..... It is a risk you take but that's one reason I don't want to get away from it totally without any means of getting back to the mainland." 326-330

In other words, his desire for safety defined the extreme boundaries of suitable opportunities for escape. It also clarifies his response to an earlier interview question in which he indicated that commercial fishing was acceptable as long as fishing vessels do not remain in the Lagoon (index lines 257-263). His opinion regarding commercial fishing, then, is not centered on the effect it has on the resource or the apparent discrepancy between commercial fishing and wilderness. Rather it is shaped by his desire to escape but not be completely isolated. This also helps explain why he found the presence of other campers acceptable.

Conclusions

Organizing the analysis around the concept of a current personal project provides insights into the type of recreational opportunity this recreationist sought: to escape civilization, life in Sydney, and "go ... bush" in a remote area. The dimensions defining an opportunity for escape did not come from the response to a single question, but across the whole interview. In fact, this camper might not even have been able to articulate as comprehensive a response to a direct question asking him to define the dimensions of an opportunity to escape. However, when describing the nature of his experience and reaction to the setting throughout the course of the interview, a coherent understanding of the meaning of escape emerged.

His understanding of an opportunity for escape has at least three dimensions: attention, convenience, and safety. The first dimension suggests an object-centered mode of perception in which the most enjoyable and memorable aspects of the experience are linked to captivating stimuli. In contrast, intrusions are those stimuli that intrude on the experience (listed in order of severity: day trippers, then yachtees, and finally the proximity and certain behaviors of campers). The second dimension suggests that challenge is not a central aspect of the escape experience for this camper; features that contribute to convenience are acceptable so long as they blend in with the setting. However, he is willing to make trade-offs on convenience if it eliminates the need for proximity with others (an intrusion). The final dimension, safety, defines the outer boundaries of an acceptable opportunity for escape. He recognizes the island as an environment with inherent dangers and does not want to be completely isolated from the safety net of civilization.

The analysis also yields insights into how his understanding of his current project shaped his perception of this specific setting. For instance, conventional wisdom would lead one to expect that an individual seeking to escape civilization on a remote barrier island would be strongly opposed to the presence of commercial fishing in the lagoon. Instead, he did not oppose this because the vessels symbolized safety, not intrusive civilization. Another example is his preference for encountering large groups as opposed to small groups. This finding seems counter to conventional wisdom, which maintains that recreationists seeking to escape civilization in wild areas would prefer to encounter small groups. However, within the context of the specific setting he was evaluating (a single camping area on a beach with no screening vegetation) his reasoning for this preference is readily understandable. Finally, although the GBRMPA considered an island with a higher use capacity to be the "sacrificial" site while Lady Musgrave was thought to offer a better opportunity for privacy and wilderness experiences, this respondent held exactly the opposite perception of the two islands. This is because the GBRMPA thought in terms of maximum use levels while the camper rated the islands in terms of intrusions or opportunity for intrusions.

CASE STUDY 2: TOURIST EXPERIENCES ON JUNIPER RUN

Overview

The previous case study illustrated an idiographic (individual) level analysis. This case study was selected to illustrate a nomothetic (across individual) analysis. This case study also differs somewhat from the first with respect to the role that the forestructure of understanding plays in the research. While the forestructure of understanding functions as a guide and builds upon previous research in both case studies, in the second case study it

does not serve as a central building block for the actual organizing system used to analyze the data. Instead, the final organizing system emerges entirely from the analysis of the data. The second case study is also used as an opportunity to explore issues related to an hermeneutic approach to data collection in more depth. Finally, this case study is used as an opportunity to examine issues related to the presentation and use of interview excerpts as a basis for opening the analysis to external critique.

This case study is based on short (10-20 minute) interviews with 30 day-use canoers in Juniper Prairie Wilderness. Juniper Prairie is a 13,260 acre wilderness area in the Ocala National Forest in Florida. It offers a seven-mile canoe trip down Juniper Run, which starts at a concessionaire operated campground/picnic area and ends at a small landing just outside of the wilderness. The Run is a slow-moving stream that originates from two springs near the launch site. For the first several miles, the stream channel generally is only slightly wider than six feet across as it winds through a thick forest comprised of palms, cypress, and other southern hardwoods characteristic of a subtropical forest. Eventually it begins to widen and pass through prairie wetlands reminiscent of the Everglades. The goal of the research was to generate an understanding of the experiences visitors find at Juniper Prairie in such a way that managers could begin to make a judgment about the extent to which these experiences represent wilderness experiences. A more complete discussion of the study can be found in Patterson, Watson, Williams, and Roggenbuck, (1998).

Forestructure of Understanding

There are many different ways to conceive of the nature of tourism and recreation experience. Several fundamental concepts related to the nature of these types of experiences were used to guide the research. First, the research adopted the view that the specific nature of recreation experiences in natural environments is best characterized by the concept of situated freedom. As noted previously in Chapter 3, situated freedom is the idea that there is structure in the environment that sets boundaries on what can be perceived or experienced, but that within those boundaries recreationists are free to experience the world in highly individual and variable ways. Within this perspective, the nature of experience is seen as emergent rather than predictable. Further, this perspective helps define the goals of research exploring the nature of experiences as those of (1) identifying the "boundaries" of the environment that constrain the experience and (2) the types of experiences that visitors are obtaining within those boundaries.

Second, the goal of analysis was not to develop a precise model describing what "really happened", but to understand how the experience is constructed and remembered. In other words, the interest was not in constructing an accurate historical record of events but in exploring how people made sense of their experiences. A final guiding assumption was that experience is best understood as a whole rather than as the sum of its parts. These latter two viewpoints influenced decisions concerning the method used to collect data. For example, one method for collecting data about experiences that is increasingly popular in recreation/tourism research is the Experience Sampling Method (Larson and Csikszentmihayli, 1983; McIntyre and Roggenbuck, 1998). This approach is highly appropriate when the goal is to gain an accurate understanding of the focus of attention at various points along the experience. However, it assumes that the experience can be adequately described by an overall "summation" of the individual "experiential" points. But in the research presented here, neither this goal nor the underlying assumption were consistent with the forestructure of understanding guiding the study. Therefore, a different

method (interviews focusing on the experience in its entirety conducted at the conclusion of the experience) was selected.

Data Collection

Several issues with regard to data collection are worth noting in this particular case study. The first has to do with what might be referred to as the "unit of analysis." We had originally intended to interview the tourists individually. However, we found that other group members frequently wanted, not only to "listen in", but to participate in the interview. Beyond this we noticed that it was common for groups finishing their trip to gather around and discuss the nature of the experience, presumably because the experience of canoeing the Run was, for many, such a powerful experience. Additionally we perceived that when tourists participated in the interviews as a group, we gained deeper access to the phenomenal experience as group members built off of each others' comments. Further, it appeared that even in cases where perceptions of the experience were vastly different (highly negative versus highly positive) members of a group were generally comfortable in expressing contrasting views. In fact, sometimes the more dissimilar the views, the more interested members were in expressing their opinion. For these reasons and because we were interested both in the experience of canoeing the Run at a nomothetic level and how the experience was constructed and remembered by visitors, we conducted group interviews when respondents demonstrated an interest in doing so. Given the nature of the analysis, we believe the mixture of group versus individual interviews did not create problematic issues. This issue serves to illustrate the emergent nature of hermeneutic research and the need to adopt a flexible approach to research design to accommodate the ability to capitalize on these emergent insights.

A final note with respect to data collection deals with the issue of transcription. Initially we always transcribed the tapes verbatim—attempting to include not only the exact words used, but also every "um", "uh", "you know", etc. However, we noticed that because we were not conducting a discourse analysis focusing on how people communicated but instead were interested in the content and meaning of the interview statements, we "cleaned" the excerpts of "extraneous" verbalizations when presenting them as empirical evidence for readers (see discussion of the final organizing system below). This change in approach was accompanied by a keen realization that oral and written language are vastly different communication media. For example, in transcribing oral communication into written form, it is difficult at times to know when to use various forms of punctuation. While oral communication is the database in its rawest form, when empirical evidence is presented in a manuscript, it must be presented in written form. In addition, given the approach to analysis we outline here, most of the analysis occurs on the transcribed data rather than directly from the cassette tapes. Finally, in science, it is critical that the reviewers be provided sufficient access to the data to determine warrants for conclusions (second defining criterion of science in Table 2.1). While it is possible to develop complex coding systems to try to precisely reflect characteristics of oral communication, in many cases these coding systems are readily interpretable only by those who develop them. Given these issues, we believe that when the goal of analysis reflects an interest in content and meaning rather than in the specific grammatical structure or syntax of communication, it is not essential or useful to transcribe the tapes entirely verbatim in the strictest sense of the term. However, we do believe it is essential to transcribe the exact language and phrases used by respondents *and all other aspects of oral communication that are meaningful* (sometimes "you knows," pauses,

etc. are meaningful aspects of oral communication); that decisions about what is extraneous and what is not should be made by researchers rather than someone whose sole role is transcribing the tapes; and that, given the difference between oral and written communication, the tapes be kept for reference until the final analysis (including the peer-review process) is complete.

Analysis

Final Organizing System.

Following the hermeneutic approach, the initial stage of analysis was at the idiographic level. However, the presentation here focuses on the nomothetic stage of analysis. At a nomothetic level, four coherent dimensions related to the nature of the experience tourists find at Juniper Prairie emerged (Patterson et al., 1998). Only one of these dimensions (challenge) is illustrated here. Challenge was the most prevalent experiential dimension; it emerged in every interview. However, the meaning of challenge and the role challenge played in defining the experience varied greatly across respondents. These different meanings and roles fell into nine different categories, four of which are considered here (Table 5.1). The organization of Table 5.1 represents our interpretation of the strength or degree to which the dimension of challenge seemed to dominate the experience, with intensity or importance decreasing as one moves from left to right in the Table.

Notice that in this case, rather than taking the form of a visual graphic, the organizing system is presented in tabular form. Also, notice the numerical summary of the data. Some interpretivist researchers steadfastly refuse to use numerical forms of representation or presentation when the database is qualitative. However, from an hermeneutic perspective, numbers are seen simply as one of many possible means of communicating information. In this case, the numbers provide useful information about how the different ways of experiencing challenge are distributed across the sample (but notice also footnote one in Table 5.1 explaining the context in which this numerical summary of the data should be interpreted). Further, the numerical summaries provide a useful context for understanding how the specific interview excerpts (presented in the discussion below) represent the data set, an important issue in "opening" the research to external critique (second defining criterion of science, see Table 2.1). However, it is the interview excerpts, not the numerical summaries presented in Table 5.1, that represent the actual evidence or "empirical test" used to support the interpretations of the experience.

Below we present empirical evidence to serve as the basis for justifying the final organizing system. Following hermeneutic tenets, this "results/discussion" section seeks to accomplish several tasks. First, rather than being merely a listing of what people said (a characteristic we feel is unfortunately all too common in qualitative analysis), the discussion presents the researchers' interpretation of the meaning of respondents' comments. This relates to the instrumental criteria of "insight" discussed in the section of Chapter 3 dealing with axiology. It leads the reader through an interpretive explanation of the phenomenal experience at Juniper Prairie rather than leaving it up to the reader to interpret the nature of the phenomenon based on study participants' comments. The reader should focus on assessing the basis or warrants for the conclusions. A fundamental question is whether or not sufficient empirical evidence is presented to allow the reader to make an independent assessment of the warrants for the conclusions drawn. Here it is important to note that the empirical evidence functions in a justificatory rather than illustrative role. Overall, this issue is related to the "persuasiveness" criterion discussed in the axiological commitments

section in Chapter 3 and the "subject to external criticism" criterion of science in general (Table 2.1).

A final issue to note in regard to the discussion presented below is the information accompanying each interview excerpt. Each excerpt is accompanied by a "tag" that identifies the speaker's gender and whether he/she was an adult or child. We included this information because we felt it provides context that might be useful in interpreting the comment. Second, we also included information identifying the interview from which the excerpt came (month, day, interview number on that day). We felt this was important to provide the reader some opportunity to evaluate how the excerpts selected were distributed across the sample (the third row of Table 5.1 facilitates this type of evaluation). However, this is not intended to imply that only comments made by several respondents are relevant. Given the small sample size and the focus on representative types as the means of representing the population, a comment by a single individual may be significant. The final component of the "tag" is an excerpt number that represents a sequential ordering of transcripts within the results section. It is included to facilitate references to excerpts in subsequent discussions within the text. Unlike the preceding Case Study, the "tag" does not include index numbers referencing the location of the excerpt in the original interview narrative. This is because in the final paper, the original interview is not accessible to the reader. However, the researcher should keep these references with the excerpts throughout the peer-review process to facilitate addressing questions that may arise.

Role Challenge Played (Category)	Challenge defined meaning of the experience		Challenge helped make experience a good story	Role of challenge unclear
Specific Description (Group)[2]	Absolute negative	Sense of accomplishment	Negative/ positive	Miscellaneous
Interview *Numbers*[3]	72102[4] 72302 80905	72103 72202 72304[4] 80603	72101 72102[4] 72304[4] 80604	80606 80701 80801 80903 81001
Percent of groups	10.0	13.3	13.3	16.7
Percent of respondents	8.8	11.8	11.8	14.7

[1]Due to the nonrandom sample and small sample size (30 groups), results should be thought of in terms of representative types rather than as statistically generalizable results (see Chapter 4 for explanation). [2]In the original study (Patterson et al., 1998), 9 different groups were identified. [3]The third row presents interview identification numbers. Identification numbers are month/day/interview number on that day. [4]Most of the interviews were done with several members of the group participating. In some cases perceptions between group members differed significantly. When this occurred, both responses were included in the analysis

Table 5.1: Challenge as a Dimension of Experience Among the Sample[1] of Visitors Interviewed at Juniper Prairie (adapted from Patterson et al., 1998).

Results/Discussion

Because this case study is presented for tutorial and illustrative purposes, a complete discussion of the organizing system is not presented (see Patterson et al. [1998] for the complete discussion). For some respondents, the experience of challenge was so intense it seemed to define the meaning of the experience. However, for the first group of respondents in this category, the nature of the challenge made for unpleasant, dissatisfying experiences (Absolute Negative group in Table 5.1). The following excerpt reflects the experience of this group:

> F: When we were here five years ago, it was a lot easier than this time ... the trees have almost totally blocked the flow there.... About killed my back..... It will be a cold day before I come back. We lost a pair of shoes and nearly got pushed in the muck over our heads. (Female, interview 72302, #1)

Challenge also seemed to define the experience for the second group of respondents. However, for this group the meaning was a more positive one (Sense of accomplishment group in Table 5.1). For these individuals, the challenge seemed to produce a sense of accomplishment, of overcoming or surviving a significant trial. The first two respondents in this category seemed to be actively debating whether the experience was, in fact, a positive one. For example, at the halfway point, one woman:

> was hoping that there would be an option to get out and have someone pick you up there.... because you can start off thinking seven miles is nothing, and then it seems very long. (female, interview 72103, #2)

However, when asked about the meaning of the experience in a later segment of the interview, she responded:

> Well personally today it's just that I survived it and managed to go. Because truly if there had been a half way point where I could have gotten out, then that's what I would have done. You know, just the idea of successfully completing it. (Female, interview 72103, #3)

The second respondent in this category was quite similar. When asked if anything detracted from the experience, his response indicated that the difficulty (challenge) of doing it was a detraction:

> Just the difficulty of it. .... It was pretty harrowing. We got stuck in one spot. I let them off [referring to his two children]. I was going to lift the boat over and I slipped because it was a fresh tree that was down. It was all kind of mossy and what not. And it took me about 45 minutes to get the boat right side up, the water out, and pulled up on the side and bring it around the tree. These guys were pretty scared, but I guess that was part of the experience. (Male, interview 72202, #4)

However, when asked about whether anything stood out in his mind as contributing positively to the experience, his immediate and sole response was "the challenge." Compared to the preceding respondent, he seemed further along in trying to decide whether or

not the experience was a positive one. Even at its immediate conclusion he seemed to feel the experience made a good story; he began enthusiastically describing his experience even before the interviewer approached him.

A third respondent in this category found a similar meaning in the experience.

> Well, it was a challenge that I wanted to do on my own, and accomplishing it means a lot. It's an achievement if you will. (Male, interview 80603, #5)

However, unlike the previous two respondents, he did not seem to be struggling with whether or not the challenge was a positive contribution to the experience. In part this seemed to be because he had expected a challenge (excerpt #5). In contrast, the previous two respondents in the "Sense of Accomplishment" group had not anticipated the degree of challenge. One had heard about it from a friend who "didn't give me any idea what it was all about" (72202) and one had been there before, but on that trip, experienced companions had done the paddling (72103).

These three respondents shared two other similarities beyond the interpretation of the meaning of the experience. First, as already noted, they were all novice canoers (one had been down the Run before, but with others doing the paddling [72103]). Second, other dimensions of the experience were not a major aspect of the interviews, suggesting that coping with the challenge had dominated the focus of attention. This conclusion is supported by a statement made by one of these respondents: "No I didn't see much anything else. Not that I expected to, you're spending most of your time watching the water ...." (Male, interview 80603, #6).

The second primary category concerning the role of challenge in the experience consisted of visitors for whom the challenge seemed to contribute to the construction of a good story (Table 5.1). The group within this category presented in this chapter (Negative/positive—see Patterson et al., 1998 for others) was of individuals who initially suggested that the overhanging trees and submerged snags that caused the trip to be so challenging detracted from the experience, and usually suggested that something needed to be done about this. However, their subsequent discussion indicated that this property of Juniper Run was a central part of what made the experience what it was and also provided a memorable and rewarding story from the experience. These "memorable stories" ranged from creative ducking, bending, and maneuvering of one's body within the canoe to actually tipping over. The following two excerpts illustrate these elements.

> M: I just, I wondered. I've seen where they have cut some trees away and I just wonder if they couldn't get back out there. Some of them were really low. Almost impossible. G1: Almost like doing the limbo in a canoe.... But some of it was fun, though. I mean I like, I'd leave some of it in. But some were really rough. G2: The ones that we went under, that last really, really low one. It had a branch hanging down like right in front of it and it was lower than the bridge. It was like, I don't know, wasn't that far off [hand gesture showing how far]. M: We all sat in the bottom of the canoe and got below the gunnels. I mean we were as low as we could get. G1: I mean we barely made it through. (male, two girls, interview 72101, #7)

> I: ... was there anything in particular that detracted from .... your enjoyment of the trip. M: Other than dumping out of the canoe? F: [Laugh]. .... No. M: No it was fine.

> F: Everything's wet. But it was good. .... I: Anything in particular that added to the experience maybe? F: Falling in the water, yeah. That, that - M: That worked both ways. .... F: And it was in a good, nice sandy spot and we could both touch, so we got the boat back over. But, looking at the boat and seeing it full of water was like, wow, what do you do now? .... F: When I went in that's what I thought [she would lose her glasses]. Though I held on to them. M: Found out your paddles float. F: They did? Yeah, they did [laugh]. I was too panicky - I'm in the water! (Male, female, interviewer, interview 80604, #8)

The final primary category in Table 5.1 contains a miscellaneous grouping of responses in which the theme of challenge was raised. However, for various reasons, the role challenge played in defining the meaning of the experience was not clear. In two cases (80606, 80701) this seemed to be because the respondents appeared "suspicious of" or uncertain about the objective of the interview and therefore the interview was not able to get beyond the "public self" to deeper personal meanings of the experience. For example, the respondent in interview 80606 seemed uncomfortable, perhaps because he was an adult leader of a scout troop that had just arrived and were engaging in a playful brawl/mud fight in the midst of other visitors in the water near the landing. Another example of situations in which respondents were placed in the miscellaneous category were three interviews (80801, 81001, 80903) in which the responses were somewhat contradictory. The Run was described as an easy one, but to varying degrees the challenge of it was also pointed out (e.g., it was not a big deal, but they got caught in the brush and were sore after the work out; it was pretty "straight forward ... [but] there were some places along the river where you weren't sure which way to go").

Conclusions

A detailed discussion of conclusions regarding the managerial and conceptual implications of this study are presented in Patterson, et al. (1998). The concluding discussion for this case study focuses more narrowly on one of the most problematic issues related to maintaining the scientific character of qualitative analyses at the nomothetic level. This issue is related to the second defining criterion of science (see Table 2.1) which, in part, requires data to be presented in such a way that readers are able to make a relatively independent assessment of the warrants or justification for the interpretations drawn from the empirical observations. This is encompassed as part of the concept of "persuasiveness" in hermeneutic axiology (see Chapter 3). There are two distinct aspects to this issue: (1) presenting data that provide the basis/justification for the specific interpretations that are made and (2) ensuring that the range of data excerpts presented are representative of the nature of the entire database and are not chosen selectively simply because they fit points the researcher would like to make for a priori or other reasons.

The first aspect can be readily addressed by presenting data excerpts in conjunction with the interpretations. However, in our experience, partly as a consequence of journal space limitations, qualitative articles often seem to focus on the interpretation, while the empirical basis for the interpretation is not presented to the reader. At other times the excerpts presented seem to play only an illustrative role, not a justificatory role. The second aspect of this problem—using data only selectively, however, is not as readily redressable. Some approaches to qualitative analysis recommend an "audit" of the whole data set by an external reviewer. However, given the volume of data underlying many qualitative data-

bases, often this is not realistically feasible, plus it does not provide future readers with such access and the ability to form an independent judgment. Short of providing every reader with the entire database, there is not a conclusive resolution to this problem. With qualitative research, then, to some extent, the reader will be dependent on the all important, though not directly observable, rigor and systematic nature in which the researcher analyzed the data. However, to some extent the researcher can provide indirect evidence that use of data was not selective. Three types of indirect evidence are illustrated in the data presented with this case study. First, showing the overall range of variation in the phenomenon (e.g., the range of roles challenge played in visitors' experiences [4 different roles in Table 5.1 and nine different roles in the original study]) suggests that the researcher did not selectively utilize the data. Second, and closely related, showing the range of variation with respect to how a specific theme was expressed by individuals through the interview excerpts presented (e.g., the range in the discussion of the "Sense of Accomplishment" group above) helps the reader understand the boundaries used to group respondents and indirectly speaks to the issue of selectivity by acknowledging differences within the sample. Finally, when appropriate, including a category of exceptions to the pattern or those cases that did not readily fit into the organizing framework along with a discussion (e.g., the "Miscellaneous" category in Table 5.1) can provide indirect evidence that the analysis was not selective.

CASE STUDY 3: JET BOATERS ON THE SALMON RIVER

Overview

Case Study 1 illustrated an idiographic analysis while Case Study 2 illustrated a nomothetic analysis. The third case study focuses on issues related to the linkage between the two. It discusses sampling principles and also explores a possible strategy for "archiving" qualitative data in a way that leaves it accessible to other researchers or accessible to the original researcher after an intervening period of months or years during which memory of the specific details about the data and linkages between themes may have decayed. We consider these to be especially important issues in academic settings where graduate students collect data but, as is frequently the case, analyze only a subset of the total possible research questions and must begin a career or new degree program before they find the time to return to the data. This is also an important issue when multiple individuals work on a project, for example when multiple individuals are involved in analyzing separate research questions. Finally, the issue of archiving data may be important when a researcher or institution works on a number of individual projects that together, over time, form a database, where the whole is more than the some of its parts and there is an interest in conducting some type of meta-analysis. Finally, this case study provides an opportunity to raise attention to ethical issues that may occur when using small sample sizes where study participants may be identified on the basis of their comments despite attempts to protect anonymity. It is particularly relevant to consider these issues in conjunction with the concept of archiving data if the archived data may be accessed by other researchers in the future.

This case study is from a research project in which 20 in-depth interviews ranging from 25 minutes to two hours were conducted with jet boat users of the Salmon River in the Frank Church River of No Return Wilderness in Idaho. The purpose of the study was to generate an understanding of the nature of jet boaters' experiences, the nature of their relationship place, and jet boating as a social community. This research was conducted as

part of a planning process for the wilderness and was intended to help provide the USDA Forest Service with an understanding of how various management alternatives might impact this user group and to help facilitate communication between the agency and jet boaters.

Sampling Principle

The purpose of a sample is to represent the larger phenomenon being studied using some subset of its elements because it is too large to be characterized in its entirety (see also discussion of sampling in Chapter 4). Different sampling principles exist, and the most appropriate principle depends on the study goals and assumptions about the nature of the phenomenon being studied. The sampling approach underlying this research project sought to represent the jet boat population in two ways. In the first phase of the study, interviews were conducted with five members of a prominent and politically active jet boat club who comprised a committee responding to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement prepared by the Forest Service. In this phase, then, the population was represented through the views of designated spokespersons and opinion leaders. The second phase of the study involved 20 interviews (with a total of 37 individuals) selected using purposive sampling criteria. The goal of this phase of sampling was to represent the population of jet boaters by capturing the range of diversity in relationship to place that exists while at the same time providing a holistic and in-depth understanding of the constellation of beliefs, values, meanings, etc. that characterize an individual's relationship to place.

Unlike quantitative research based on hypothesis testing, where the goal is to attain unbiased estimators of population parameters and to achieve statistical generalizability, the sampling logic underlying the approach employed in this study is characterized in terms of "representative types" (Bellah et al., 1985). The phrase "representative type" is meant to imply two concepts. First, it refers to the idea that the characterization of beliefs and experiences represents a detailed understanding of actual individuals rather than an aggregate characterization of some nonexisting average individual (Shafer, 1969). Second, it is used to emphasize the idea that the data "represent" a type of belief system that comprises the underlying population. With this approach, populations are represented by capturing the range of diversity in representative types comprising the population.

To try to ensure diversity in the sample, two primary criteria were used to select the sample of interview participants. The first criterion was organizational affiliation. Three categories were identified: members of the power boat club centered in Boise, Idaho; members of the power boat club centered in Lewiston, Idaho; and unaffiliated jet boaters. The second criterion was "nature of jet boat use." Three different categories were defined to represent this dimension: jet boat operators, passengers, and landowners who used jet boats to access their land holdings on the Salmon River. The goal was to distribute the interviews across these categories (with slightly greater emphasis given to operators over passengers).

Determining the sample size for a study of this nature requires balancing three factors. First, the sample needs to be large enough to capture the range of diversity within the population. Second, the sample needs to be large enough to provide insight into commonalities within the population, to provide insight into differences within the population, and to offer the possibility of seeing patterns that might be associated with the differences in perceptions. The third factor deals more with the maximum rather than minimum suitable sample size, and its explanation requires a brief overview of the nature of the database in the study. The data in this study consisted of tape-recorded and transcribed interviews

generally lasting 1/2-2 hours in length. Unlike quantitative data where data are represented and structured in a way that allows researchers to use computer algorithms to conduct the analysis, or content analyses which entail counting the occurrence of terms or concepts in the interview text, analysis of these interviews entailed a more holistic iterative process in which researchers repeatedly read and coded interviews. With this approach to analysis, at some point the amount of data becomes so cognitively overwhelming that it exceeds the researcher's ability to identify and grasp new patterns within and across interviews. Therefore, the sample size should not exceed the researcher's cognitive capacity in this regard. Based on previous experience with interpretivist research of this type and the nature of the questions being asked, we felt a sample of 20 was large enough to provide significant insight into the research questions being asked, but still would fall within the researchers' capacity to conduct, analyze and present a detailed analysis.

We were seeking insight into this user groups' long-term relationship to place rather than the nature of a single experience and we wanted to select an interview setting where the respondents were comfortable and willing to spend time discussing these issues. Therefore, we chose to interview jet boaters off-site at a place convenient to the respondent (their homes or other settings of their choice). Interviews were arranged with specific individuals selected on the basis of these sampling criteria. However, when the interviewer arrived at the agreed-upon interview site, he frequently found that a husband and wife both wished to participate, or that the original contact had invited one or more friends to participate in the interview. As in Case Study 2, we felt these situations would provide richer insights into understanding these jet boaters' relationship to place due to the tendency for respondents to "build off" each others' comments and because these usually were people who went jet boating together. Therefore we conducted group interviews when these situations occurred.

Forestructure of Understanding

The approach to exploring leisure experiences in Case Study 3 was, in general, guided by the same conceptual perspective previously described for Case Study 2. This case study differed from the second somewhat in a stronger emphasis on, and more explicit conceptualization of, place. In tourism and recreation studies, interest in meaning, experience, and identity is frequently linked to the concept of place attachment understood as an emotional and/or symbolic bond to places (Williams, Patterson, Roggenbuck, and Watson, 1992). The concepts of place attachment and meaning tend to emphasize holistic relationships (affective bonds) with tourist destinations and recreational settings as unique places in contrast to characterizations of destinations and settings as collections of desired features or attributes. A final dimension of the forestructure of understanding stemmed from somewhat less concretely developed ideas about social specialization as it relates to leisure activity (Celsi et al., 1993). The fundamental notion guiding this dimension of the research is that jet boating might represent a specialized leisure world with its own language and social structure, and that the research should be approached with the goal of trying to gain an understanding of this leisure community.

Idiographic Analysis

As noted previously, analysis of individual interviews is the starting point for all hermeneutic analyses. Idiographic analyses require an enormous investment of time and energy. For example, in this particular study, some of the individual interview transcripts exceeded 40 single-spaced pages. In this particular Case Study, one of the goals at the idiographic

stage was to develop a way of recording or storing the initial energy invested in the idiographic analysis with minimal loss of insight to facilitate nomothetic level analyses at some distant point in the future by the same researcher or even by different researchers. We sought to accomplish this using a three-stage process. In the first stage, the "raw" interview transcripts were read and re-read in depth to identify both themes related to original research question and emergent themes. These themes were then coded in the text of the interview transcripts using NUDIST software.

In the second stage, the "raw" interview was reconstructed according to the themes identified in the first stage. NUDIST was used to retrieve the excerpts from the interview according to thematic categories. These excerpts were "cleaned" (see discussion on transcription in Case Study 2) of extraneous verbalizations that did not contribute to an understanding of the content or meaning of the comments. These cleaned transcripts were then grouped together according to theme. Appendix III contains the "reconstructed" interview transcript for one of the interviews. Each excerpt is followed by the pseudonym(s) assigned to each interviewee, index numbers referring to the location of each excerpt in the raw interview transcript, and an excerpt number indicating the sequential order of the excerpt in the "reconstructed" interview.

The intention is for these "reconstructed" interviews to serve as the basis for current and future nomothetic level analyses. The reconstructed interviews are shorter than the original interviews, because portions of the interview deemed inconsequential to an understanding of the phenomena being studied (e.g., rapport building conversations with the interviewer, apologies for having to interrupt the interview due to phone calls, discussions judged to be totally off target, etc.) have not been incorporated. As a consequence of this and of identifying the themes used to group the transcripts, some degree of interpretation has already occurred—indeed this is the idiographic analysis. However, we believe that this idiographic level analysis is broad enough to serve as the basis for many different types of nomothetic level analyses.

The third and final stage in saving the idiographic level analysis for archival purposes was to prepare a short (2-4 page) "biosketch" for each of the reconstructed interviews. The biosketches represent a brief characterization of individuals' relationship to place, jet boating experiences, use ethic, and other relevant issues that was written by the researcher. An example of the biosketch for the reconstructed interview illustrated in Appendix III is presented in Appendix IV. These biosketches contain no interview excerpts, but they are keyed to the interview excerpts in the reconstructed interviews according to the sequential excerpt number at the end of each excerpt. These biosketches are intended to function as a guide to the data, by reviewing these and a listing of the themes evident in an individual interview, one can rapidly grasp the nature of insights addressed in the interview and possibilities for future nomothetic analyses without having to start entirely from scratch with the raw interviews. In summary, the complete archive for the data includes the raw interviews, the "reconstructed" interviews (keyed to the raw interview through index numbers based on the reference system), and the biosketches (keyed to the "reconstructed" interviews through excerpt numbers).

Nomothetic Analysis

In the final project report for this study, six nomothetic level themes were identified and discussed (Patterson, 1999). Unlike the previous two case studies, no graphic or table was developed specifically to display the organizing system. Instead, the organizing system

Significance of the Salmon River to Respondent
- The Salmon River as Home or a Part of My Life
- The Salmon River is Highly Significant
- Salmon River Significant for Specific, Tangible Features
- Salmon River of at Least Moderate Personal Significance
- Salmon River of Relatively Low Personal Significance
- Implications of Significance of Relationship

Access
- Jet Boats as a Means of Accessing Some Other Value
- Access Related Issues from the Perspective of Local River Users
- Access for the Young, Elderly, and Disabled

Meaning of Wilderness
- Wilderness-like Characterizations of the Salmon River Country
- Positive Values Associated With Wilderness
- No Additional Value From Designated Wilderness
- Negative Values Associated With Wilderness Designation
- Human Past, Presence, and Sense of Community on the Salmon
- Summary - Meaning of Wilderness to Interview Participants

Use Ethic - Responsible Shared Use
- Use
- Shared Use - Responsibility to the Community of River Users
- Equity
- Stewardship

Public Relations

Dimensions of the Experience

Table 5.2. List of Nomothetic Level Themes from the Study of Jet Boat Users on the Salmon River.

was communicated to the reader through the Table of Contents (Table 5.2) and headings within the text of the report. Comparison of Table 5.2 to Appendix III reveals that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between the idiographic level organizing system and the final nomothetic level organizing system. This supports the notion that the idiographic level analysis is flexible enough to support multiple nomothetic level analyses, and therefore is a useful way of archiving the data without a complete loss of the time and energy invested in the idiographic level analysis. Also note that some nomothetic level themes (access, public relations, use ethic) are not directly related to (predetermined by) the concepts identified in the forestructure of understanding initially guiding the research (which focused on nature of experience, constructions of place, and jet boating as leisure community). This supports the idea that, while guided by some a prior understanding built from

previous research on similar topics, an hermeneutic research approach is open to emergent characteristics of the specific research context being studied. In other words, the prior understanding functions in an enabling rather than narrowly limiting role (see discussion of epistemology in Chapter 3).

Results/Discussion.

Because this case study is presented for tutorial and illustrative purposes, only one of the nomothetic level themes (Public Relations) is presented.

One issue that can be explored at a nomothetic level deals with the relationship between the management agencies and the jet boating community as perceived by jet boaters. While there is variation in perception across jet boaters, overall comments suggest a strained relationship and a user group that has significant concerns about the legitimacy of planning/decision-making processes. In fact, several interview participants expressed this view very directly as indicated in the excerpts presented below.

> I: If you were ... give[n] a chance to manage this area ... what would be the issues that you would choose to focus on... ? J: The first thing, I'd kick the Forest Service totally off of it. [laughter] ... And then that would be the end of the problem. (Interviewer, Jason, 616-626, #1)

> I: In terms of ... the Forest Service doing business up there ... what in your opinion would have to happen or would they have to do for you to regain a little confidence in them? ... T: [laughter] Go home. (Interviewer, Ted, 777-782, #2)

> A: Personally, I feel the Forest Service ... in their draft plan .... they pitted the float boater against the backpacker on the Middle Fork and the backpacker against the horse person and the float boaters against the jet boaters, not necessarily on the Middle Fork but on the big river. What they need to do is say, "Hey, you guys are all going to be here, you all got to get along." ... I think if they did that, I don't think they'd have near the problems we have today. (Andy, 204-207, #3)

> ... there's only one time I would have ever turned anybody in in my life, and I started to and I didn't because ... all the Forest Service would need is another black mark on the jet boater. I watched some guys from Boise pull up on the boat dock, just out of the water about 20 feet, and dump their oil out of the engine, let it run back in the water. ... And I -- I would have turned them in, and I started to, took their boat number and license number and everything. Then I got thinking. Man, that's just another black mark for jet boaters because of this one guy. (#4)

As the last excerpt presented above (#4) indicates, this friction has implications not only for this user group's perception of the agency, it also may result in lost opportunities for cooperative stewardship of the resource.

The purpose of this section of the project report was not to take a position on the truth or accuracy of these types of perceptions, but to describe this user groups' perceptions concerning their relationship with the management agencies and to identify some possible factors shaping these perceptions. With respect to the latter issue, while it is tempting to

attribute a cynical attitude simply to a special interest group that is not getting its way, a deeper analysis of the situation suggests other factors are involved. Taken as a whole, comments by respondents suggest that the strained relationship between the management agencies and the community of jet boat users is influenced by a variety of factors including: (1) perceptions that public input is ignored (Table 5.3 excerpts 5.3-1, 5.3-2); (2) perceptions that the decision-making process reflects the desires of special interest groups rather than the broader public (Table 5.3 excerpts 5.3-3, 5.3-4); (3) misunderstandings concerning the purpose or meaning of information presented at public meetings (Table 5.3 excerpt 5.3-5) (4) perceptions that decision makers are "out of touch" with the resource they manage, a situation perceived to be exacerbated by lack of continuity in personnel (Table 5.3 excerpts 5.3-6 to 5.3-8); (5) perceptions regarding what management actions communicate about how management agencies view or value individuals (Table 5.3 excerpts 5.3-9, 5.3-10); (6) different perspectives about consequences of management actions and the most appropriate way to protect the resource (Table 5.3 excerpts 5.3-11, 5.3-12); and (7) perceived differences in underlying values (Table 5.3 excerpts 5.3-13 to 5.3-15).

	Public Input Ignored
T5.3-1	I feel they made the rules on the river years ago. The book was sealed and put in cellophane. I went to all these meetings that they have on the river. They already knew what they was going to do and they would just give us a pacifier by the meetings. ... they didn't listen to a damn thing. ... And they'd ask a question that would be answered to what they wanted to hear.... If you brought up a question that they didn't want to hear the answer, you were smoothed over pretty fast. (Jason, 1089-1096)
T5.3-2	G: ... I don't know it'd be true, but rumors that we do hear, you know, that they'll have people like you do a study ... and then when they go to make a decision it's all throwed out the window. ... They've already made up their mind. L: Well, that's another thing I think that threatens all of us, or we all don't like, is just not feeling like — G: We're not listened to at all. L: Yeah, yeah. ... They've lost their credibility with the public ... (Gary and Linda, 1345-1370)
	Special Interests vs. the Public
T5.3-3	J: And as far as managing an area, I mean, you can't show favoritism .... You know, outfitters and rafters and private jet boaters have always been looked at in three separate categories, and there's none of them that should use it more or less or be expected to .... K: Or to have priority. J: Yeah, one way or the other. And there's a lot of priority that goes along with the outfitters. K: Yeah. Because it's a money-oriented thing ... they go and they have their big outfitters' association that they can fight through and all that. Where us private boaters, there is an association for that ..., but it just seems way smaller ... -- J: Yeah. The one that speaks the loudest gets heard, I guess. [laughter] (Jack and Ken, 875-892)

T5.3-4 The local [Forest Service] people have a good relationship basically with the boaters and the floaters both. But then you get up into the higher levels of management and a little more political in nature and one group hollers louder than the other one, or has more money on the table, or something. And you never know for sure what it is. But they seem to listen to that group a lot more than they do the other one. (Denny, 361-370)

Misunderstandings About the Purpose or Meaning of Information

T5.3-5 I: ... so [the Forest Service is] kind of contributing to the problems? A: I feel they are when they start fitting people into plans. It's just like their draft EIS, there was quite a few comments on this among jet boaters. They made the statement that most of the float boaters were college educated and most of the jet boaters weren't. Well, this might be true, most of the jet boaters own their own businesses and it's a matter of time. I know people that float and jet boat both. And I've done it. I like to float, but only if I got enough time. And usually it's a matter of time. If I had a week, it'd be nice. I: So did it seem like it was a slam maybe to jet boaters? A: Well, they [jet boaters] felt it was, they felt ... that's just like saying most of them are from L.A. and most of them are from Montana. ... It doesn't pertain to anything. All they're [Forest Service] doing is causing trouble... And I know jet boaters, a number of them have a college education also. (Interviewer, Andy, 209-229)

Distant Decision Makers/Lack of Continuity in Personnel

T5.3-6 I guess what I think is the Forest Service spends too much time in the office. I've I talked to Forest Service people here in town that've never been on the river. (Doug, 747-748)

T5.3-7 H: I think the Forest Service decisions are made well above the local offices, and those people have no idea what goes on. ... That's my personal feeling. And sometimes I feel sorry for the local Forest Service people because they've got to take the brunt of it and they've got to tell them, well, this is the decision. And I don't believe that some of the decisions are made with all of the facts that are presented to them.... I: Do you think then maybe with respect to jet boat users, that they don't have all the information, they don't know really? H: It's given to them and I would say for some reason they don't view all of it. (Hank, Interviewer, 551-564)

T5.3-8 B: And the people that's doing it ought to stay in this position at least long enough to get to get their feet wet. L: ... they transfer their personnel around a lot and when it gets to be a hot topic, sometimes people aren't there when you come back ... and by the time you get your appeals and everything, which are inevitable, many times those people have transferred and you're having to deal with a whole new set of personnel and — G: Uh-hmm, that's already got their mind made up too. L: Well, or just aren't familiar with everything ... previous. G: But I don't think anybody, Forestry or any of them, ... should be able to make a decision, till they see it and they experience it. (Bart, Linda, and Gary, 2376-2394)

Perceptions About What Management Actions Communicate

T5.3-9 Also the other thing that really bugs me about them is, [I'll] be setting in my camp enjoying the river running by, and here come the jet boat ... with the Forest Service and the Fish and Game. They both pack pistols into my camp like I'm a criminal. (Jason, 1143-1144)

T5.3-10 M: So, you know, whenever they start putting more regulations on a river, everybody gets their hair up on their neck because of that sort of thing. ... All of a sudden when you want to go out there and enjoy what you want to do, somebody's watching you. K: And we're all law abiding people. M: Yeah. K: We're not criminals that just got out of the state pen or something. There's no reason for anybody to be watching us. (Matt, Ken, 967-1043)

Different Perspectives on the Most Appropriate Way to Protect the Resource

T5.3-11 J: ... the float groups, they have their canister [for packing out human waste] and so forth. Just at Sheep Creek one day ... and I seen them all pull in. And I kept seeing all these people go out behind these big rocks. So the next day I went up there and sure enough, it was terrible ... and it was an outfitter. ... an outfitter ..., what they'll tell you is, well, we told our people they have to, but we can't control them all the time. And instead of them going to use the canisters, they were going up to the bushes or behind the rock. There used to be an outhouse right there at that spot. And, you know, they wouldn't have had that mess. ... that's one of my biggest complaints ... and I've brought that up time and time again to [the Forest Service]. And they kept saying, well, we've got to pack it in, pack it out. Good story. I: ... So ... from your experiences up there, that philosophy with regard to ... toilets is unreasonable? J: Totally. (Jason, Interviewer, 1250-1269)

Different Perspectives on the Most Appropriate Way to Protect the Resource

T5.3-12 Oh, they've done some stupid things. The other thing that just totally fried me is we started losing our mountain sheep up there a few years back from disease. The University of Idaho needed a carcass when it was still warm to run tests on it. So they wanted to fly a helicopter in and load a sheep and get it out. They couldn't do it because it was wilderness. They couldn't get through the red tape to land a helicopter there, so we're losing our sheep because somebody's stupid idea -- I mean, how much harm would it hurt to land a helicopter, load a sheep in it, and haul it out to save our sheep. (Jason, 707-712)

Differences in Underlying Values

T5.3-13 K: The Forest Service has always been sort of wanting to erase anything that was left from all that history, and I don't think they do so much of it any more. But they used to burn all the cabins and stuff and that -- that's just crazy to me. That's like taking historical documents and burning them. (Ken, 750-752)

T5.3-14	B: I may be a little wrong on this, but we went to one meeting and I think it's really wrong for the Forest Service to ... put a price tag on each person ... for revenue coming in ... on the Salmon, and they're almost doing that. They've got so much calculation out that they can tell you how much each rafter brings in for revenue and each jet boater brings in for revenue. Well, ... the rafters has got us outnumbered ... So the jet boaters, hey, we're not putting the money into the big economy like ... the rafters... And I definitely don't think that they should figure it that way. ... I don't think there should be a price on our heads ... on anybody. When they start figuring out how much groceries and stuff you spend and all of that.... L: Yeah, he had it figured out by the dollar. ... D: Well, I'm sure that there's probably some real solid truth to that. But what difference does that make? (Bart, Linda, and David, 1934-1961)
T5.3-15	I think there are people within the Forest Service who see our point of view and believe that wholeheartedly. But I think there are a lot of people in the Forest Service ... [who are] going to do what they can to ... get rid of motorized use. And they just view it as motorized use and they view it as an encroachment, and that's their attitude. And that's unfortunate. (Daniel, 1148-1158)

Table 5.3. Factors Contributing to Jet Boaters' Perception of a Strained Relationship with the Management Agencies.

Conclusions

The nomothetic analysis discussing use ethics in the final project report (Patterson, 1999) suggests that the community of jet boaters interviewed have a strong social norm regarding the responsibility individuals have to maintain positive relationships with other members of the community of river users. At the same time, the comments presented in this section on public relations suggest that the relationship with the management agencies is strained. This situation may in part reflect differences in underlying values as indicated by excerpts T5.3-13, T5.3-14, and T5.3-15. When it comes to management of a resource, these types of differences are extremely difficult to resolve. However, the comments presented in Table 5.3 suggest that some of the perceived strain in the relationship with the management agencies among jet boaters is due to not only value differences, but also to issues of communication. These types of issues are more readily addressed than value differences. Addressing these communication issues may eliminate some controversies and in other cases may promote a more constructive atmosphere for addressing conflicts in values. Particularly in light of a user group whose use ethic places a high value on maintaining positive relationships, attempts to address communication issues as part of the long term planning effort may be highly warranted.

In light of this suggestion, the jet boat clubs in the area might potentially serve an important role. Conflict resolution literature indicates that resolving conflict within a community is extremely difficult in the absence of an established social network capable of linking the community together, passing on information, and representing the interested parties (Duane, 1997). Although the scope of this present study was limited (20 individuals selected using nonrandom procedures), results suggest that the jet boat clubs may potentially provide the type of social network necessary for representing and resolving issues

associated with the community of jet boat users. First many of our respondents indicated that, while they recognized the social and educational functions the clubs served, they joined a club (entirely or at least in part) because they saw it as means of representing their interests (Patterson, 1999). Second, it appears that through informal relations (friendships, family), the influence of jet boat clubs may extend even more broadly than its membership. For example, as noted above, while the interview was set up with a specific individual, on five occasions those individuals invited one or more friends to participate. In three cases those self-selected social groups included a mixture of club members and nonmembers. Jet boat clubs, then, could possibly serve as a social network for facilitating management agency interaction with the community of jet boat users in the long term.

Ethical Issues in Small Samples

Numerous ethical issues are associated with the use of in-depth interviews and studies involving a small community of recreationists. The example discussed here illustrates just one of many such issues. It revolves around the issue of protecting anonymity. When conducting the study, we told interviewees that we would use pseudonyms to protect their anonymity. However, this is a small community of users. As a consequence, simply on the basis of the discussion of personal history and experiences on the river, it is potentially possible for others to piece together who the speaker is based on the nature of their comments. In one instance, this created something of a dilemma with respect to the issue of Public Relations as illustrated in the comment expressed in excerpt #4 presented above. We felt the insight suggested by this empirical observation (i.e., that in some cases the nature of the relationship between users and management agencies is so problematic that a consequence is lost opportunities for cooperative stewardship) was important to convey to the management agencies. At the same time, though, given the use ethics expressed by some of the respondents (discussed in the final project report [Patterson, 1999]), we were concerned about how the comment presented in excerpt #4 might influence perceptions of this jet boater. As a consequence, we chose not to identify the speaker even by pseudonym in public reports or to include that excerpt in the "reconstructed" individual interviews or biosketches as these idiographic level analyses are archived and somewhat "public" documents. At the same time, we did not want to make interpretations that were not supported empirically. As a consequence, we presented the empirical observation while protecting anonymity.

1Because this research was conducted using the guidelines of a normative paradigm different from hermeneutics, it is not surprising to find that the interview methodology does not exactly mirror an hermeneutic approach. This statement is not a criticism of the interviews nor is it a statement concerning the worthiness or value of the original analysis (which, in fact, was used successfully to revise and improve the management plan for Lady Musgrave Island).

2The numbers at the end of the quote are from the reference system for this interview (Appendix II) and refer to the location of the statement in the original interview.

6
Conclusion

PREVIOUS CHAPTERS DISCUSSED the nature of science (Chapter 2), explained the normative commitments and principles of hermeneutics as an approach to science (Chapter 3), discussed hermeneutic methods (Chapter 4), and presented exemplars or case studies that provide tutorials and illustrations of the application of hermeneutics to issues relevant to research in tourism and recreation (Chapter 5). The final issue we address in this book centers on the question of when, or more precisely, in what types of research situations, it would be appropriate to adopt an hermeneutic approach to science. To begin this discussion, we will first introduce the concept of Critical Pluralism.

Critical pluralism is a World View (the first level in the macrostructure of science; see Chapter 2). World Views deal with "rules" in science and the concept of validity at a very broad level (Patterson and Williams, 1998). One way of characterizing World Views is along a continuum that ranges from extreme rationalism to extreme relativism. Rationalists maintain there is one and only one approach to science. Often rationalist discussions present an "algorithmic" set of rules for the conduct of science referred to as "*the* scientific method". At the other end of the continuum is extreme relativism, which maintains that no rules of science can ever be specified (Figure 6.1).

Figure 6.1 maps some prominent discussions of science according to a continuum of World Views reflecting different degrees of rationalism and relativism and provides a basis for clarifying what Critical Pluralism entails. An "extreme" rationalist perspective is evident in Calder and Tybout's (1987) insistence that the body of scientific knowledge consists only of research conducted in compliance with the principles of falsificationism and their rejection of interpretivism as merely entertaining reading that must stand apart from science. In contrast, Paul Feyerabend's (1975:296) conclusion that "[a]ll methodologies have their limitations and the only 'rule' is 'anything goes'" reflects an extreme relativist perspective. Thomas Kuhn (1970) , whose discussion of normal science and scientific revolutions is perhaps the most well known discussion from the philosophy of science in tourism and recreation, represents a mid-point between extreme rationalism and extreme relativism.



Figure 6.1: Map of Some Prominent World Views with Respect to the Philosophy of Science

Kuhn's belief that there are periods of normal science in which the conduct of science adheres to a single paradigm that sets the standards of legitimacy for scientific research *reflects* a rationalist dimension. However, according to Kuhn, crises in the paradigm eventually lead to the emergence of a new paradigm during a period of revolution, though adoption of the new paradigm requires something akin to a religious conversion because *no purely* logical argument demonstrating the superiority of one scientific paradigm over another can be made (Chalmers, 1982). This reflects a relativist dimension to his World View.

Critical Pluralism represents a World View that also has both relativistic and rationalist dimensions. Critical Pluralism maintains that multiple approaches to science (paradigms such as hermeneutics, grounded theory, cognitive psychology, etc.; see Chapter 2), each reflecting somewhat different evaluative rules or standards, legitimately co-exist within the broad realm of science. This reflects a relativist dimension. However, this World View also maintains that "nonevaluational, nonjudgmental, noncritical, or mindless pluralism" is an unreasonable stance (Hunt, 1991:41). Critical Pluralists argue that a logical choice among paradigms can be made on several bases, including: the internal consistency of a paradigm's normative commitments (Anderson, 1986); the fit between the paradigmatic assumptions (as expressed in the paradigm's normative commitments) and the researcher's assumptions about the phenomenon being studied; and the nature of research questions being asked. This reflects a more rationalist position than Kuhn's characterization of choice among paradigms as requiring a religious conversion or leap of faith. Critical Pluralism does, though, recognize a certain degree of indeterminacy in choice of paradigms with regard to a particular phenomenon. This indeterminacy stems from the recognition that selection of a research approach requires judgments about tradeoffs between competing research goals and threats to validity for which there is no definitively correct answer (as discussed in Chapter 4). As a consequence, while logical arguments can be made for a particular paradigm given a certain set of assumptions about the weighting of various goals and threats to validity, another paradigm might be equally appropriate as a basis for studying a phenomenon given a different set of goal/validity assumptions. Critical Pluralism does not require adoption of a single, universally applicable stance on weighting of threats to validity or the importance of different goals. However, once a position on these issues is adopted, Critical Pluralists maintain this serves as part of the foundation for adopting a particular paradigm rather than some other.

From a Critical Pluralist point of view, then, there are three possible avenues from which to approach a discussion about research situations in which it would be appropriate to adopt an hermeneutic approach. The first approach to framing this discussion focuses on underlying assumptions about phenomena being studied in tourism and recreation research. A second approach would be to focus on the substantive (real world, managerial) research questions that are addressed in tourism and recreation. And finally, the third avenue from which to conduct this discussion would be from the perspective of tradeoffs that have to be made between different research goals and threats to validity. The latter approach requires far more context specific details than the first two approaches, and therefore is difficult to discuss in general or in abstract. As a consequence, the following discussion of research contexts suited to an hermeneutic approach is presented from the perspective of the first two approaches described above.

ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT PHENOMENA BEING STUDIED

As discussed in the section on epistemological assumptions presented in Chapter 3, Danziger (1985) noted that in order for an empirical test to be legitimate, the research must demonstrate that the methodology underlying the empirical test is consistent with the assumptions underlying the concept being tested. If this is not the case, "the theory one is testing is not the theory one wanted to test, but at best some vague analog thereof" (p. 4). Thus, any discussion regarding the use of hermeneutics as a research approach must make a link between the underlying normative commitments of hermeneutics and assumptions about the phenomenon being studied.

Assumptions about the nature of phenomena being studied are contained within the conceptual frameworks employed within social science disciplines. With respect to tourism and recreation research, it is possible to "map" these conceptual frameworks in a manner that reflects differences in underlying assumptions about the phenomena being studied. However, given the diversity of phenomena studied within tourism and recreation and the variety of disciplinary perspectives that can be adopted, there are multiple ways that conceptual frameworks can be mapped and it is not possible to develop a single, all-compassing map. The map presented in this discussion (Figure 6.2) reflects the authors' disciplinary foundations (social and environmental psychology). Absent are other disciplinary foundations that are equally worthy and important to tourism and recreation (e.g., sociology, anthropology, etc.). This situation reflects our limited backgrounds and not necessarily the limits of hermeneutics as a potentially viable research approach.

The organization of our map is based on fundamental distinctions between conceptual frameworks previously recognized in social psychology, environmental psychology, and tourism. A complete discussion of these conceptual frameworks is beyond the scope of this book. Below we provide a brief overview of the distinctions between these conceptual frameworks relevant to the question of when an hermeneutic research approach might be an appropriate choice. The map presented in Figure 6.2 and discussed below represents an initial attempt to synthesize and integrate conceptual distinctions made previously in social psychology (Diener, 1984; Omodei and Wearing, 1990), environmental psychology (Saegert and Winkel, 1990), and tourism (Mannell and Iso-Ahola, 1987). For a more thorough discussion of these conceptual frameworks, the reader is referred to the original sources and Williams and Patterson (1996, 1999).

Overall, the conceptual frameworks from social and environmental psychology summarized in Figure 6.2 attempt to explain mechanisms underlying human behavior and view experiences arising from tourism and recreation engagements as important sources of happiness and well-being. At the broadest level, two distinct classes of conceptual frameworks exist (Diener, 1984; Omodei and Wearing, 1990): end state (telic) and process oriented (auto-telic). End-state frameworks emphasize behavior as a means of satisfying underlying needs or goals while process-oriented frameworks emphasize the nature or meaning of experience as a basis for understanding behavior. Within these two broad classes are different conceptual paradigms: the adaptive paradigm (which emphasizes the role of biological mechanisms and/or our evolution as information processors) and the opportunity-structure paradigm (which emphasizes goal-directed behavior) (Saegert and Winkel, 1990). The social constructionist paradigm reflects process-oriented perspectives and can be further subdivided into approaches that focus on the nature of experience and those that focus on meaning construction. Finally each of these broader conceptual paradigms can be asso-



Figure 6.2: Map of Some Conceptual Frameworks from Social and Environmental Psychology that are Relevant to Tourism and Recreation Research.

ciated with specific conceptual frameworks that serve as the foundation for specific empirical research programs in tourism, recreation, and related fields. For example, Ulrich, Simons, Losito, Fiorito, Miles, and Zelson's (1991) psychoevolutionary approach for understanding human response to landscapes is a biological model of behavior in line with the tenets of the adaptive paradigm while Patterson et al.'s (1998) study of the nature of visitor experiences at Juniper Prairie (see also Case Study 2 in Chapter 5) reflects an experience- based model of human behavior in line with the socio-cultural paradigm.

These conceptual frameworks are grounded in different assumptions about the nature of the core phenomena explaining human behavior and experience. These differences in assumptions can be thought of as occurring on a series of continuums. The bottom half of Figure 6.2 reflects some of the principal differences in underlying assumptions. Among "adjacent" conceptual perspectives within Figure 6.2 there may be quite a bit of overlap regarding underlying assumptions and constructs important for understanding the phenomena studied (e.g., despite its process/experience orientation, Csikzentmihalyi's (1975) flow model maintains a strong emphasis on the construct of behavioral goals, which is also a central construct underlying conceptual frameworks in the opportunity structure paradigm). However, the further apart the research programs are (e.g., models of behavior emphasizing physiological mechanisms such as Ulrich et al.'s [1991] psychoevolutionary perspective versus meaning-based perspectives such as McCracken's [1987] conceptual framework) the more dissimilar they become. The underlying assumptions illustrated in Figure 6.2 parallel ontological, epistemological, and axiological commitments underlying different scientific paradigms. Hermeneutics as a paradigm is comprised of normative commitments (see Chapter 3) consistent with the assumptions underlying conceptual frameworks within the socio-cultural paradigm. As a consequence, hermeneutics would be an appropriate research approach for researchers utilizing these conceptual frameworks as a basis for their empirical studies. In contrast, hermeneutic normative commitments diverge from, and in some cases conflict with, fundamental assumptions underlying "end state" perspectives, and therefore an hermeneutic approach would not be the most appropriate choice (or at best would function only in an exploratory role rather than as an endpoint) for research grounded in these conceptual frameworks.

SUBSTANTIVE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

There exists an almost infinite diversity of substantive research questions underlying tourism and recreation management. As was the case with the discussion of conceptual frameworks presented above, the discussion of substantive questions presented below reflects the types of tourism and recreation-related research that we (the authors) have emphasized in our careers; specifically questions related to experience, meaning, conflict resolution, and collaboration. Again this reflects our limited backgrounds and not necessarily the limits of substantive issues for which hermeneutics may provide useful insights. As a consequence, readers should pay as much attention to the characteristics of the substantive questions for which hermeneutics is an appropriate research approach as to the actual content of the questions discussed below.

Substantive Issues Related to Experience and Meaning

Increasingly the late 1960s and early 1970s saw the emergence of a move to view, understand, and plan for recreation as an experience rather than as an activity (cf., Driver

and Tocher, 1970). However, this movement was dominated by a psychological perspective that viewed recreation as goal-directed behavior and ultimately led to research that focused on expectations, goals, desired outcomes, motivations, and cognitive judgments about outcomes actually received rather than the actual nature and dynamics of experience itself (Mannell and Iso-Ahola, 1987; Williams, 1989). This research approach led to the development of broad scale planning and management frameworks, most notably the Recreation Opportunity Spectrum (ROS) (Driver et al., 1987), which sought to link research on the relationship between setting/experience characteristics with the managerial goal of ensuring diversity in recreation opportunities. However, even those who developed ROS clearly emphasized that because it is oriented toward regional planning "of vastly different types of settings, any guidelines for its implementation will provide only general directions," thus ROS "serves only as a macro guide ... [and that] through site and project planning, additional diversity can be provided" (Driver et al., 1987:206). Hermeneutics, with its emphasis on the nature of experience and specific context in which experience occurs, represents a logical choice of research approaches for developing a more site-specific understanding of the relationship between setting and experience encouraged by those who developed ROS. Indeed, this substantive goal is strongly evident in the first two case studies presented in Chapter 5.

A closely related substantive concern is the issue of tourist/customer satisfaction. The development of customer satisfaction research in tourism and recreation closely parallels the emergence of the goal-directed perspective on tourism/recreation experiences. Specifically, satisfaction is thought to be a cognitive judgment that reflects a visitor's evaluation of outcomes actually attained in relation to desired outcomes and is therefore thought to serve as an appropriate measure of quality (Brown, 1989; Williams, 1989). While this is a sound and useful perspective in many cases, there are situations where it does not seem appropriate (Patterson et al., 1998). For example, in some situations, especially where first-time users are concerned, expectations are often vague or nonexistent (Arnould and Price, 1993). Experiences also have an emergent quality, and the most memorable or enjoyable aspects may be the unexpected (Arnould and Price, 1993; Scherl, 1988; Rolston, 1987). Finally, particularly in publicly provided tourism and recreation opportunities, other goals may be of equal significance to a concern solely for satisfaction. For example, federal agencies employing ROS try to provide a diversity of opportunities. In situations where the goal is to provide a specific type of experience, it is possible for a visitor to receive the type of experience managers seek to provide, but to be dissatisfied with it because it is not the experience the visitor was seeking. In these types of situations, hermeneutics offers an alternative approach to understanding the quality of experience, one that looks more directly at the nature and dynamics of the experience and provides greater depth of understanding into these issues than is possible through the more generic or abstract depictors of experience provided by quantitative research approaches.

In fact, the opportunity to describe and explore the nature and dynamics of the experience in greater depth using an hermeneutic research approach creates an opportunity to address issues related to crowding, carrying capacity, and other aspects of destination/setting management. Consider, for example, the Limits of Acceptable Change (LAC) planning/management framework, which has been developed within the USDA Forest Service to address these types of recreational setting management issues. Specifically, LAC is a planning system that seeks to facilitate management decision making by integrating technical, scientific knowledge about impacts to resources associated with recreation use with

prescriptive value judgments about what is acceptable or unacceptable in terms of resource or experience conditions (cf., Stankey, McCool, and Stokes, 1984). Central to the implementation of an LAC process are the selection of indicators related to the condition of the resource or experience and specification of acceptable standards for these indicators. These indicators are then monitored to ensure that the resource/experience remains within acceptable standards. However, experience indicators selected typically have been factors that potentially influence the experience (e.g., percent time in sight of other parties, number of other recreationists encountered per day, group size, etc.) (cf., Watson and Cole, 1992) rather than actual dimensions describing the nature or quality of the experience. Given the unpredictability and context dependent nature of the relationship between these indicators and the quality of experience, monitoring these types of indicators alone seems to be an inadequate approach when the interest is the "condition" of the experience. Hermeneutics offers a research approach for monitoring the quality and nature of the actual experience, which can be a useful supplement to the existing LAC framework.

The substantive concern for quality in tourism and recreation up to this point has focused on the issue of quality with respect to a single outing. However, there is a broader context of quality that is also a highly significant concern for planners and managers. For many individuals in modern culture, tourism and recreation are also a significant means of defining self and one's place in the world. For these individuals, the quality of a single outing cannot be represented by evaluating whether or not a specific goal has been achieved; rather, quality should be understood in terms of whether the engagement succeeded in terms of the expression or development of a valued sense of self (Williams, 1989). Given the highly variable nature of this type of quality assessment and the depth of insight required to understand this issue, hermeneutics is a highly appropriate and valuable research approach for exploring these types of questions.

In addition to constructing a sense of self and one's place in the world, we live in a time when people are increasingly free to "construct" the meaning of the world itself. For example, with respect to the meaning of animals, Sutherland and Nash (1994) have noted that with modernization and the shift to increasingly differentiated production systems, meanings of animals have become less understandable in social or institutional contexts due to utilitarian/instrumental values and instead are more individualized with an emphasis on emotional/symbolic values. Spaargaren and Mol (1992) made a similar point with respect to the meaning of nature in general, distinguishing between sustenance-based meanings versus intuited (experiential) meanings. And Dizard (1993) described nature as the "original Rorschach". This issue is especially relevant with respect to the types of experiences associated with nature-based tourism and recreation. Central to these forms of experience are socially defined concepts such as wilderness, wildness, wildlife, and nature. As human lives become increasingly organized around urban experiences rather than agrarian or other sustenance-based lifestyles, the experiences provided through nature-based tourism and recreation will become an increasingly significant basis for constructing the meaning of these concepts as we become an increasingly urbanized population. And these constructed meanings will define the role of nature and wildlife in our personal lives and our society as well as ultimately defining the political feasibility of preservation, restoration efforts, and resource conflicts in general. Thus exploring the social interactions and experience processes through which meaning is constructed represents one of the most significant environmental concerns of our times. Nature-based tourism and recreation experi-

ences will be a significant source of constructed meanings, and hermeneutics is a research approach ideally suited to addressing these types of questions.

Conflict Resolution and Collaboration

Another major arena for application of hermeneutics has to do with conflict resolution and collaborative processes associated with planning, management, and use of tourist and recreational settings. As noted above, recent developments in social theory suggest that meanings and values associated with "nature" are becoming increasingly individualized and emphasize emotional and symbolic dimensions over instrumental dimensions (Williams, in press). If the emotional/symbolic (intuited/experiential) meanings typical of modern urban dwellers increasingly dominate more instrumental/sustenance meanings, conflicts over planning and the management of resources are likely to continue to become increasingly contested. This is true not only for nature-based tourism and recreation, but also for tourism and recreation development in general. In response to growing conflicts in planning and management, many public agencies are in the midst of a paradigm shift that involves changes in fundamental issues such as the concept of the public interest and the role of the public in decision-making. Specifically there is a strong shift toward the development to more collaborative processes in which: (1) public interest is seen as something that is created through an ongoing dialogue rather than something discovered through research by scientific experts and (2) the public is accorded a more significant role in decision making compared to the "expert management" decision making models of the past (Williams and Matheny, 1995; USDA Forest Service, 1999).

Accompanying this paradigm shift is a recognition that the nature of social science that informs this process must change fundamentally as well. Traditional quantitative research on attitudes and values has dominated this type of social science assessment in tourism and recreation. Whereas attitude research is useful for documenting the nature of the beliefs underlying conflicts and the types of appeals the public might respond to in information campaigns, it is not as well suited for yielding insights into how to negotiate a resolution to problems when fundamental values are in conflict (Patterson, Guynn, Guynn, 2000). To negotiate and resolve conflicts of this type, we need theoretical frameworks and social assessment processes capable of articulating not only the differences among individuals, but also approaches capable of discovering barriers to communication, sources of conflict, and possible areas of common ground that represent a useful starting point for constructive dialog (Kahn, 1994; Patterson et al., 2000; Peterson and Horton, 1995; Primm, 1996). An hermeneutic research approach is ideally suited for this type of research, given its open-ended, exploratory nature, emphasis on communication and language, focus on negotiating meaning, and emphasis on validation as the practical utility of research insights over the "truth" of the underlying constructs (see section on instrumental goals in Chapter 3).

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Appendex I
Glossary of Selected Terms

Anti-foundationalism - Refers to those philosophies that maintain "the credibility of an interpretation cannot be inferred separate from its reading" (Holt, 1991:59). Unlike foundationalists, adherents of this philosophy maintain there is no single algorithm or set of standardized rules for distinguishing truth from nontruth and science from nonscience. Rather than relying primarily on antecedent methodological procedures to evaluate the quality of research, anti-foundationalists focus instead on the product itself. Hermeneutics is an anti-foundationalist philosophy. See Chapter 3 for an in-depth discussion.

Assertoric Knowledge - Knowledge that is not known with absolute certainty but is supported by the evidence. This perspective on knowledge is associated with postpositivist philosophy that maintains humans do not have access to absolute truth. This perspective maintains that it is possible to have more confidence in some knowledge claims than in others even when it is not possible to know truth or falsity with certainty. Rather than relying on deductive logic "assertoric knowledge uses practical reasoning and argumentation. ... A supporter of a knowledge claim is expected to argue cogently before the appropriate community, providing evidence pertinent to his or her proposal and defending his or her position as the most likely correct position among various alternatives. Assertoric knowledge is time-bound. It is knowledge that one (or a group) decides for—a particular alternative—in order to act in a given situation. This kind of knowledge is not considered true for all times and for all places, but it does serve as the basis for action" (Polkinghorne, 1983:279-280). This perspective on knowledge is consistent with hermeneutics.

Axiology - Normative philosophical commitments related to the goals underlying a particular approach to science. At the paradigmatic level of the macrostructure of science, there are two types of goals: terminal goals (e.g., prediction, understanding, control, communication) and instrumental goals (e.g., generalizability, internal consistency reliability, predictive validity, persuasiveness, insightfulness). See also, macrostructure of science, paradigm, instrumental goals, and terminal goals.

Co-constitution - A central concept in hermeneutic ontology. It refers to the idea that a person has no existence apart from the world, and the world has no existence apart from the person. "It is through the world that the very meaning of the person's existence emerges both for himself or herself and for others. The converse is equally true. It is each individual's existence that gives his or her world meaning" (Valle et al., 1989:7). This concept helps distinguish hermeneutic philosophy from dualistic philosophies that describe human experience in terms of interaction between a subject (the individual) and an object (the environment). See also intentionality and situated freedom.

Constructivist Ontologies - Those philosophies that maintain humans actively construct identities, reality, and knowledge (cf., Howard, 1991:187; Nespor and Barylske, 1991:806; Paget, 1983:69). An important implication of this belief is that knowledge-gathering practices are viewed as a production process rather than a process by which researchers discover facts about an objective reality (cf., Howard, 1991:187; Nespor and Barylske, 1991:806). In hermeneutics, this perspective is linked to the concepts of co-constitution, fusion of horizons, intentionality, and situated freedom. See also objectivist ontologies.

Deterministic Ontologies - Those philosophies that view psychological functioning (e.g., satisfaction, aesthetic response, and behavior) as outcome variables dependent on or caused by isolatable environmental and personal variables (Altman and Rogoff, 1987; Anderson, 1986:160; Hudson and Ozanne, 1988:510). This perspective is not consistent with hermeneutics. See also narrative ontologies.

Epistemology - Normative philosophical commitments or beliefs concerning issues related to the nature, methods, and limits of human knowledge. For example, at the paradigmatic level of the macrostructure of science, these assumptions deal with issues like relationship of observer to the phenomenon being observed, research process, and type of knowledge generated. See also macrostructure of science and paradigm. See Chapter 3 for a more in-depth discussion.

Forestructure of Understanding - This is a central concept in hermeneutic epistemology that comes from Martin Heidegger's philosophy. It refers to the belief that we understand in terms of what we already know (Packer and Addison, 1989:34). Thus we approach a phenomenon with a preliminary understanding shaped by expectations, life styles, and culture which cannot be set aside in an interpretive analysis as hermeneutic reenactment maintains. See also fusion of horizons.

Foundationalism - Refers to those philosophies that seek to ground knowledge in methodological procedures that distinguish truth from nontruth and science from nonscience (Thompson, 1990:25,26). These methodological algorithms become the instrumental goals by which research is legitimized in a peer-review process (e.g., generalizability, internal consistency reliability, multi-method multi-trait approaches to establishing validity) among foundationalists. Foundationlist logic is particularly evident in positivist approaches to science, but may also be found in subjective approaches to science such as Lincoln and Guba's (1985) naturalist inquiry paradigm. Foundationalist logic is grounded in dualistic assumptions regarding subject/object distinctions (Thompson, 1990:26) and is therefore inconsistent with the normative commitments of hermeneutics. See also anti-foundationalism and instrumental goals.

Fusion of Horizons - This is a central concept in hermeneutic epistemology, which comes from Gadamer's philosophy. Gadamer maintains that an interpretation of the meaning of an action does not entail empathetically "getting inside the author's mind" to identify his or her subjective intentions as some interpretivist paradigms maintain. Rather, both the actor's and the researcher's horizons of meaning play a constitutive role. Thus, interpretation of meaning is "neither an appropriation of the actors' concepts nor the imposition of the interpreter's categories, but a fusing of the two into a distinct entity: the interpretation." (Hekman, 1984:337,338,345). See also constructivist ontologies and forestructure of understanding.

Hermeneutic Circle - A central concept in hermeneutic epistemology. Broadly speaking, it refers to the inter-relationship between the parts and the whole. Phenomena are viewed as *having parts whose meaning* depends on an understanding of some larger whole, while at the same time the understanding of the whole is shaped by the parts (Terwee, 1990:116,128). In a more specific sense it is a metaphor describing the nature of hermeneutic analysis. First, whole texts are read to gain an understanding of the data in its entirety. This global understanding is then used as the basis for a closer examination of the separate parts (Kvale, 1983:185; Thompson et al., 1989:141). In turn, "the closer determination of the meaning of the separate parts may come to change the originally anticipated meaning of the totality, and again this influences the meaning of the separate parts" (Kvale, 1983:185). In this sense, this metaphor represents an important aspect of the testing logic underlying hermeneutic analysis and describes the systematic and rigorous process by which analysis is to be conducted.

Hermeneutic Divination - A branch of hermeneutics associated with the philosopher *Friedrich Schleiermacher. A distinguishing characteristic* of this version of hermeneutics is the belief that the correct interpretation of a "text" is achieved by "divining" the author's original intentions (Nicholson, 1984:26). This is not the branch of hermeneutics presented in this book. See also hermeneutics and productive hermeneutics.

Hermeneutic Reconstructionism - A branch of hermeneutics associated with Karl-Otto Apel and Jurgen Habermas (Nicholson, 1984:31; Russell, 1988:130). One distinctive feature of this version of hermeneutics is the suggestion that human action cannot be understood solely in terms of an individual's experience; science must also consider how social and authoritarian structures influence behavior (Nicholson, 1984:31). This is not the branch of hermeneutics presented in this book. See also hermeneutics and productive hermeneutics.

Hermeneutic Reenactment - A branch of hermeneutics that is associated with Wilhelm Dilthey (Nicholson, 1984:26; Stewart, 1983:381). The distinctive feature of this version of hermeneutics is the emphasis on interpretation through an empathetic process that requires *bracketing (setting aside, suspending) preconceptions*, putting oneself in the place of another, and imaginatively reliving the actual and possible experiences of others (Russell, 1988:130; Stewart, 1983:379; Wertz, 1983). Modern expressions of this approach to hermeneutics are found in existential phenomenology (Polkinghorne, 1983:213). This is not the branch of hermeneutics presented in this book. See also hermeneutics and productive hermeneutics.

Hermeneutics - A interpretivist world view that emphasizes ontology as opposed to epistemology. It originated in the 17th century as an approach for interpreting biblical texts (Gergen et al., 1986). Philosophers of the late 19th century expanded the domain of this world view to include the study of human behavior and meaning based on the belief that understanding humans "and society was more like interpreting texts than like gaining empirical knowledge of nature" (Olson, 1986:160). At least four different branches of hermeneutics have been distinguished: hermeneutic divination, hermeneutic reconstructionism, hermeneutic reenactment, and productive hermeneutics (Nicholson, 1984; Russell, 1988). This book presents an approach to science consistent with productive hermeneutics; when used in the book, the term "hermeneutic" refers to this branch of hermeneutics.

Idiographic Analysis - This refers to the analysis of individuals as opposed to an aggregate or across individuals analysis. In hermeneutics, idiographic analysis always serves as the first stage of analysis and occurs before any attempt at an aggregate or across individuals analysis. This approach is required both for philosophical reasons (underlying ontological beliefs like situated freedom) and for practical reasons (the interview process employed in hermeneutic research generates data with a varied structure across interviews and therefore requires an idiographic stage of analysis before aggregation is possible).

Information-Based Models of Human Nature - In this book, this refers to those models of human behavior that treat individuals as rational, analytic, goal-driven information processors (cf., McCracken, 1987; Mick and Buhl, 1992). Critics of this perspective maintain that it treats individuals "as if they are solitary subjects, without identities, who react to [objects] through linear stages or limited persuasion routes" (Mick and Buhl, 1992:317). This perspective is closely aligned with deterministic and objectivist ontologies, and is not the perspective adopted by hermeneutics. See also meaning-based models of human nature.

Instrumental Goals - Part of a paradigm's axiological commitments, this concept refers to the criteria by which research will be evaluated as good or bad science (for example for acceptability for publication in a peer-reviewed journal). Traditional instrumental goals includes include concepts such as generalizability, internal consistency reliability, and predictive validity. Hermeneutic instrumental goals are persuasiveness, insightfulness, and practical utility. See Chapter 3 for a more in-depth discussion.

Intentionality - In hermeneutics, intentionality refers to the concept that consciousness is always consciousness of something (i.e., consciousness is an activity, not a mental object) (Valle et al., 1989; von Eckartsberg, 1981; Wertz, 1989). This concept helps distinguish hermeneutics from dualistic philosophies that make a distinction between subject and object. See also co-constitution and situated freedom.

Macrostructure of Science - Since Thomas Kuhn, philosophy of science has defined the unit of analysis for discussing research traditions as the macrostructure of science. A concept much broader than simply theory or methodology, the macrostructure encompasses the array of normative philosophical commitments that underlie different research traditions. There are many different frameworks for describing the macrostructure of science; the one employed in this book characterizes the macrostructure into three levels of specificity: world view, paradigms, and research programs (Patterson and Williams, 1998).

Meaning-Based Models of Human Nature - In this book, this refers to those models of human behavior that portray individuals as actively engaged in the construction of meaning as opposed to processing information that exists in the environment (cf., McCracken, 1987; Mick and Buhl, 1992). This perspective is closely aligned with constructivist and *narrative ontologies, and is consistent with the normative commitments of hermeneutics.* See also information-based models of human nature.

Meaning Units - In hermeneutic analysis, this refers to the smallest units of an interview narrative that are comprehensible on their own (Tesch, 1990:17). The suggestion that portions of text are comprehensible on their own is not meant to imply that they can be fully understood independent of the context in which they are embedded. Rather, what is implied is a concept similar to Altman and Rogoff's (1987:37) term, "aspects," which they defined as referring to "features of a system that may be focused on separately but that require consideration of other features of a system for their definition and for understanding of their functioning." Meaning units are typically not words or phrases, but groups of *sentences.* Beyond this general definition (i.e., a unit of the interview narrative that expresses an idea complete and coherent enough that it can be focused on separately), there is no specific algorithm or set of rules of identifying and defining a meaning unit. Meaning units are actual statements from interviews; they represent the "hard data" or evidence that researchers use to persuade the reader the analysis and interpretations are warranted. See also organizing system.

Narrative Ontologies - Those philosophies (e.g., hermeneutics) that assert human experience is more like an emergent narrative than an outcome predictable on the basis of isolatable antecedent environmental and personal variables. In hermeneutics, this perspective is linked to the concepts of co-constitution, intentionality, and situated freedom. See also deterministic ontologies.

Nomothetic Analysis - Refers to an analysis that seeks to identify patterns across individuals. In hermeneutics, a nomothetic level analysis is conducted only after a thorough idiographic (individual)-level analysis has been completed.

Objectivist Ontologies - Those philosophies that maintain the existence of a single, free-standing reality waiting to be discovered (Howard, 1991:187). This view is inconsistent with hermeneutics. See also constructivist ontologies.

Ontology - Philosophical commitments or beliefs concerning issues related to the nature of reality, human nature, and the nature of human experience. For example, at the paradigmatic level of the macrostructure of science, these assumptions deal with issues like the existence of single versus multiple realities, the nature of human consciousness, and deterministic versus constructivist views of human experience. See also macrostructure of science, paradigm, constructivist ontologies, objectivist ontologies, narrative ontologies, and deterministic ontologies.

Organizing System - Hermeneutic data analysis centers around the development of what Tesch (1990) described as an organizing system. The purpose of an organizing system is to identify predominant themes through which qualitative data (often interviews) can be

meaningfully organized, interpreted, and presented. The process of developing an organizing system *is* the "analysis," while the final organizing system is the product of the analysis. The first stage in developing an organizing system is to construct an indexing (numbering) system used to reference the location of specific units of text. In the second stage, meaning units (see definition of meaning units above) are identified. The final stage of developing an organizing system involves the development of thematic labels under which meaning units are grouped and the explanation of relationships among themes. In an hermeneutic analysis, typically the final organizing system is presented in the form of a visual aid (figure or table) and is explained and "empirically justified" through the discussion presented in the results section. See Chapter 4 for a more detailed explanation and Chapter 5 for examples.

Paradigm - The second level in the macrostructure of science. Describes specific approaches to science (e.g., applied behavior analysis [cf., Geller, 1987], critical theory [cf., Murray and Ozanne, 1991], grounded theory [cf., Strauss and Corbin, 1998], naturalistic inquiry [cf., Lincoln and Guba, 1985], semiotics [cf., Mick, 1986]) on the basis of a core set of interdependent normative assumptions. Discussions of these core assumptions can be structured around Laudan's (1984) Reticulated Model of Scientific Rationality, which groups normative commitments into: ontology, epistemology, and axiology. Hermeneutics, the approach to qualitative research presented in this book, is a paradigm.

Productive Hermeneutics - A branch of hermeneutics most closely associated with the philosophies of Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Paul Ricoeur. This label largely serves to distinguish this version of hermeneutics from hermeneutic reenactment. Whereas hermeneutic reenactment attempts to reproduce the original actor's experiences and meaning through bracketing and empathy, productive hermeneutics maintains that researchers cannot bracket their preconceptions, nor, can they truly empathize with another's experience. Instead they acknowledge that an "utterly innocent" reading of the text is impossible and that the researcher plays an active role in the interpretation (Nicholson, 1984:29). This branch of hermeneutics serves as the basis for establishing the hermeneutic paradigm outlined in this book. See also hermeneutics.

Research Program - The third level in the macrostructure of science. Refers to specific theories, conceptual models, and associated constructs (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi's flow model, Driver and colleagues' motivational approach, Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of reasoned action, Petty and Cacioppo's elaboration likelihood model). See Chapter 6 for a discussion of research programs in relation to hermeneutics.

Science - A rigorous and systematic set of empirical activities for constructing, representing, and analyzing knowledge about phenomena being studied (Brunner, 1982; Nespor and Barylske, 1991) that is guided by a set of normative philosophical commitments shared by a community of scholars. All scientific research is characterized by three universal and defining characteristics (empirical tests, opportunity for external critique, and rigorous and systematic analysis). These three normative characteristics are necessary but not sufficient for defining science; however, additional normative characteristics are dependent on the specific approach science under consideration. See discussion in Chapter 2 for an in-depth discussion.

Situated Freedom - In hermeneutics, situated freedom refers to the belief that human experience is not completely determined by the environment, nor is it characterized by complete personal freedom (Valle et al., 1989). The social and physical environment presents situations that constrain how a person may act (Thompson et al., 1989; Valle et al., 1989). However, one's practical interests make perception interpretive, and human control manifests itself through the ability to act in the world in a purposeful manner and the ability to orient attention to different aspects of the environment (Thompson et al., 1989; Valle et al., 1989). This concept helps distinguish hermeneutic philosophies from dualistic philosophies that make a distinction between subject and object and from deterministic philosophies of human experience. See also co-constitution and intentionality.

Terminal Goals - Part of a paradigm's axiological commitments, this concept refers to the ultimate aims of a specific paradigm or research tradition (e.g., universal laws of human functioning, predictive explanation, understanding). See Chapter 3 for a more in-depth discussion.

Testing Logic - A testing logic refers to the system of logic describing the relationship of data to research concepts (Schrader-Frechette and McCoy, 1994). Hypothesis testing is perhaps the most prominent and widely known testing logic, however it is only one of many possible testing logics. For example, Mishler (1990) makes a distinction between the logic of hypothesis testing and the testing logic underlying inquiry-guided research. The concepts of the hermeneutic circle and an organizing system represent key aspects of the testing logic underlying data analysis in an hermeneutic approach. However, the logic of analysis represents only one aspect of a testing logic. A complete testing logic also includes sampling and data-collection principles. Selection of an appropriate testing logic should be guided by explicit assumptions about the phenomenon, research goals, and theoretical foundations. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss these issues from an hermeneutic perspective.

World View - The broadest level in the macrostructure of science. This level is characterized by a continuum ranging from extreme rationalism to extreme relativism. Rationalism asserts that there is one, universal, timeless set of criteria for judging the merits of rival theories. For example, one set of criteria could be called on to judge "the relative merits of the physics of Aristotle and Democritus, Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomy, Freudian and behaviorist psychology, or the big bang and steady state theories of the universe." Relativism asserts there is no universal, ahistorical criterion for judging the relative merits of theories. Instead, they argue that the criteria for judging theories are dependent on the values or goals of the scientific community evaluating them (Chalmers, 1982:101-103). See Chapter 6 for a more in-depth discussion.

Appendex II
Interview Transcript/Reference System - CASE STUDY 1

Below is a portion of the interview transcript for the Lady Musgrave interview which is discussed in Case Study 1 of Chapter 5.

NUDIST STAND-ALONE v.2.3.1c FOR IBM PC
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camper105
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Retrieval for this document: 363 units out of 363, = 100%

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*Lady Musgrave Island Interview ID: 105 Interview type: Camper
Date: 4/2/91 Interviewer: Lea Scherl
------------ TEXT UNITS 1-363:

*QUESTION 1 1

1) Tell me about your visit to Lady Musgrave and what sort of
experience has today been for you. 2
C105: I think it was a good trip out. 3
The boat we came out on actually gave us a lot of information and
did a good job. 4

It is a pity they didn't drop us closer to the camp site because it is hard carrying your stuff all around the island. 5
Apart from that it has been really good, the weather has been fantastic. 6
It is great being able to camp so close to the area where you are going to be snorkeling. 7
You can just walk out at low tide and go snorkeling, you don't have to wander around the island or anything. 8
I don't like being as close to the other campers. 9
I prefer to be separated so you can't see them or hear them. 10
It so happens that you can hear them playing their music at night and I came to be able to get away from that sort of thing. 11
When you camp anywhere you can normally get that sort of stuff, but if you come to a deserted island you expect to be away from everyone else. 12
But that is part and parcel of coming here. 13
It is good having the turtles here. 14
If I had my holidays earlier in the year I would have come when the turtles were nesting because that would have been great to have them nesting as well as hatching, but I saw some hatchlings again last night which was good. 15

*QUESTION 2 16

2) Thinking about the experience you have been having at Lady Musgrave what were some of the things that were going through your mind? 17
C105: Wouldn't it be nice to do this for more than a week because I only have a week here. 18
I would be happy to do this for 3 weeks or more. 19
I think it would be nicer to have a longer holiday. 20
Everyone should be able to have that sort of holiday or everyone should be able to have access to that sort of information. 21
When we had the slide show the other night and the kids were told about the reef and what to expect when they go out there and how to look after, what not to do and what to do, I think that sort of thing everyone in Australia should have access to that sort of information. 22
If they had that sort of talk as a compulsory part of coming to the island, when you buy your ticket you have to not only read the little information but you have to have a talk saying what you are going to see out there and what not to do, and what to do with everything. 23
We don't cook dinner until after the sunset because everyone sits on the beach to watch the sunset because it is just so beautiful. 24
It is really nice. 25

*QUESTION 3 26

3) Could you tell me what you specifically have been doing while here? 27
C105: Snorkeling was one thing and that was good. 28
The few days it has actually been a bit windy and it has stirred up the water where I was so it wasn't particularly good visibility, but friends went around the lagoon yesterday and I will probably go around there today. 29
I am actually going to dive off the boat, I am going diving this afternoon. 30
I went snorkeling, I didn't have a book to identify fish but I brought a guide to the Barrier Reef fish so whenever I go snorkeling, I come back and look up all the fish I saw and the bird identification books, I look up all the birds that are flying around as well. 31
That is good. 32
Just sunbaking on the beach, that is good, the weather has been good for that. 33
A walk around the island. 34
That was interesting seeing the different sorts of shells that were there. 35
ILS: When you came across with the boat, did you go on the glass bottom boat? 36
R:105 Yes 37
ILS: How was that? 38
C105: It is not as good as snorkeling and you can't get much of a view from the glass bottom boat. 39
You can't actually go over the coral because you have the engine in the back so you can't go over anything that is very shallow and they are only really small glass things and you have the bubbles under the boat so you can't actually see clearly and if you see something interesting, you go right over the top of it, you don't stop to actually have a look at it. 40
So as far as I am concerned, snorkeling is much better. 41
ILS: Did you go to the observatory? 42
C105: Yes and that was interesting I suppose. 43
It is just like snorkeling but not getting wet. 44

Appendex III
Reconstructed Interview from Case Study 3

Jason and Cathy

Personal History

I started at about twelve. Actually it wasn't a jet boat. It was a prop boat because I didn't have a jet boat yet. But I ... was raised — I could throw a rock from the house and hit the river, so I'd get off the school bus and I'd go down Salmon fishing. So I started running, not the whole river, but I'd run a good ten mile stretch right here by Whitebird when I was about twelve to thirteen, in that area. My dad, ... he couldn't swim, and he loved to fish, but he didn't want anything much to do with the boat. So he had [name] here teach me to run the boat, which was an old River Runner, so I could take him fishing. (Jason, 264-282, #1)

I taught, ... a lot of the people that runs the river around here I taught. (Jason, 303, #2)

I spent twenty years camping up there at least a week to two weeks up the big Salmon up in the Frank Church, and that's the one trip that we really enjoy. (Jason, 341, #3)

When we got married we had a jet boat wedding. It was mid-December and ice was floating and she was nervous that we would have to do something different. I went down and there was too much ice. There was no way ... And I ran down about an hour later, a little bit less and a little bit less. When we went down I had to miss a lot of ice, but we went down on the beach that we wanted to get married on and this boat out here went. The guy owned it, ran it, and we had the wedding party in there, and we had two jet boats and we got married [inaudible] icy weather on the river. (Jason, 1718-1724, #4)

Salmon Unique Characteristics

It's my home. I was raised on it. I live here because I can't afford a place down there. But if we had — either one of us had our wishes we'd live right on the river down there. J: And, no, I just love that river. (Jason, 520-527, #5)

I: So then it sounds like the Salmon itself has some special meaning to you? J: Yeah. It's home. ... I've used it to jet boat, to chukkar hunt, to deer hunt, I've used it to elk hunt, fish, swim, water ski, just about anything you can do. (Interviewer, Jason, 535-542, #6)

I: So does the Salmon itself have then some special meaning to you above and beyond, say, other rivers? C: Not really. I mean, I enjoy the Snake too. It's, like I say, ... to me it's the outing and being able to have that freedom to do it. (Interviewer, Cathy, 147-152, #7)

I: Is there something about the Salmon that sets it apart from other places? J: Yeah, it's cleaner. I mean, it's a clean river. ... and it's — the Snake, you know, is so much dirtier. The water's dirtier, it has a odor to it from being held up in the reservoirs, and let me put it this way, when I get out of the Salmon River from going swimming I don't [inaudible] take a shower, but the Snake River I feel I need to. (Interviewer, Jason, 516-528, #8)

[On the] Snake River you've got volume. Here you've got rocks. (Jason, 1641-1642, #9)

And so when you order boats, the perfect boat ... for the Salmon is not the perfect boat for the Snake, vice versa. You have to really know what your main river that you're going to run, and that's what you buy. ... Like people buy steering wheels. Steering wheels belong in the lake. I had a stick. I had 18 inches from full left to full right. ... How long does it take to move 9 inches. I missed so many rocks that I would have hit with a steering wheel because 9 inches I had full throttle. But then Bill Fisk, one of the best river runners in the country, he likes steering wheels. But he has his like a race car. It won't even make a full turn. It's got a real fast rack and pinion and he likes that because he likes to water ski .... (Jason, 1659-1678, #10)

I don't run Ludwig too often. I've run it four times. Three times successfully. [laughter] Ludwig — the bad thing about Ludwig ... you go up — from Vinegar Creek to Ludwig, if you break an engine down or anything you can get help to go up and get you. ... 90 % of the people turn around at Ludwig. So you get above there and you break down, you're in trouble. ... If you blow an engine, whatever, you're in a whole bunch of trouble, where down below you can tow your boat out or get help in. (Jason, 454-464, #11)

Regional Outlook

J: I went more in the winter than I do the summer. I: No kidding? Did fishing more in the winter? J: Oh, steelhead's the best and the sheep are best. And less traffic on the river and that's what I like. But, no, I ran a lot more in the winter. Summer time, July and August, I probably ran the least because it's hot, the steelhead's not here. But then that's when I usually like to go to Snake River catfishing and sturgeon fishing. (Jason, Interviewer, 736-754, #12)

Experience

Boating - Respect for River, Skill

Because that river has got a lot of power and when it gets you down it stomps on you and it stomps on you fast. (Jason, 1366, #13)

C: I've even seen him a lot of times pull over ... and get out of the boat and walk around and look it all over before he ever attempts to — J: Even though I've ran that rapid for 20 years — C: Every year it changes. J: Rocks roll in, rocks roll out. And if I pull up there and something don't look right, there's nothing wrong — I'd rather go to shore and think about it for a little bit than in the middle of a rapid think about it. And it's just something that you have to do. (Cathy and Jason, 1378-1395, #14)

... it's just two different rivers. When I run it it's around 4,000 feet or less. It's a rock patch so you have to know the channels and how to read the rocks. That's one experience. The big water, to know where to run - ... the last time we was up there, my boat, I got in trouble in Dried Meat. ... it started raining and it rained all week. The river raised three feet. Well, ... I'd never been up there at that level. All the years running it I waited until low levels. And there was two rocks in between and there was a dip in the middle you could see. [But this time] you couldn't see the dip. So I went up there and I didn't hit a rock, but the river — I tired out. I washed out and I made it. Well, I didn't realize it but I found out from the people that run it all the time, when you can't see the dip, you sneak the left bank. You go to the side. I learned from — I had a bad experience so I started asking questions. Hey, I had an error here. It turned out good because I drove my boat back out of it. From experience I knew how to get out of a problem once you got into it. But I'd never been up there with that volume of water before. But it's — every level is different. (Jason, 1313-1350, #15)

You have to learn to read the water, have to understand why it's white, and how to go through it. It's more of a thrill because the only way to keep from hitting a rock in the river is to stay out. Sooner or later you're going to foul up and hit a rock. [laughter] So it's a challenge. (Jason, 329-335, #16)

C: And [as Jason] was saying [a little while ago] when he powered out ..., it was my weight that was in the back and this other guy, and I took that guy and I shoved him up front and I went up front just over the top. J: She knew what I needed and that made me plane out. I: So it sounds ... like even the passengers play a role. C: I think they do. J: It helps. Now if you've got a commercial and had a bunch of people that have never been in a jet boat before, they could have panicked and did the wrong thing, went the wrong way. (Cathy, Jason, Interviewer, 1581-1590, #17)

So whenever I was younger I had to go up through those rapids for the thrill to do it. As I got older, ... the problems I see that you can have along the way you learn just don't do it unless you need to. (Jason, 467-469, #18)

Access

I: ... what initially attracted you to jet boating? J: Just fishing. Our whole family's been into fishing, and camping. That's our way of travel around here if you're going to go up and down the canyon. (Interviewer, Jason, 315-319, #19)

J: I sold my boat... [So this year] we four wheeled in the snow. We went in the [inaudible] and we stayed on the river. C: It was wonderful. ... and it snowed about 20 inches while we was in there ... C: Yeah, it wasn't near as thrilling [as being in a] boat and being able to drift

down. ... and fish and see the sheep. We were in a spot we couldn't see the sheep. So it was different this year. I: So you felt — without having the boat you felt like maybe you were a little bit more limited? J: Oh, yeah, totally because you only have a half a mile of river that you can get on, period.... We didn't get to see any sheep this time ... C: It's raining. There was nothing to do but sit in the tent. In a boat, you can get in the boat and get under the top and — J: Fish. C: — go look at the river and drift fish. (Jason, Cathy, Interviewer, 400-431, #20)

C: We've hiked on a few of the trails, but not -- I couldn't honestly say that's one of our main deals. I've got a really bad knee so I'm limited. I: Would that be then a reason why, partly why you enjoy jet boating, .. having a bad knee, it allows you to get into some places maybe? C: Oh, yeah. If you don't have a horse, you can't walk it, how do you get there, you know? ... you can't get on a four wheeler ... because they don't allow it, or a Snow Cat. So in order to see this country you have to get there the best you can. (Cathy, Interviewer, 198-211, #21)

But what I felt bad is that they don't want the jet boats on up there because the float deal. Well, at that time my mother was still alive and she was 78 years old and she would have loved going up there. Well, she couldn't go up there and she couldn't set in a raft for days to come down. So they were discriminating against senior citizens and stuff like that, you know. I felt that they should have the right to go up there as well as anybody else. (Jason, 583-587, #22)

J: We used to sit here of a morning and not doing anything - let's get in the boat and go catch some catfish. See, you can't do it any more. You got to have a permit clear back in March for the summer time. That's one reason I don't have a boat. ... When you live here you shouldn't have to plan a vacation ... in March, what day you want to go fishing in July or August. C: Well, you got to go by the weather, a little bit ... J: ... and then ... have to work, you know. You never know. (Jason and Cathy, 755-780, #23)

J: As a working man, I used to use my boat for relaxation. And we'd get up Saturday morning and if we didn't have something going we'd go down the river to go fishing for a couple hours, all day, whatever we had time. I don't have time to fill out a permit and — I mean, that's like going on vacation. ... C: Fill out a permit and that day you get up and it's the worst weather, you've got junk floating in the river. You can't take your boat in that. (Jason and Cathy, 1710-1716, #24)

... this permitting thing. I mean, if I can't go to the Snake River and go catch a catfish in July and August like I always have in my whole life — probably since I was seven years old, last year was the first time in my life I didn't go there fishing, and I didn't do it because I'll get in trouble. ... I mean, it's stupid. And it's the first time in my life. ... we raise a little garden ... We used to always have an annual — we'd go to the Snake River, catch trout and bass and catfish, come back and get everything out of our garden and that was our meal. We did that once a year, just go do it, off a whim. And it was fun and there was nothing wrong with that, [but] to have to have a permit [to go] over there in March ... And now ... what they've got the $5 fee to go up to Vinegar Creek. I bet you it's not five years you'll have to have a permit year round to go up there. (Jason, 1771-1781, #25)

Non-Boating Dimensions of Experience

I: For you, what's the part that you like the best about it? ... C: I don't — just the view. I mean, you don't see it unless you're in a boat. C: I don't know. I enjoy just fishing without a whole bunch of people around. The whole thing is just remarkable. The river itself is quite remarkable. I: What is it about the river then, if you could describe, what is it that makes it unique and special? C: [laughter] I don't know. What makes the ocean so great? I don't know. It's just the whole thrill of the rapids and just the scenery, the — you know, you see the sheep and just everything is just — it's — I don't know. I don't think there is just one thing. (Interviewer, Cathy, 49-69, #26)

I: ... what initially attracted you to jet boating? J: Just fishing. Our whole family's already been into fishing, and camping. (Interviewer, Jason, 315-318, #27)

Pretty well a jet boater's out there for the same thing. You'll see it's the family thing. You take the kids and the kids will swim and Dad will fish.... Just like me, I would never race. They tried to get me to race the river down there and I said no. I have no reason to race through this, you know. I'd rather go up there slow and look. (Jason, 1061-1067, #28)

I: When you take a jet boat trip up the Salmon, do you go up for the same thing every time or is it ... different reasons at different times? J: Different reasons, yeah. ... But the one thing — my favorite animal is the wild sheep. There's that picture [showing interviewer picture]. That's one that we took up there and have taken several up there. But I love — that's my favorite animal. So I used to go up there and I hunt them with a camera. I've never even applied for a permit to shoot one. I just love to go and watch them, especially in November when they start banging heads. ... You darn near see a sheep every time you go up there. (Interviewer, Jason, 338-362, #29)

... Cathy, I said, you know, I'm going to miss the boat but dammit — I used to ... go down there with stress from my work or whatever and I'd just relax and just the river flowed and I just enjoyed it. [But more recently] I'd come back even more so damn mad that I can't see straight and it didn't work. ... The only thing I can say is thank God I got to do it before all these people screwed it up, and now it's screwed up big time. (Jason, 1791-1796, #30)

You know, you're up there camping to get away. I worked with the public, working for the power company all day long. ... [But recently] I had more hassling up there than I did work. So what'd I go for? (Jason, 1966-1969, #31)

Wilderness

Characterization

I: Does the fact that the Salmon runs through a wilderness area up there, does that seem to make it any different ... Do you think about it differently? C: I don't think so, huh-uh. No, because we see all kinds of horseback riders packing, people walking, other boaters, floaters. I don't think I really think of it as a wilderness. A thrill, you know, of being in this wilderness area, I don't. (Interviewer, Cathy, 127-139, #32)

I: Does the fact that the Salmon runs through a wilderness up there, does that make a difference to you when you're up there? J: No. (Jason, 578-581, #33)

And that's — but the part of the wilderness, I'm glad they didn't build a road back there, you know. ... I'd rather go up there and jet boat than I would from here to Riggins. ... it's the same water, the same river. And I've ran Riggins a lot of times but I just, you know, it just — I'd rather go down, you know, [inaudible river name] River with no road or I'd rather go above Vinegar Creek. (Jason, 602-611, #34)

We do need some places to — that — that's not populated. (Jason, 643, #35)

Awareness of Socio-cultural Presence

Well, for one thing I've been on the river so many years that I know the creeks and I know who homesteaded there and the history of the river, and ... it hasn't changed that much, you know. I mean, in the winter time when the floaters aren't there. (Jason, 439-441, #36)

The south fork of the Salmon runs in there. And up the south fork there's a place, a big flat called Copenhagen. It's where ... it was a part of the Nez Perce Tribe and we camped there and they were the sheep eaters ... but anyway, it's a beautiful flat and ... there's about five private parcels of property. Well, one guy had a log house there. He has never — he's always — hired somebody or called air service for somebody to fly him in there or somebody boat him.... (Jason, 1428-1432, #37)

... my cousin runs the Mackay Bar Lodge, so we go and visit him. (Jason, 367, #38)

Use Ethic

Shared Use

I: If you were given the job of managing that area of the Salmon and in the wilderness there, what issues do you think would be important to focus on? ... C: ... it would be great to me to open some of it up and let people enjoy it. That's what it's there for. What's the sense of having it if you can't enjoy it? And don't mean to abuse it, but there's got to be some way that people could enjoy it that can't walk it or they don't have a jet boat, you know, or a horse. (Interviewer, Cathy, 213-226, #39)

Of course, I have to admit that we have more people now that we didn't have, the floaters. I mean, usually you'd see a few floaters. Now all these people found our whitewater and they started to use it. (Jason, 1206-1208, #40)

... there was no reason that we couldn't have used the river together. There's plenty of room on the river. (Jason, 858-859, #41)

... we used to see floaters, wave at them. And instead of people shoving from Whitebird [having to] shuttle cars to [inaudible] and float down that stretch of river, I don't know how many times ... we used to load the rafts on the jet boats to haul them back up so they could do it again. (Jason, 635-636, #42)

J: Like Mackay Bar Resort, the Shepp Ranch, all the commercial jet boat outfits, I've never seen such friendly people ... They — but they live there. They don't just float down the river a few times a year and float by. They own real estate there and they make a living there. But also, I can pull in and have a cup of coffee at any one of the places or like - we was down

there one day ... in November ... [a] boat was sunk. And the Shepp Ranch [boat] ... run ahead of me. We went down through the rapid and we both turned around and go back to help to see if anybody was hurt, and he wasn't. But these people needed to get out of there, it was cold and wet. And we was probably fifteen miles up the river from Vinegar Creek. And Mike from the Shepp Ranch, he said, I got a full load of paying customers here. He said, I'm either going to have to take them out and come back, or could you haul these people out? I said, sure will, Mike, you know. But we've always worked together. And I've never had any problem with that. (Jason, 900-920, #43)

C: I know in the last few years that we boated in the summer time it was just impossible, because of the floaters, to even enjoy the river. I: Just too many people? Or because of their attitudes? C: It just -- their attitude. The outfitters, they are plum snotty. They get like, why are you on the river? And, frankly, they take up all the dock space so you can't even -- ... it's a hassle. (Cathy, Interviewer, 156-164, #44)

J: The experience we had last summer with the rude floaters. When I left the river I was so durn mad I didn't enjoy myself. I don't go up there to fight and to be bullied around. I go up there to enjoy. C: We were on the beach. J: Just the jet boat setting there. C: Both of us. J: Eating lunch. We wasn't even camped there. C: And here come all the floaters in — J: And then he said, we sure hope you're not staying here because we are. C: We are. J: And started throwing their stuff out. ... They was totally rude. (Jason and Cathy, 759-819, #45)

And they'd [a group a jet boaters] been rude all day. But besides that, they — you have your river rules, you know. You take Mackay Bar, Shepp Ranch, whatever, and they have fifteen, twenty people in this big boat and they're coming in and it's 4:00 in the evening. It gets dark about 5:00. So they've got to get these people unloaded so they can go about their way and get back to the ranch because they don't have any headlights. So it's always been a rule of thumb if you come down and they're there - go over across the river and fish, give them fifteen minutes to get out of the way and whatever. ... These guys from Boise actually passed the Shepp Ranch boat to beat them in, they wanted to get their boat in the trailer first and get out of there. And here was Shepp Ranch sitting out here then waiting and worried about time. You just don't do it. (Jason, 949-958, #46)

What I have found is commercial is the worst. The University of Idaho had a group and they was terrible. They were very environmental. They was wanting us off the river. You find privates that are usually pretty friendly and not much problem. (Jason, 841-845, #47)

I: Do you notice whether or not that's predominantly the guided floating trips or the private trips or both? C: The guided. The private, the people who are just out there having a good day like we are, usually they'll wave, they'll stop and talk to you. It's the guided. I: Do you have any idea why there's that difference? ... C: I don't know. Other than I think that their big selling probably is that this is — it's quiet ... and then they run into jet boaters and we're ruining that outing for them, I guess. I don't know. I've never really asked, you know, talked. I just know that they do. They don't — just not sociable people. (Interviewer, Cathy, 156-187, #48)

I've never had any problems with floaters. Like I said, the few rude and the reason why that is is because they're wanting the river for themselves. I mean they're selfish people. It wasn't the floaters in general. .... I'm actually saying the outfitters caused most of it. And they lobbied with the Forest Service and got the Forest Service backing them and they started the whole thing. (Jason, 1742-1750, #49)

I: Do you have a feeling why it is maybe that the commercial groups — why it is that there's that much bad feelings and so forth? J: Yeah, I had one of them tell me in 1976. I won't say his name. But he told me ... one of these days you'll pay me to go on the Salmon River. I said, over your dead body. ... So what they're doing, they're taking our natural resources and they're selling them. They're making a profit from them and stopping people like me from enjoying the natural resources without me paying for it. And that's what they want. (Interviewer, Jason, 871-890, #50)

Scope of Management

I: If you were ... give[n] a chance to manage this area ... what would be the issues that you would choose to focus on... ? J: The first thing, I'd kick the Forest Service totally off of it. [laughter] ... And then that would be the end of the problem. It don't need managed. ... it was doing just fine until people started managing it and then all of a sudden special groups lobbies a little harder than other groups, has more money, has more time, and then the problems started .., and then there started being a problem. Before the Forest Service ... used to sell timber and manage timber and they had something to do. And now that they don't sell timber anymore or -- and have timber sales, they want to manage people. And so they created theirself a job by managing people... (Interviewer, Jason, 616-635, #51)

I bet you it's not five years you'll have to have a permit year round to go up there. It's just what they're after. It's just another way to control people. (Jason, 1781-1783, #52)

But I feel that the Forest Service and BLM have done a terrible job. And just because they make all these rules to make jobs. And I know they have. Most definitely they have, because there's no reason for most of them. (Jason, 644-654, #53)

The other thing is starting to come up and down the river worrying about fire pans. Worried about fire pans and little things like that, you know. They should be cleaning up the banks. If they want a job, that's what they should be doing. They should be working. They don't want to work. They want to go up and regulate people, control people. But ... if they want to manage the river, they should manage it and clean up things like that, improve the boat ramps. (Jason, 1215-1228, #54)

... I feel that jet boats have never hurt anything on the river. I've hauled out so much garbage and trash that was left by campers. And for instance, you take a float party, every boat is full. I mean, they're sitting in there and they don't have much room, and they're in there for days. ... they pick up garbage, but there's a whole bunch of garbage to haul out. They ... can't — they don't have room, where a jet boat we had room and we took it out. (Jason, 593-598, #55)

... and there was no man could ever find where I camped. When I leave a camp you can't see where I camped. (Jason, 1895-1907, #56)

Lack of Sound Rationale for Current Management Actions

Of course, I have to admit that we have more people now that we didn't have, the floaters. I mean, usually you'd see a few floaters, you know. Now all these people found our whitewater and they started to use it. And that's when the Forest Service took out the facilities. (Jason, 1206-1209, #57)

... there used to be outhouses, toilets up above Vinegar Creek. Now they took them all out because they decided it wasn't natural. ... [Now] you go find a big rock ... [never] seen so much toilet paper and crap in all my life. It's just sickening. And the Forest Service did it by taking the toilets out because they -- you know, they've got the pack it out policy? (Jason, 653-657, #58)

And I've heard ... the float groups, they have their canister and so forth. Just at Sheep Creek one day I was curious and ... and I seen them all pull in. And I kept seeing all these people go out behind these big rocks. So the next day I went up there and sure enough, it was terrible, and it was the floaters, and it was an outfitter. ... But the deal is, even though they're with an outfitter, sure, what they'll tell you is, well, we told our people they have to, but we can't control them all the time. And instead of them going to use the canisters, they were going up to the bushes or behind the rock. There used to be an outhouse right there at that spot. And, you know, they wouldn't have had that mess. ... that's one of my biggest complaints ... and I've brought that up time and time again to them. And they kept saying, well, we've got to pack it in, pack it out. Good story. I: Yeah, okay. So that's just -- from your experiences up there, that philosophy with regard to at least toilets is unreasonable. J: Totally. (Jason, 1250-1269, #59)

Oh, they've done some stupid things. The other thing that just totally fried me is we started losing our mountain sheep up there a few years back from disease. The University of Idaho needed a carcass when it was still warm to run tests on it. So they wanted to fly a helicopter in and load a sheep and get it out. They couldn't do it because it was wilderness. They couldn't get through the red tape to land a helicopter there, so we're losing our sheep because somebody's stupid idea -- I mean, how much harm would it hurt to land a helicopter, load a sheep in it, and haul it out to save our sheep. (Jason, 707-712, #60)

Failure to Build Constructive Relationships

I feel they made the rules on the river years ago. The book was sealed and put in cellophane. I went to all these meetings that they have on the river. They already knew what they was going to do and they would just give us a pacifier by the meetings. ... they didn't listen to a damn thing. I went to every meeting I could trying to stop this regulation of the river. And they'd ask a question that would be answered to what they wanted to hear .... If you brought up a question that they didn't want to hear the answer, you were smoothed over pretty fast. (Jason, 1089-1096, #61)

It's a bunch of environmentalists and the people that makes those decisions -- here's the sad part about the Forest Service. Most of the decisions are made in Washington, D.C., or back

east. The people making those decisions have never seen Pittsburgh Landing, Vinegar Creek, and whatever, and that is one of the major [problems]. I: Ok. So even just getting some of those decision makers to float down or to jet boat -- J: Or let local people make them. They got people here qualified to do it. (Jason, Interviewer, 2036-2044, #62)

J: Or the worse thing about it, the local folk, they may have been here local for five years. ... you'd have to live here five years before you could boat, if I had my way, just to learn how the lay of land is. ... the same way with the people working in the Forest Service. They come in here, they get promoted in or move in, transferred in. They haven't a clue. They've lived here six months. Oh, this is beautiful. Well, let's fix this, let's fix this. Why the hell fix it if it's not broke. ... If we wanted to change we would have changed it years ago, the people that lived here, you know. (Jason, 2059-2077, #63)

He was a ranger at the ... Ranger Station. And I thought he was a river friend ... I talked to [him] a lot. ... I shot trap with him. All of a sudden a friend of mine that's a surveyor said that they'd surveyed at Mackay Bar Lodge and the lodge was actually setting on Forest Service property. So they did a land trade and they did a good trade deal, except the road to go up the South Fork of the Salmon, the land no longer belonged to Mackay Bar Lodge. So I call up [the ranger] and I said, ... we jet boat up there and hike up there and hunt up there and everything else. He said, no, Jason. He said, we wouldn't do that to you. He said, we're going to trade them that piece of land, but then we're going to build a nice trail so you can pull your boat in and go right up there. He lied. They never built a trail. Not only did they not build a trial, Mackay Bar can't even let somebody go up through there now because the Forest Service said that's part of the deal. Can't let them even go up through there. ... So I don't have much respect. (Jason, 1103-1139, #64)

And the fire pan's a stupid thing too, but I played their games. The whole problem I had at first is they couldn't get their facts together. I called up the first year that I got a warning for no fire pan. I hadn't heard about it. So I called up [the ranger] down here. He was in charge of the Salmon River, so who else would you call? And he told me if I laid down ... five layers of tin foil then I could just roll it all together and that'd be adequate. And I did that, but their little Forest Service cop didn't agree with that when he come by. But his boss told me, so I could have told him where to kiss off. And so we did what they wanted. We built this damn fire pan. We had 30 pounds -- that's something in a jet boat, weight's a problem -- 30 pounds .... (Jason, 1895-1906, #65)

Also the other thing that really bugs me about them is be setting in my camp enjoying the river running by, and here come the jet boat pulling with the Forest Service and the Fish and Game. They both pack pistols into my camp like I'm a criminal. (Jason, 1143-1144, #66)

J: They want to go around and -- C: Check and see if you caught any fish that you're going to eat in camp. J: I don't mind that. What she's talking about, Fish and Game, and the guy was good, but, ... this is something that's kind of silly too. It's always a family dream to take your children out and go fishing and cook your trout or whatever. You know it's illegal? ... It says right in the rules you can't have -- you cannot harvest -- you cannot fillet a fish. You have to leave it whole. ... Well, I had it chopped up for supper. Legally you can't do that.

Now, he didn't give us a ticket. He said, I know ... you were up here fishing. You should be able to eat this fish ... Legally you cannot -- you can't -- in a field, you can't have it dressed in the field. Well, a tent, I figured was not. But no, that's not true. You don't pay tax on it, it's the field. And that's how he -- you know, and he was nice. But just bringing it up disturbed you. (Jason and Cathy, 1928-1960, #67)

... oh, I do have to say a good thing about the Forest Service. I haven't done that so — We used to have a lot of trouble in the Snake River. You couldn't get in and out of that river because the floaters would just totally cut off the ramp and there was just a fight every time you come in. They did ban that a few years ago and now they have a float pad and they make them keep a lane of traffic for jet boats. And that was a real plus over there .... (Jason, 1293-1301, #68)

The problem I've seen on the river ... and I don't know how it started, but the floater against the jet boat. But people didn't realize that it actually was river users against the Forest Service, is what it should be, because ... they was using us back and forth. Now the floaters are getting jumped on pretty bad and permits cutting down every year and whatever. And they're looking around like what happened? Well, they started it but the Forest Service used them as a scapegoat, you know. My feeling is everybody wanted to use the river and, like I said, until they started being managed we never had any problem. Then all of a sudden somebody would say, let's make this rule. Well, then the floater didn't like it or the jet boater didn't like it. ... there was no reason that we couldn't have used the river together. There's plenty of room on the river. (Jason, 850-859, #69)

Club Membership

I: When you originally joined that club, what was your reason for joining? ... J: Yeah, to meet new jet boaters, new people. Because they jet boat up — see, all these jet boats come up from Lewiston. ... And I just don't know ... you can't take me up and down the river here that I don't know 99 percent of the people and the boat just by seeing it I know who they are. So I see these boats on the Snake River and thought I should meet them. So I joined the club. And also at that time I felt it was — maybe we should organize and get together and see what's going wrong. We wanted it — they're putting more permit pressure on us every year (Interviewer, Jason, 1015-1038, #70).

Safety

Learning

Before I teach anybody to run the upper river up there, I make them ride up and back with me [inaudible] their boat at least twice. ... The five major rapids, I let them go up the river, then I run it back down, then they go up, because you can always read going up. And then after they do that four or five times, then I let them ... Basically they have to go up that river with me eight times before I'll let them solo. (Jason, 1399-1409, #71)

I: ... you kind of talked about this a little bit, but does having experience on the Snake ..., does that mean that a person can go and then run the Salmon or run the other river automatically? J: No. (Interviewer, Jason, 1600-1601, #72).

Appendex IV
Bio-sketch from Case Study 3

Jason and Cathy - Operator/Passenger, Unaffiliated

Cathy had been jet boating with Jason for about 9 years while Jason had been power boating on the Salmon for about 35 years (since he was 12). Jason primarily boats on the Salmon and the Snake, although he also had a little bit of experience on the Clearwater and Payette. Jason estimated he put about 200 hours a year on his boat, which he thought translated to using it about two weekends every month. Cathy is primarily a passenger, but has operated the boat on the Snake and the Salmon below Riggins. Due to frustration with the management of the Snake and Salmon (discussed later) Jason sold his jet boat the previous year. However they did jet boat on the Salmon the previous summer and camped on California Creek for 9 days on a friend's jet boat.

Of the two, Jason seemed to have the strongest tie to the river. He was raised a stone's throw from the river. The original motivation for getting into power boating was fishing. His father loved to fish but couldn't swim and "didn't want anything much to do with the boat" so his father had someone teach Jason how to run a boat so they could go fishing on the river (excerpt #1). As an adult, Jason has shared that knowledge and taught a number of local boaters how to run the river (excerpt #2). For 20 years now Jason has been camping on the upper Salmon at least one or two weeks a year (excerpt #3). He and Cathy even had a jet boat wedding on the river (excerpt #4).

For Jason, this long association has led to a strong bond to the place - he views it as home (excerpts #5-6). Cathy valued the place as an opportunity to have the freedom to engage in activities she enjoys (excerpt #7). In terms of other distinctive characteristics of the Salmon River, Jason notes the cleanliness of the water compared to the Snake, which is dirtier and has an odor due to being held up in reservoirs (excerpt #8). Another distinction between the Snake River and the Salmon is that the Snake has more volume, the Salmon more rocks (excerpt #9). These differences have implications for boat design - the perfect boat on the Salmon is not the perfect boat on the Snake (excerpt #10). Finally with regard to distinctive characteristics of the Salmon River, Ludwig Falls is described as a significant

boundary for jet boaters. Not only is it a particularly difficult rapid, but above Ludwig, the remoteness and lack of use makes the experience significantly more perilous (excerpt #11). As a final note with regard to distinctive features of the Salmon, Jason's comments suggest that he views the Salmon and Snake as complementary, part of a regional system for river users, rather than as alternative destinations (excerpt #12).

As excerpt #11 suggests, jet boating on the Salmon has generated a high level of respect for the river. Jason describes it as a river that can "stomp on you fast" (excerpt #13) and Jason still at times gets outs and scouts rapids he has run for 20 years because the river is constantly changing as rocks shift in rapids from year to year (excerpt #14). And even within a year Jason describes the Salmon as being two different rivers distinguished by different levels in water flow (excerpt #15). These characteristics add a dimension of challenge and thrill to the experience that may at times demand quick action on the part of passengers as well as the operators (excerpts #16-17). However, the thrill and challenge of the experience were more significant for Jason when he was younger; now other dimensions of the experience have increased in importance (Jason, #18).

As with other jet boaters, Jason and Cathy also view jet boats as a means of access to gain the other types of experiences they are seeking (excerpt #19). And, as a means of access, a jet boat is significant in part because it provides opportunities to engage the river in ways that other means of access do not allow (excerpt #20). However, the jet boat is also significant as a means of access because it provides opportunities for access by those with physical limitations due to age or disabilities. As with some of the other jet boaters interviewed, this is not just a hypothetical issue, the issue is directly relevant to Jason and Cathy's own life experiences (excerpts #21-22). The issue of access is also a significant dimension of the experience for Jason and Cathy as local residents. For them, the river is a local resource and they valued opportunities to be able to go jet boating on the spur of the moment. However, the permit system requires plans to be made months in advance and is seen as a major impediment to the way they had used the river all their lives. Further, given the variability in river conditions, Jason and Cathy felt such that situation did not make sense. On the day they were forced to choose months in advance by the current permitting system, jet boaters could find that the river was too full of debris to be safe (excerpts #23-25).

With respect to the nature of other dimensions of the experience, Cathy valued the opportunity to fish in a place without many people, the unique view that can only be seen from a boat, and the thrill of the rapids. At the same time she had difficulty isolating or singling out specific features of the experience. For her "the whole thing is just remarkable. The river itself is quite remarkable." And when asked to be more specific she noted "[laughter] I don't know. What makes the ocean so great? I don't know" (excerpt #26). Jason was attracted to jet boating for the opportunity it provides to participate in fishing and camping (excerpt #27). He describes it as a family activity. And while there has in the past been a segment of jet boaters who encouraged him to get into racing, Jason was not interested, looking instead for an opportunity to "go up there slow and look" (excerpt #28). He particularly enjoys opportunities to watch and photograph bighorn sheep "especially in November when they start banging heads" (excerpt #29). While these dimensions of the experience are tied to the physical features of the setting, Cathy and Jason also both valued intangible dimensions related to freedom of opportunity and the opportunity to relax and escape work related stress (excerpts #7, #30, #31). In part, it was the loss of these latter opportunities (which Jason attributed to the increase in regulations) that led him to sell his jet boat the previous year.

When asked about whether the fact that the Salmon runs through wilderness carried any special meaning, Cathy responded no, that she encountered all types of users up there and did not think of it as wilderness (excerpt #32). Jason initially responded no to the same question (excerpt #33). However, in discussing the issue he did point out he valued the opportunity to boat a river with no road beside it (excerpt #34) and felt that it was important to protect an area that is not populated (excerpt #35). Also, as with many of the other float boaters Jason was keenly aware both of the human history in the area and the continued presence of humans living along the river corridor (excerpt #36-38).

Jason and Cathy's use ethic emphasizes facilitating use (excerpt #39). They do recognize the growth in the number of floaters in recent years (excerpt #40) and even though early comments suggested they valued the opportunity to boat in an area without many people around (excerpt #26), Jason felt there was still plenty of room on the river for both user types (excerpt #41). Rather than numbers, they were more concerned about the nature of the interactions between users. They described a time when interactions between floaters and jet boaters were positive (excerpt #42). Memories of times when there was a sense of cooperation among the community of river users were held in high regard (excerpt #43). However, the increasing rudeness and the attitude of floaters is making it harder for Jason and Cathy to enjoy the rivers (excerpts #44-45). While most of the concern was associated with floaters, jet boaters who did not follow appropriate standards of etiquette on the river were also viewed with irritation (excerpt #46). The increase in rudeness was attributed primarily to outfitted groups rather than private floaters (excerpt #47-48). Cathy felt in part that this was because floaters on outfitted trips were being sold on the quietness of the setting and that unexpected encounters with jet boats might ruin that experience in their eyes (excerpt #48). Jason attributed it to selfish motives - wanting the rivers to themselves. In fact he attributed much of the problem to outfitters who were trying to increase their opportunities to profit (excerpt #49-50). But again, as excerpts #43, 46, and 51 indicate, it is the nature of the interaction among river users that seems most significant rather than distinctions such as commercial/noncommercial or the floater/jet boater.

In spite of an increasing concern for how interactions among visitors are affecting the quality of experiences, Jason views the Forest Service's efforts to develop regulations and manage use in a highly negative light. He cynically views regulations and current management actions (e.g., worrying about fire pans) as simply attempts to control people in order to create jobs so the agency can survive now that timber harvesting has declined (excerpts #51-54). An important question is how Jason arrived at such a cynical view. Comments addressed in the preceding paragraph would suggest, it is not due to lack of concern about issues related to visitor use. Nor is it lack of concern about the resource, as previous excerpts (#5-6) indicate he views the Salmon as his home. And excerpts #55 and 56 reflect a concern for stewardship of the resource and a sense of pride in terms of his ability to leave no trace when camping. He also believes that jet boater users are more able to do so compared to floaters. Instead of lack of interest, responses throughout the interview suggest three reasons why Jason has such a cynical view of Forest Service management: (1) his understanding of what the concept of management should entail; (2) what he views as the apparent lack rationale for many of the management actions; and (3) lack of a positive relationship with the Forest Service as an agency.

With regard to the first issue, Jason and Cathy's comments throughout the interview suggest that they associate management with actions to care for the land (cleaning up trash) or to facilitate use (maintaining trails) (e.g., excerpts #39, 54). Actions to regulate or re-

strict behavior seem to be viewed as outside the realm of what is appropriate for the Forest Service.

With regard to the second issue, apparent lack of a rational basis for management actions, two examples will be used to illustrate views Jason expressed in the interview. The first issue is related to the removal of toilet facilities in the Wilderness. His impression was that the "pack it out" policy is an unrealistic expectation (especially in light of the outfitted float trips). His observations on the river seem to confirm this. Further he feels the policy is made all the more irrational in light of the fact that it was implemented just as river use was dramatically increasing (excerpts #57-59). The second example involves his favorite animal in the region (see excerpt #29), big horn sheep. According to Jason, a few years ago the bighorn sheep population started to decline due to disease, researchers needed a warm carcass to run tests, and the agency would not approve the use of a helicopter to allow this (excerpt #60). Jason could not understand this decision when a valued resource was at stake. As these examples illustrate, Jason's cynicalness toward management actions do not reflect a disregard for the resource or simply narrow self interest, rather underlying them is a different perspective on the appropriateness and consequences of management actions taken to protect the resource.

The third cause of Jason's cynical attitude toward management is the overall absence of a positive relationship with the Forest Service. This is reflected in a number of responses through out the interview and seems to have several causes. The first cause stems from the perception that the planning/decision making process lacks legitimacy. Based on his experiences, Jason feels that the Forest Service is not truly seeking input in public meetings and that the decisions for how the area will be managed are decided before the public is approached (excerpt #61). Further, like some of the other jet boaters interviewed, he feels that Forest Service decision making is being driven by easterners who have never even seen the river, rather than local agency personnel whom he described as qualified (excerpt #62). On further reflection though, like some other jet boaters interviewed, he was increasingly pessimistic of the local Forest Service decision makers due to what he perceived as a rapid rate of turnover in Forest Service personnel. He feels newcomers start making management decisions before they have been in the area long enough to "to learn how the lay of land is" (excerpt #63).

A second factor inhibiting a constructive relationship between Jason and the Forest Service stems from personal experiences in which Jason feels the Forest Service, in one form or another, has not lived up to its word. Specifically, Jason related two stories to illustrate why he so mistrusts the agency; one related to a trail closure (excerpt #64) and the other related to his experience with fire pans (excerpt #65).

A third factor associated with the absence of a positive relationship with the Forest Service is related to the nature of interactions Jason has had with Forest Service personnel in the field. As suggested in excerpts #65 and 66, at times he feels as if Forest Service personnel act like cops and that he is being treated like a criminal. While it is tempting to view this simply as an intolerance for being regulated, a careful analysis suggests something deeper. For example with respect to the fire pan issue described in excerpt #65 - Jason made a sincere attempt to comply when he first learned of the regulation. And excerpt #67 illustrates a situation where he held a positive image of a game warden even though he was enforcing a regulation Jason found somewhat absurd. This may link back to or reflect his use ethic in which it was his perception of the underlying attitude and nature of the interaction that was the most significant factor in his perception of users. In other words, regu-

lations, or at least their enforcement, may be deemed more acceptable simply by the virtue of a positive relationship with the agency.

Despite negative examples in the preceding discussion, there were some positive interactions with the Forest Service. He did mention that he had friends who worked for the Forest Service and earlier in life he had even fought fires for the Forest Service. Further, he did recount one action taken by the Forest Service to manage visitors that improved a problematic situation for which he was appreciative (excerpt #68). While it is tempting to view this as being satisfied only when his narrow self interests are served, the discussion presented above suggests there are deeper issues involved. Taken as a whole, the overall pattern of interactions are such that Jason is not left feeling he has a positive relationship with the agency. This, in turn, has led to suspicion about the agency's intentions including a perception that agency is, in fact, a major source of the conflict (excerpt #69).

Although Jason is currently not a member of a jet boat organization, he had been at one time. He indicated he joined for two reasons. The first, so he could meet and come to know the jet boaters on the Snake, reflected what seems to be one of the major dimensions of his use ethic - positive relationships among users. The second reason was political, reflecting the belief that such an organization would be more effective in protecting the interests of jet boaters (excerpt #70).

Finally as noted earlier, Jason had helped many other jet boaters in the area learn to run the Salmon (excerpt #2). His method was to first have the novice boater ride with him as he instructs and then let them navigate the rapids with him in the boat. As a rule of thumb he had novice boaters ride with him 8 times on the river before he allowed them to solo (excerpt #71). Finally, he was of the opinion that experience on other rivers like the Snake did not mean a person would be able to run the Salmon (excerpt #72).